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Abstract 
This thesis has aimed to explore an application of Multibiometrics to secured wireless 
communications. The medium of study for this purpose included Wi-Fi, 3G, and 
WiMAX, over which simulations and experimental studies were carried out to assess 
the performance. In specific, restriction of access to authorized users only is provided 
by a technique referred to hereafter as multibiometric cryptosystem. In brief, the 
system is built upon a complete challenge/response methodology in order to obtain a 
high level of security on the basis of user identification by fingerprint and further 
confirmation by verification of the user through text-dependent speaker recognition. 
First is the enrolment phase by which the database of watermarked fingerprints with 
memorable texts along with the voice features, based on the same texts, is created by 
sending them to the server through wireless channel.  
Later is the verification stage at which claimed users, ones who claim are genuine, are 
verified against the database, and it consists of five steps. Initially faced by the 
identification level, one is asked to first present one’s fingerprint and a memorable 
word, former is watermarked into latter, in order for system to authenticate the 
fingerprint and verify the validity of it by retrieving the challenge for accepted user. 
The following three steps then involve speaker recognition including the user 
responding to the challenge by text-dependent voice, server authenticating the 
response, and finally server accepting/rejecting the user.  
In order to implement fingerprint watermarking, i.e. incorporating the memorable 
word as a watermark message into the fingerprint image, an algorithm of five steps 
has been developed. The first three novel steps having to do with the fingerprint 
image enhancement (CLAHE with 'Clip Limit', standard deviation analysis and 
sliding neighborhood) have been followed  with further two steps for embedding, and 
extracting the watermark into the enhanced fingerprint image utilising Discrete 
Wavelet Transform (DWT). 
In the speaker recognition stage, the limitations of this technique in wireless 
communication have been addressed by sending voice feature (cepstral coefficients) 
instead of raw sample. This scheme is to reap the advantages of reducing the 
transmission time and dependency of the data on communication channel, together 
with no loss of packet. Finally, the obtained results have verified the claims. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
Enhancing the security in various scenarios such as used for national identification, 
network access and border pass, has resulted in an unprecedented growth in the use of 
biometrics. The ever-increasing application of biometrics extends also to wireless 
world for the obvious reason of important role security plays in this field. An example 
can be found in authorized mobile devices where an authorization based on biometric 
identification allows the user to gain access to data such as needed for bank 
transactions. In addition, the recent upgrading of the E-Health and E-Commerce to 
M-Health and M-Commerce [1-5] increased the contribution of biometric 
authentication in disparate wireless applications (e.g. [6, 7]) and this is expected to 
increase even more in the near future. Wireless networks have significant advantages 
over wired networks such as elimination of cables and freedom of mobility. Whereas 
the disadvantages are lower channel capacity (i.e. limited spectrum available, power 
restrictions, noise levels), Denial of Service (DoS), eavesdropping (signal is in the 
open air and data is not encrypted unless the protocol is encrypted), theft or loss of 
device (due to size and portability) and Masquerading (i.e. rogue clients pretend to be 
legitimate endpoint), etc. Currently the use of wireless networking is expanding way 
faster than before by the introduction of new technologies such as 4G, and WiMax. 
These networks regardless of whether they use WiMAX or Wi-Fi LANs as defined in 
the IEEE 802.11 standard are inherently less secure than wired counterparts due to the 
lack of physical infrastructure [8, 9].  
The main issue here is making sure to have a control measure in place prior to 
establishing a connection, so that access is restricted to the authorized users only. 
Biometrics can deliver outstandingly here as compared to the traditional solutions for 
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access control, taking into account the rare chances of data being lost or stolen. The 
only issue is that there is no single biometric technology, which suffices in terms of 
protecting from various types of threats. Unimodal biometrics in the context of 
security raises several design limitations such as noise in input data, intra-class 
variation, interoperability, vulnerability against spoof attacks and inter-class 
similarities [32].  
Some of these restrictions can be alleviated through multimodal biometric approaches 
by providing multiple evidences of the same identity [35]. As with multimodal 
biometric, there are inherent problems with utilizing identification systems in open 
area such as wireless communications that seem likely to prevent further attempts at 
improving such approach. The main problems are deeply rooted starting first with the 
mobility of wireless systems and the availability in large numbers, making the system 
more intolerable against the spoofing and attack. The second issue is the 
incompatibility of some biometric technologies and algorithms to allow it be 
employed over wireless medium. There are other problems as well voting against 
using multibiometric, the biometric technology market is changing rapidly, standards 
are not widely supported, and performance is depending on the operation 
environment. In addition, life cycle cost of a biometric technology, i.e. enrollment, 
integration, and maintenance is a source of concern. Last but not least, parallel to 
improving the biometric technologies, various types of attacks and forges are being 
reintroduced and hence, suggested multibiometric system should be able to adapt and 
evolve. Therefore, once the compatible multibiometric algorithm is found, analysis of 
the wireless environment must be perfected to avoid any possibility of future attacks. 
While in a system based on one-to-one matching database can be decentralized, in 
wireless applications on the other hand it should take the opposite form. This means 
the database as well as data should be protected against the imposter attack during 
transmission and accessing database. In other words, the acquired sample must be 
transmitted securely to the location of template in order to perform at the decision 
level. Otherwise, incorrect storage or transmission in a biometric system can affect 
the overall performance of the system especially in wireless communication.  
All in all, storing biometric features in a server is not an appropriate technique unless; 
some countermeasures are employed to make the data inaccessible for imposter (e.g. 
encryption or anonymous techniques). This thesis is about implementing an encrypted 
multiple biometric system over wireless networks.  
 3 
1.1 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The main aim of this research is the development and investigation of the 
multibiometric cryptosystem based on combining the fingerprint authentication with 
that of speaker recognition as access control for secure wireless communication. In 
addition, this research investigates Wi-Fi, 3G, and WiMAX platforms as end-to-end 
communication channels. As a final point, it will carry out simulation studies of a 
number of typical scenarios. Such a system when fully developed could replace PIN 
or ID card as authentication in any feasible application (e.g. commercial and health 
care environments). Aside from the main purpose, this research also looks at various 
performance measurements of selected biometric devices and explains what each 
measurement means and how it can affect whether or not the user of the device is 
being accepted or rejected. As mentioned above, implementing biometric solutions 
comes with inherent problems, mainly the accuracy level and increased cost of 
maintenance. The final aim of this research is to recognize the base biometric 
identifications and to study the architectures and solutions for merging these 
biometric implementations and simulation of them to yield the highest level of 
accuracy and reliability. The conclusion and further work will highlight the process of 
this project from beginning to the end, indicating the ways to improve on. The 
following steps are taken in order to meet the main objectives of this research: 
• To study and investigate the feasible biometric identification over wireless 
devices (e.g. laptop, PDA and, Mobile Phone); 
• To develop and investigate the multibiometric cryptosystem based on fingerprint 
authentication combined with speaker recognition as access control for secure 
wireless communication. To do this, main requirements for either of the components 
are defined and addressed; 
• To revise and investigate the existing weaknesses in the prevailing security of 
fingerprint and speaker recognition in wireless communication (e.g. 3G and 
WiMAX); 
• To develop and investigate the performance of a three-step novel approach 
proposed for preprocessing the fingerprint identification, using CLAHE (Contrast 
Limited Adaptive Histogram Equalization) together with applying 'Clip Limit', 
standard deviation analysis and sliding neighborhood as fingerprint image 
enhancement algorithm;   
 4 
• To design a method to embed and extract the watermark message into and from 
the enhanced fingerprint image by using the DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform); 
• To assess the performance of multibiometric security system to implement secure 
and real time wireless communication, this is studied over Wi-Fi, 3G, and WiMAX 
platforms as end-to-end communication channels.  
1.2 Proposed Multibiometric Cryptosystem for Implementing Secure 
Wireless Communication 
In brief, the system is built upon a complete challenge/response methodology in order 
to obtain a high level of security on the basis of user identification by fingerprint and 
further confirmation by verification of the user through text-dependent speaker 
recognition. This proposed system consists of two parts, enrolment, and verification, 
which are detailed, in Chapter 5. First, the enrolment phase by which the database of 
watermarked fingerprints with memorable texts along with the voice features, based 
on the same texts, is created by sending them to the server through wireless channel. 
Later in the verification stage, claimed users, ones who claims are genuine, are 
verified against the database, and it consists of five steps. Initially faced by the 
identification level, one is asked to first present one’s fingerprint and a memorable 
word, the former is watermarked into latter, in order for the system to authenticate the 
fingerprint and verify its validity by retrieving the challenge for accepted user. The 
following three steps then involve speaker recognition including the user responding 
to the challenge by text-dependent voice, server authenticating the response, and 
finally server accepting/rejecting the user. Figure 1.1 illustrates the different stages of 
this proposed system from beginning to the end. 
In order to implement fingerprint watermarking, i.e. incorporating the memorable 
word as a watermark message into the fingerprint image, an algorithm of five steps is 
developed and explained in Chapter 6. The first three novel steps having to do with 
the fingerprint image enhancement (CLAHE with 'Clip Limit', standard deviation 
analysis and sliding neighborhood) are followed with two further steps for 
embedding, and extracting the watermark into the enhanced fingerprint image 
utilizing Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). 
In the speaker recognition stage, the limitations of this technique in wireless 
communication are addressed by sending voice feature (cepstral coefficients) instead 
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of raw sample in Chapter 3. This scheme is to reap the advantages of reducing the 
transmission time and dependency of the data on communication channel, together 
with no loss of packet. Finally, in order to assess the performance of proposed system 
in wireless communication, simulations and experimental studies have been carried 
out for each phase in Chapter 6. The medium of study for this purpose includes Wi-
Fi, 3G, and WiMAX. 
Figure 1.1: Block Diagram of Proposed Multibiometric System in Wireless Communication 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
The following are the major claimed contributions to knowledge of this research: 
•  To improve the performance requirements of unimodal biometric and to cover its 
limitations, a compatible multibiometric system has been introduced based on 
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combining the fingerprint authentication with that of voice recognition as access 
control for secure wireless communication system.  
• The possible limitations of fingerprint and voice recognition in wireless 
communication have been investigated and multibiometric cryptosystem has been 
proposed and developed to address these limitations based on the watermarking the 
enhanced fingerprint image with the same text, which is used as text dependent 
speaker recognition (Figure 1.1). 
• A novel three-step preprocessing for the fingerprint identification has been 
developed, using CLAHE (contrast limited adaptive histogram equalization) together 
with applying 'Clip Limit', standard deviation analysis and sliding neighborhood as 
image enhancement algorithm. The motivations for developing this method, its 
phases, and its possible advantages through a simulated investigation have been 
presented. 
• To increase the security of fingerprint image in wireless communication, a new 
watermarking technique has been introduced and developed based on the embedding 
and extracting the watermark message in to enhanced fingerprint image by using the 
DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform). 
• The acceptable results have been achieved by applying and analyzing the effect of 
the proposed multibiometric cryptosystem and watermark algorithm to implement 
secure and real time wireless communication systems and Wi-Fi, 3G, and WiMAX 
platforms as end-to-end communication channels have been investigated. 
In the following Chapters, a detailed description of each of these contributions is 
provided. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis  
The main body of the thesis comprises seven major Chapters, starting with the 
introduction in Chapter 1, and an Appendix containing the author list of publications. 
Chapter 2 presents an extensive review of literature on the application of biometrics 
and considers the implementation of these multiple biometric system over wireless 
communication system. This Chapter starts with a review of the advantages of 
biometrics and its requirements in section 2.1. In section 2.2, the various biometric 
techniques are compared in terms of weaknesses, strengths, cost, accuracy, 
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distinctiveness perceived intrusiveness, and feasibility in wireless applications. 
Section 2.3 reviews the different types of biometric modules and processes. Section 
2.4 indicates the difficulties and restrictions of unimodal biometric systems. Sections 
2.5 propose appropriate biometrics over wireless application. Section 2.6 covers the 
rewards of unimodal biometric systems by multimodal biometric systems. Section 2.7 
categorizes a fusion strategy for multibiometric in three categories, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each fusion are discussed. Finally, section 2.8 is a 
conclusion of this Chapter.  
With the main concern being how to provide access only to authorized users, Chapter 
3 is devoted to investigating the limitations and merits of voice recognition as a way 
of securing wireless networks. First in section 3.1, speaker recognition as applied to 
wireless technology is investigated. In section 3.2, characteristics of this method are 
introduced. In section 3.3, a review of some of the well-known and popular features 
includes Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs), Cepstral Mean Subtraction 
(CMS), and RASTA filtering is presented. Section 3.4 describes some of the most 
famous classification and pattern-matching techniques that include Template 
Matching (TM), Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), Vector Quantization (VQ), Hidden 
Markov models (HMM), and Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs). Section 3.5 
summarizes these reviewed techniques from beginning to the end suggesting ways to 
improve. Finally, based on this analysis, the most suitable speaker recognition 
algorithm to apply over wireless communications is selected and presented in section 
3.6.  
Chapter 4 presents a review of possible techniques to detect liveness of fingerprint in 
patents and published literature. In this Chapter, an attempt has been made to assess 
and evaluate the performance of each technique and discuss their effectiveness and 
possible limitations. In Chapter 4, these methods are categorized into either voluntary 
or involuntary. Section 4.1 is devoted to critical review of various types of fingerprint 
scanning techniques. Section 4.2 reviews different kind of attack at sensor level and 
appropriate countermeasures are proposed. Finally, Section 4.3 is designated to 
summary and discussion. 
Although, the fingerprint authentication system presents certain advantages from the 
protection viewpoint, it is from the enrolment to the verification level susceptible to 
various types of threats and attacks. Therefore, providing the software, hardware, and 
advanced algorithms to deal with this intolerability against spoofing and fraud, 
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remains an issue of concern when employing fingerprint in wireless device. These 
specific aspects are investigated in Chapter 5. In Section 5.1, security challenges and 
requirements in wireless applications are explored. Section 5.2 describes different 
fingerprint image storage in wireless application. In Section 5.3, a review of the 
possible attacks at template and data communication level is carried out. Section 5.4 
presents various countermeasures and protection methods against these possible 
attacks. Finally, limitations of using fingerprint techniques will be addressed through, 
the use of watermarked fingerprint with text dependent speaker recognition as 
proposed system in Section 5.5.  
Chapter 6 is organized as follows: section 6.1 has introduced fingerprint 
characteristics. Section 6.2 provided a literature review with the aim of giving a full 
account of the technique resulting in desirable fingerprint identification with high 
performance. In section 6.3 performance of a novel three-step procedure for the 
fingerprint image enhancement are investigated, using CLAHE (contrast limited 
adaptive histogram equalization) together with applying 'Clip Limit', standard 
deviation analysis and sliding neighborhood as stages during processing of the 
fingerprint image. Section 6.4 is designated to develop and evaluate the two-step 
process for the fingerprint watermarking technique, embedding the watermark 
message and extraction this message from the watermarked fingerprint image. 
Section 6.5 described the methodology and the design of the five-step 
challenge/response process based on proposed method in Chapter 5. Section 6.6 is 
devoted to the simulation methods and environment of projected system. Subsection 
6.6.1 and 6.6.2 present the simulation results for sending watermarked fingerprints 
and voice features over WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G. Subsection 6.6.3 is designated to the 
analysis of the presented results and section 6.7 is dedicated to summary of this 
chapter. 
Finally, Chapter 7 is dedicated to conclusion of this research and suggestion for 
further research that may improve the accuracy and security of the proposed system.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review  
Introduction 
The recent improvements and innovations in networking, communication, and 
mobility, particularly in wireless network such as Wi-Fi and WiMAX, have increased 
the demand for security and identification in these fields. In comparison to wired 
networks, wireless technologies are less robust against various types of threats and 
attacks, due primarily to mobility and the availability of data in open areas [9]. 
Inherent problems with utilizing identification systems in open applications like 
wireless communication seem likely to prevent further attempts to improve this 
approach. This limitation can be addressed by using biometrics as an access control, 
which has significant benefits when compared with traditional methods such as the 
inability to be lost or stolen. However, unimodal biometrics still has some significant 
limitations such as noise in the inputs data, which can be covered by using multiple 
biometric traits [35]. This Chapter presents an extensive review of literature on the 
application of biometrics and considers the implementation of these multiple 
biometric system over wireless communication system.  
2.1   The Advantages and Requirements of Unimodal Biometrics 
In the past, only passwords, (“what you know”) and ID cards (“what you have”) were 
known to restrict access to systems but these methods can be lost, stolen, or easily 
forged. The solution to this matter is biometrics, which cannot be borrowed, stolen, or 
forgotten. The word biometric comes from the Greek words bios (life) and metrikos 
(measure). Biometrics is based on individual biological (e.g. fingerprints, hand 
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geometry, and facial recognition) or behavioral characteristics (e.g. voice and 
signature) of the human body (“what you are”).   
In the case of a password-based system, the security of the entire system is only as 
safe as the weakest password and if the password is disclosed, there is no way for the 
system to distinguish between the genuine user and an imposter. Biometric based 
systems are significantly difficult to copy, share, and distribute. They also cannot be 
forgotten or disclosed, since biometrics data systems require the user to be present at 
the point of recognition. At the same time, increase in the demand of identification 
security in sensitive areas and communication devices have increased the contribution 
of biometric authentication in various applications such as E-Health and E-
Commerce. Therefore, it is not complicated to understand the necessity of biometric 
traits as identification in various applications and scenarios. 
2.1.1 List of Requirements 
There are number of firm requirements for both physical and behavioural human 
characteristics, which should be satisfied in order to be an acceptable biometric 
technique [10, 26, 32]. These requirements for such characteristics comprise: 
1. Permanence: characteristic should be invariant with time; 
2. Universality: possessed and observable on all people; 
3. Uniqueness: different across users; 
4. Performance: achievable recognition accuracy and speed;  
5. Unforgeable (circumvention): not defeated by disguise or counterfeit;  
6. Acceptability: acceptance by user, not objectionable to display by users; 
7. Collectability: the characteristic can be measured quantitatively. 
In addition to the aforementioned requirements, there are a number of evaluation 
criteria in biometric techniques over wireless application that leads this research to 
design and implement successful security system. 
8. Feasibility of the techniques on wireless device; 
9. Failure to acquire rates (Reliability); 
10. Scalability, especially for use with large data bases;  
11. Accessibility: easily displayed to a sensor; 
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12. Enrollment time (Is the failure to enroll acceptable);  
13. Environmental restrictions, limitations, hindrances; 
14. Integration with other operations or policies;  
15. Business process and policies requirements;   
16. Management of enrollment;  
17. Vulnerabilities and its consequence for each biometric technology; 
18. Counter measures (Is the biometric system robust against spoofing);   
19. Privacy issues. 
2.2 A Comparison of Biometric Traits over Wireless Communication 
As shown in the previous sub section (2.1.1), satisfying the following requirements is 
mandatory for all biometric identifiers. These requirements are universality, 
distinctiveness, permanence, collectability, performance, acceptability, and 
circumvention. Each biometric system should be harmless for the user, have 
acceptable recognition accuracy, and speed with reasonable resource requirements 
[10]. In fact, there is no best single biometric, because there is no set of criteria for all 
situations. Nevertheless, each biometric has its strengths and limitations and the 
choice typically depends on the application but being sufficiently robust to various 
fraudulent methods is a minimum requirement for the appropriate technology. In this 
section, several well known biometric techniques are described, analyzing limitations, 
robustness and the feasibility of these techniques on wireless devices, and evaluating 
authentic applications. 
2.2.1 Face:  
This technique is based on machine recognition of faces from still and video images 
and it has a high degree of acceptability due to the fact that method of obtaining face 
images is not disturbing. Currently the two techniques being used as identification 
based on face recognition comprise: (a) Transform approach [11, 59], in which the 
universe of the facial image domain is represented using a set of orthonormal basis 
vectors and the most popular basis vectors are eigenfaces. The approach transforms 
face images into a small set of characteristic feature images known as eigenfaces [56]. 
Two faces are identical if they are sufficiently “close” in the eigenface feature space 
that is resulting from the covariance analysis of the face image population. However, 
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as it is shown experimentally by Belhumeur et al. [15], the proposed “Fisherface” 
method has error rates that are lower than Eigenface technique. (b) Attribute-based 
approach: facial attributes such as nose and eyes, are extracted from the face image 
and the invariance of geometric properties among the face landmark features is used 
for recognizing features [12]. However, this method is non-intrusive, it may suffer 
from facial masquerade, and research studies show that it is not easy to develop face 
recognition techniques, which do not suffer from problems with the effects of aging, 
facial expressions, slight variations in the imaging environment and variations in pose 
of face with respect to camera [50]. The main issues to utilize face recognition in 
wireless devices are possibility of face appearance change and imaging conditions. 
Despite this, recently cameras have been successfully integrated into mobile devices 
providing a novel possibility of using face recognition biometrics [14].  
2.2.2 Hand and Finger Geometry: 
This method scans some features related to a human hand such as length of fingers, 
width, thickness, and curvatures, which are relatively invariant for each person. In 
this technique, patterns can be extracts frontal and side view images of the palm flatly 
placed on a panel with outstretched fingers. However, finger geometry is not as 
mature as that for hand geometry, it is more compact and as it is claimed, more 
accurate than hand geometry. The main advantage of this system is its compact size 
and the requirements of the hand are very small (9 bytes) which is a valuable feature 
for bandwidth and memory limited systems (e.g. mobile phone). Several hand 
geometry technologies have developed such as electro-mechanical devices and solid-
state electronic scanners. This technique can protects privacy of the user better than 
other biometrics such as fingerprint due to complexity of templates to be accurately 
“reverse engineered” to identify the users. In addition, hand geometry has a high level 
of acceptability as an identity authentication application and it could be used for blind 
persons. However, it suffers from limited distinctiveness and limited flexibility of the 
palm, e.g. those suffering from arthritis. Furthermore, it is not unique, permanent (the 
hands change due to natural, age and environmental changes), and it cannot be used 
as identification of an individual from a large population of identities [13, 50]. In 
order to limit the constraints usually posed on the environment and the placement of 
the hand, Malassiotis et al. [16] proposed a biometric authentication system based on 
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measurements of the user’s three-dimensional (3-D) hand geometry. This technique 
relies on a novel real-time and low-cost 3-D sensor that generates a dense range 
image of the scene and therefore, greatly contributes to the unobtrusiveness of the 
system. Furthermore, hand geometry is not affected by variations in illumination, 
obstructions, etc. In spite of the above advantages, it is not feasible to employ hand 
and finger geometry in majority of wireless devices due to the sensor size 
requirement [40].  
2.2.3  Iris:  
This technique is based on visual texture of the human iris, which can be determined 
by the chaotic morphogenetic processes during embryonic development and it is 
claimed to be distinctive for each person and each eye. The most unique phenotypic 
feature visible in a person’s face is the detailed texture of each eye’s iris [50, 57] and 
Iris recognition is one of the most powerful techniques for biometric identification 
ever developed [53]. An ordinary CCD camera with a resolution of 512 dpi captures 
images. The identification error rate in this technique is very small and the constant 
length position invariant code is a fast method of iris recognition. Acquiring an iris 
image requires the patience of the user in order for the image of iris to be registered in 
the inner imaging area and to ensure the iris is at a fixed distance from the focal plane 
of the camera [50]. In a different approach, Matey et al. [53], present Iris on the Move 
(IOM) system that is, enable to capture of iris images of sufficient quality for iris 
recognition while the subject is moving at a normal walking pace through a 
minimally confining portal. However, iris recognition is not generally employed in 
mobile devices, due to the imaging conditions, uncomfortable operation, and low 
acceptability [14].  
2.2.4 Keystroke Dynamics:   
This technique is based on the hypothesis that in typing a phrase or a string of 
characters, the typing dynamics or timing pattern can be measured and employed for 
identity verification. In addition, the authentication method based on keystroke 
dynamics can be used to verify the ongoing presence of the user at an input device 
(e.g. a user could be periodically prompted to type in the password) [17]. Although 
this behavioral biometric is not unique enough for each user as a sign of identity has, 
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it can be used for the design of more robust authentication systems than traditional 
password when implemented in conjunction with traditional schemes [21]. However, 
this identifier suffers from various weaknesses. For instance, it is not unique enough 
to establish the identity of the user and it depends on the keyboard and person’s 
emotions. In addition, it is less acceptable if the keyboard is continuously monitored 
[14].  
2.2.5 Retinal Scan:  
This technique is based on capturing the surface of the retina and comparing nerve 
patterns and blood vessels in the retina. The main advantage of this system is its 
accuracy since it is not easy to impersonate or replicate. However, it is not generally 
accepted, as the user must be trained to use it. The user is required to look into an 
eyepiece and focus on a specific spot in the visual field. In addition, retinal 
vasculature can be influenced by medical conditions (e.g., hypertension) and the 
required hardware is expensive compared to other methods [50]. Therefore, these 
issues reduce the public acceptability of retinal scan based biometrics and prevent the 
application of retina scans in wireless devices.  
2.2.6 Signature:  
This method comprises each user signing his/her name, known as a signature. As 
compared to an offline signature, an online signature is more robust as it stores 
dynamic features like azimuth, elevation, and pressure signals in addition to position 
trajectories [54]. Signature is a behavioral biometric and it is influenced by physical 
and emotional conditions of the signatories [18, 22]. Generally, there are two 
approaches to automatic online signature verification including parametric and 
functional. The parametric approach is based on comparing specific features of 
signatures that are typically global (e.g. total time taken). In the parametric approach, 
a signature is described compactly therefore; the enrolment data size is considerably 
small and constant. In addition, it is more reliable against the variations in local 
regions, which are common in signatures. While function-based approach relies on 
comparing specific functions such as position coordinates versus time, velocity, 
acceleration each versus time along the entire signature [54, 55]. The permanence in 
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this technique is arguable and it is not secure enough due to the possibility of the 
change in the signature [14].   
2.2.7 Voice:  
Voice is a characteristic of an individual, which is not expected to be satisfactorily 
unique to permit identification of a person from a large database of identities [50]. 
Speaker recognition is the process of automatically recognizing the user by using 
speaker specific information included in speech waves. Speaker recognition can be 
classified into speaker identification (process of determining from which of the 
registered users a given utterance comes) and speaker verification (process of 
accepting or rejecting the identity claim of a user). In addition, speaker recognition 
can be categorized in two different ways include text-dependent and text-independent 
methods. Text-dependent is based on restricting utterances to predetermined words or 
sentences that are same for both training and recognition while Text-independent is 
not based on a specific text being spoken [23]. Although, it is more difficult to design 
a text-independent system than a text-dependent system, it is more robust against 
fraud. Despite, speaker recognition is an acceptable biometric in the majority of 
societies and of course over the phone, it is not sufficiently distinctive as an identifier 
in large databases and the quality of the voice signal can be degraded by the 
communication channel [32]. In addition, this technique is less acceptable in public 
places, due to the privacy issue, and also a person’s voice can be changed 
unintentionally because of emotional, health conditions, stress, or even on purpose as 
some people can imitate others. This technique has already been applied to wireless 
devices, particularly mobile phones and majority of the wireless devices. Although, 
voice is not considered for all purposes and environment have a strong impact on the 
performance [14], sometimes it is the only possible biometric trait with sufficient 
security (as a verification method) to be used over the phones or wireless devices.  
2.2.8 Fingerprints:  
Fingerprinting is one of the more mature technologies used in criminal investigations 
and it can be captured either by scanning an inked impression of a finger or by using 
a live-scan fingerprint scanner. A fingerprint image is made of a spatial map of the 
friction ridges of the skin and the valleys between them. In order to find out if two 
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images are a matching pair, an algorithm of identification is needed to compare two 
fingerprints by examining the "landmarks" of ridges and valleys. In the majority of 
the current fingerprint matching systems, the features employed in the matching 
process are the fingerprint minutiae, mainly ridge bifurcation and ridge ending. This 
is due to the following reason: (1) minutiae capture much of the individual 
information, (2) minutiae-based representations are storage efficient, and (3) minutiae 
detection is relatively robust to various sources of fingerprint degradation. Minutiae-
based fingerprint matching transforms fingerprint image into a minutiae map and 
generally involves preprocessing, ridge direction and ridge width, enhancement, and 
minutiae detection [52, 60]. Using fingerprints as an identification system is very 
popular today and has almost become a synonym for biometric systems. 
Fingerprinting is suitable for a large number of recognition applications e.g. the FBI 
fingerprint database exceeded 200 million fingerprints and is growing continuously. 
In addition, fingerprints are very distinctive and fingerprint details are permanent 
even if there are temporary cuts or bruises on the skin [18].  
 
Figure 2.1: From left to right Lock, Corporate [27], PDA with fingerprint, and Fingerprint Cards 
provide in mobile phone [58] 
Fingerprint sensors are one of the most accepted and developed biometric techniques 
in wireless device since it is quite small and relatively inexpensive with good 
performance. In addition, it is an appropriate technique for a large number of 
recognition applications. This technique is recognized by various mobile and 
handheld companies as an authentication method in their devices such as personal 
digital assistant or mobile phone that offers biometric security through a built-in 
fingerprint scanner (Figure 2.1) to restrict access to the devices. In addition, various 
wireless devices include fixed and mobile equipment with fingerprint recognition 
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sensor such as Lock Secure, and Corporate Access Control Locks (Figure 2.1). Small 
size, inexpensive price, good performance of sensors, convenience, and user-
friendliness are the key drivers for embedding fingerprint sensor in wireless devices 
such as notebooks and mobile phones. The major problem in utilizing fingerprints in 
mobile device is the varying image quality due to population characteristics and 
environmental factors [14]. Therefore, providing the software to deal with the 
alignment and quality of the image is an issue of concern when employing 
fingerprints in wireless devices. These issues will be further discussed in Chapter 6.   
2.2.10 Biometrics Market and Revenue 
Iris, DNA, retina and fingerprints are the most universal, unique and permanent 
biometrics. In addition, user acceptability is high when features can be obtained in a 
non-obtrusive way therefore; voice, face, and fingerprints are the best biometric 
identifiers in terms of acceptability. According to the biometric market report by the 
International Biometric Group (IBG) while fingerprints, iris, and alternative biometric 
technologies are still expanding, other biometric techniques, lack the potential to 
obtain market relevance [29]. Competition in biometric technologies pricing is very 
hard and therefore it is important to trade off between the benefits of new 
technologies and the costs associated with it.  
   
Figure 2.2: Biometric Market Report of International Biometric Group [29] 
Figure 2.2 shows the Biometric market report of various biometric traits in the year 
2009. Fingerprint-based biometric systems were the leading biometric technology in 
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terms of market share with more than 60% (AFIS/live scan and fingerprint) of 
biometric revenue and face recognition was second with 11.4%. In addition, 
fingerprints with more than 50% and face scan with 12.9% were leading technologies 
in 2007 that is reported by International Biometric Group, so from 2007 until now 
using fingerprint technology is increasing. Figure 2.3 shows annual revenue 
projections from 2009 through 2014 for the eight leading biometric technologies as 
well as multimodal biometrics. Therefore, it is not difficult to predict the leadings 
biometric technologies for 2020. Every biometric technology is categorized based on 
the scores it attains in terms of ease-of-use, cost, accuracy, FAR, FRR, size, 
habituation, and distinctiveness perceived intrusiveness. In fact, the market for each 
biometric technology is directly dependent on the strengths and weaknesses of that 
technology. 
 
Figure 2.3: Annual revenue projections from 2009 through 2014[29] 
2.3 Types of Biometric Modules and Processes 
A biometric system is designed using the four main modules. These modules are 
sensor (captures the biometric data of an Individual), feature extraction (the acquired 
data is processed to extract a set of features), matcher (matching scores are generated 
by compare the extracted features against the stored templates), and system database 
module (which is used to store the biometric templates of the enrolled users). There 
are two distinct phases in the operation of biometric systems, enrolment, and 
verification/identification. The template is created during enrolment process; the 
enrolment process may require the individual to provide multiple instances of 
biometrics trait. Identification is commonly defined as the matching of a single 
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biometric sample set against a database of samples. This entails that the user’s 
biometric trait is matched against all previously enrolled samples and generating the 
scores for each comparison. In general, the highest score exceeding the threshold 
results in a match. The verification or authentication means where a person's claimed 
identity must be confirmed or denied. This involves calculation of a similarity 
between a claimed biometric sample with an enrolled template. The verification mode 
is a "one-to-one" comparison while, identification means where a person's identity 
must be initially established and it is “one-to-many" comparison process [10, 26, 32]. 
2.4 Restrictions of Single Biometric Systems 
It is important to note that some techniques, such as finger print recognition or retinal 
scanning, may offer high accuracy (especially retina scanning) while also having a 
high data collection error rate or low user acceptability. In both cases, their 
employment may not be appropriate for some applications due to the high level of co-
operation required by the user or the social or psychological factors. Voice and face 
recognition are considered easy to use and normally acceptable by potential users, 
while their accuracy is currently less than some other biometric technologies, 
especially in unconstrained environments such as where background sound and 
illumination is variable. However, recently biometric authentication has experienced 
considerable improvements in reliability and accuracy, even the best biometrics to 
date are still facing numerous problems [30]. Zhang et al. [32] considered these 
vulnerabilities and limitations when such unimodal systems are deployed in real-
world applications involving a large number of users. Their considerations are listed 
as follows:  
1- Intra-class variation:  it can be caused by a user who is incorrectly 
interacting with the sensor or changes in the biometric characteristics of a user over a 
period of time. 
2- Noise in the inputs data (e.g. dirt on a fingerprint sensor) noisy data may not 
be successfully matched with corresponding templates and therefore incorrectly reject 
a genuine user.  
3- Non-universality: this is due to the inability of biometric system to acquire 
biometric trait or extract features from acquired data such as extract incorrect minutia 
features from poor quality of the ridges in fingerprint (e.g. HONG KONG (Reuters) – 
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“A Singapore cancer patient was held for four hours in the United States when they 
could not detect his fingerprints which had apparently disappeared because of a drug 
he was taking”) 
4- Spoof attacks caused by an impostor’s attempt to spoof the biometric trait of 
a legally enrolled user in order to circumvent the system (especially when behavioral 
traits such as signature and voice are used).  
5- Inter-class similarities: Overlap of feature spaces corresponding to multiple 
classes or individuals caused inter-class similarity. This can increase the false match 
rate of the system in unimodal identification systems comprising a large number of 
enrolled individuals and subsequently upper bound on the number of individuals that 
can be effectively discriminated by the biometric system. 
6- Interoperability issues: This is another limitation in biometric systems 
caused by the theory of comparing biometric features from the same sensor. 
However, this theory is impractical due to difficulties in obtaining biometric data 
from different sensors and, hence, the ability of such systems are restricted when 
matching or comparing biometric data originating from different sensors. For 
instance, the challenge of comparing voiceprints originating from different handset or 
comparing fingerprints when the images are from different sensors. Ross and Jain 
[33] consider fingerprints obtained by using different multiple sensor technologies 
cannot be reliably compared due to variations in sensor technology, image resolution, 
sensing area, distortion effects, etc.  
2.5 Proposed Biometric Traits for Wireless Applications 
Since there is no set of criteria for all security system applications, there is no single 
best biometric trait for all applications. Figure 2.4 depicts the comparison of 
biometric technologies (in terms of ease-of-use, cost, accuracy, and distinctiveness 
perceived intrusiveness) and it shows that as one biometric, it may be possible to 
describe the most accurate, easiest to use, easiest to deploy, or cheapest biometric for 
that particular deployment, but no biometric technology is best for all situations [34]. 
Nevertheless, fingerprint has a high balance of the all-desirable properties in both 
type of biometrics and it is suitable for a large number of recognition applications. In 
addition, it is one of the most accepted and developed biometric techniques in 
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wireless devices due to its small size, inexpensive price and good performance of 
sensors. There is also pragmatic evidence of fingerprints recognized in various 
wireless device and mobile handheld companies as an appropriate authentication 
method in their wireless devices. 
 
Figure 2.4: Biometric Market Report of International Biometric Group [34] 
The main features of fingerprints to sum up briefly are: 
1. Everyone has fingerprints even users with hand-related disabilities; 
2. Fingerprints are very distinctive; 
3. Fingerprint details are permanent even if there are temporary cuts or bruises 
on the skin; 
4. Live-scan sensors can easily capture high-quality images without suffering 
from the problem of segmentation of the background like face recognition; 
5. Currently, fingerprint sensors are becoming quite small and cheap with good 
performance; 
6. Using Multibiometric systems with fingerprints recognition is quite difficult 
to circumvent; 
7. It is suitable for a large number of recognition applications; 
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8. Fingerprint sensors are one of the most accepted and developed biometric 
technique in wireless device;  
9. Fingerprinting technique is one of the mature technologies used in criminal 
investigations. 
As it shown in table 2.1, fingerprinting has a high ranking in the majority of 
requirements and medium in some of them. Furthermore, using a person’s voice as a 
biometric is unobtrusive and it is an acceptable biometric in almost all societies. In 
addition, in wireless applications where identity authentication over the handheld 
device or telephone is desirable, sometimes voice is the only feasible biometric. The 
core weakness in voice recognition is affected by a person's condition (e.g., cold, 
stress, emotions, etc) and can be mimicked by others. However, there are a number of 
techniques to overcome impersonation such as prompting the subject to utter a 
different phrase each time (known as text dependent algorithms detailed in Chapter 
3). However, in this thesis, such weaknesses are countered by the development and 
investigation of multibiometric based on combining the fingerprint authentication 
with that of voice recognition as an access control for secure wireless communication.  
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Face High Low Medium High Low High High Medium Low 
Fingerprint Medium High High Medium High Medium High High High 
Hand  
Geometry Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium Medium Low Medium
Iris High High High Medium High Low Low Medium High 
Retinal  
scan High High Medium Low High Low Low Medium High 
Signature Low Low Low High Low High High Low Low 
Voice Medium Low Low Medium Low High High High Low 
Facial  
thermo grams High High Low High Medium High Low Low High 
Table 2.1: Comparison of biometric technologies in wireless application (adapted from [26]) 
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This section reviewed various kind of biometrics that are evaluated by several 
researchers to find an optimum solution for better throughput performance and 
accuracy as unimodal biometric security in wireless communication system. 
However, whilst unimodal biometric systems have advantages over traditional 
security system, such as the impossibility of being lost or stolen, they still have some 
considerable limitations. These limitations as detailed in section 2.4 and 2.5 can be 
addressed by using multimodal biometric technique. The next section considers 
implementing these multiple biometric system.  
2.6 Multibiometric 
In the previous section, an extensive literature review presented regarding unimodal 
biometrics in wireless communication system and its limitations. User verification 
system that is based on a single biometric in the context of security raises several 
design limitations such as interoperability issues, noise in input data, intra-class 
variation, non-universality, vulnerability against spoof attacks and inter-class 
similarities. Some of these restrictions can be alleviated through multimodal 
biometric approaches by providing multiple evidences of the same identity [35]. The 
integration of two or more types of biometric systems helps to improve the security 
and performance of unimodal system in different ways. Some of them are as follows: 
1. Improving the accuracy of the overall system: The accuracy of the system can be 
improved by combining the information derived from multiple traits to reduce the 
FAR and FRR of the system; 
2. Providing sufficient data if it is not successfully derived from a unimodal trait, 
for instance, this can cover cases where noisy data is an issue;   
3. Furthermore, parallel to alleviate some of the drawbacks with individual 
matchers and increasing the performance which may not possible to obtain by a 
unimodal biometric system, multibiometric systems provide anti-spoofing measures 
by making it difficult for an impostor to spoof multiple biometric traits [35]; 
4. Multibiometric systems can address the issue of non-universality in a unimodal 
system if the user is not able to present a particular biometric trait by providing the 
additional biometric trait in order to enroll and authenticate (e.g. enrolling the user by 
his voice and fingerprint if the user’s face is not available).      
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This section starts with a review of the advantage of integration of two or more types 
of biometric verification systems, which is normally known as a “multibiometric” 
system, to improve the security performance requirements of unimodal biometrics 
and cover its limitations. However, designing an appropriate multibiometric system 
raises several issues such as cost/benefits, determining sources of biometric 
information, types of information and finally fusion methodology.  
2.7 Fusion 
Generally, information fusion is based on the combination of different sources of 
information either to produce one figurative format or to make a decision. This 
function can be executed in five categories including the information fusion acquired 
from multiple sensors, multimodal biometric, multiple units (multi-Instance), multi-
sample and multiple algorithms for the same biometric [10, 32]. The main advantage 
of fusion is the increase in the reliability of biometric systems by either combining the 
information from separate biometric (e.g., fingerprints and voice or two fingers from 
the same person) or using a separate acquisition device (e.g. multiple cameras or 
microphone and camera). However, some researchers [32, 36] classify fusion levels 
into (i) fusion prior to matching and (ii) fusion after matching. Usually in literature, it 
is divided in to three possible fusion level based on the strategies of integration 
including, feature extraction level; the matching scores level; and the decision level 
[35]. In addition to these levels, there is another fusion level based on combining the 
digital output signal from more than one sensor at a sensor level. This level of fusion 
is very unusual in multimodal biometric systems due to the incompatibility of the 
obtained data from the various sensors [51]. In image processing literature, this sensor 
level fusion is referred to as image level or pixel level fusion [37]. However, fusion at 
a sensor level can be used over a unimodal system through the integration of obtained 
data from either using a single sensor or different compatible sensors to reduce the 
noise or cover the blind part of input data (e.g. mosaicing of multiple fingerprint 
impressions of a subject to make a more detailed fingerprint image) [32]. 
Although, integration of information, at the feature extraction level is more effective 
than the other two levels due to the availability of more information about the input 
data than in matching or decision levels. Appropriate care must be taken to check the 
relationship between the feature spaces that are combined to remove the highly 
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correlated features [51]. Furthermore, developing efficient matching algorithms in 
many cases is the most challenging issue in the design of a biometric system and, 
therefore, fusion at the sensor or feature levels commences additional processing 
complexities. In addition, the majority of commercial biometric systems limit access 
to feature sets in their products. Therefore, the majority of researchers have focused 
on integration at match scores or decision levels [32]. Integration at the matching-
score level is the most common level of fusion due to the ease in accessing and 
combining the scores generated by different matchers [190]. However, in the case of 
using the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) matchers to build a multibiometric 
system, sometimes the only feasible level of fusion is decision level. This is due to 
restrict the access only to final recognition decision by many COTS biometric 
matchers [32]. 
Information fusion in biometrics can be accomplished at several levels and many 
fusion techniques documented in the literature regarding these levels. However, 
fusion is a compulsory phase of many multibiometric systems; the correlation 
between the sources has to be inspected before determining their suitability for 
fusion. In addition, correlation between sources is not the only driving factor behind 
fusion, the performance disparity between individual sources of information also 
impacts the matching accuracy of the fusion scheme. Hence, there is no clear criterion 
with regards to conditions, which depend on a great extent on correlation between 
sources and performance disparity between individual sources of information. 
“Defining a suitable diversity metric that would help predict the performance of a 
particular fusion scheme has been elusive thus far “[32]. 
2.8 Conclusion  
This Chapter started with a review the advantages of the integration of two or more 
types of compatible biometric verification systems in wireless communication, which 
is normally known as a “multibiometric” system, to improve the security performance 
requirements of unimodal biometric and to cover its limitations. As indicated in this 
Chapter, finding the best fusion method, biometric trait, and transmission technique to 
fuse, and send secure data over the wireless channel is a challenging problem in 
multibiometric in term of types of information and fusion algorithms. This Chapter 
reviewed different biometric technologies in theory and experiments based on the 
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evaluation of the output of several researchers to find the optimum type of biometric 
traits with better throughput performance and accuracy for multibiometric security in 
wireless communication systems. Finally, fingerprint and voice recognition were 
selected due to their feasibility, high balance of all the desirable properties, high 
performance, and accuracy. There are, many problems associated with fingerprint and 
voice technologies such as error rates, spoofing attacks, and interoperability. In the 
next Chapters (3 and 4) recent advances and limitations of these two biometric 
technologies are reviewed. In addition, this Chapter provided a literature review with 
the aim of giving a full account of the technique resulting in a desirable fusion 
technique and algorithms. Despite the fact that some of them proved efficient in 
improving the performance, it is not possible to predict the performance in every 
scenario. This is due to the using different environments and conditions, which 
depended on performance disparity between individual sources of information and 
correlation between the sources. For this reason, further investigation (in terms of 
performance and correlation imbalance) based on the suggested system in Chapter 5 
and related expert of two selected biometric traits (voice and fingerprint) is essential. 
Nonetheless, accuracy of the whole system definitely can be improved using the 
appropriate fusion techniques to achieve results that are more reliable.    
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Chapter 3 
Speaker Recognition in Wireless Application 
Introduction 
Wireless networks come with significant advantages over wired networks, including 
no cabling, freedom of mobility, scalability, and flexibility. Therefore, wireless 
networks are still gaining in popularity and are now becoming a viable alternative to 
traditional wired solutions. For instance, hospitals, universities, airports, hotels, and 
many retail shops are using wireless technologies to conduct their daily business 
operations [8]. Currently these networks are expanding much faster than ever with the 
introduction of 4G and WiMAX. The problem is however that wireless networks 
regardless of whether they are based on WiMAX or Wi-Fi LANs, as defined in the 
IEEE 802.11 standard, are inherently less secure than wired counterparts due to lack 
of physical infrastructure [9]. With the main concern being how to provide access 
only to authorized users, this Chapter is devoted to investigating the limitations and 
merits of voice recognition as a way of securing wireless applications.   
3.1 Speaker Recognition in Wireless Technology and its Motivation  
The use of speaker recognition technology as a biometric identification, as prevalent 
in commercial, civil, and forensic applications, is continually growing. These 
applications are access control to computer networks, transaction authentication (E 
and M-commerce), law enforcement (Home-parole and prison call monitoring), 
speech data management (Voice mail browsing and intelligent answering machines), 
and personalization (Voice-web or device customization) which are not an exhaustive 
list [62]. Despite, speaker recognition is an acceptable biometric in the majority of 
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societies and of course over the phone, voice is not sufficiently distinctive as an 
identifier in large databases and the quality of the voice signal can be degraded by the 
communication channel [32]. In addition, a person’s voice can be changed 
unintentionally because of emotional, health conditions, stress, or even on purpose as 
some people can imitate others. This technique has already been applied to wireless 
devices, particularly mobile phones and handheld devices. However, voice is not 
considered for all purposes, over the phone or wireless device sometimes it is the only 
possible biometric and secure enough as a verification method.  
Speaker recognition over IP networks, wireless mobile devices, and through 
telephone channels has been widely studied in scientific literatures [66-73]. Problems 
arise in scenarios such as dependency of data on the quality of microphone and 
communication channel, transcoding, transmission errors (Lost data packets, delay 
and jitter), and possibility of hack by impostors [74]. There are many available 
publications in scientific domain, which address these limitations. For instance, 
Besacier et al. [66] and Mayorga et al. [67] cover the transcoding and transmission 
errors through reconstruction strategies. This is based on using the interleaving 
techniques to distribute the speech information among packets, and combined with 
interpolation methods, to estimate the lost acoustic features. Siau et al. [68] present 
investigations conducted into the transmission of data over network for the purpose of 
biometric-based recognitions. In spite of all, it is not still possible to transmit raw 
biometric data over Internet due to long delays. Based on experimental investigations, 
it is shown that the transmission of data models, or features, instead of raw material, 
will significantly reduce the transmission time. In addition, they have demonstrated 
that an increase in overall transmission time due to data encryption is relatively short. 
Evans et al. [69] have considered the adverse effects on speaker verification accuracy 
due to the two independent forms of signal degradation (packet loss in 
communications system and ambient noise at the wireless device). They have 
experimentally concluded that even without any form of recovery, packet loss is 
unlikely to be significant in speaker verification performance compared to the adverse 
effects of additive noise. 
In addition, Reynolds [70] presents an empirical study of the effects of handset 
variability on text-independent speaker recognition performance. They have 
experimentally demonstrated that although many of the linear filter compensation 
techniques can improve performance under mismatched handset conditions, 
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performance gap between matched and mismatched handset conditions persists to 
other uncompensated effects. 
The main aim of this thesis is to provide a secure and robust authentication by 
implementing a multibiometric technique with high level of confidence. Furthermore, 
by using this technique, it might be possible to protect communication against denial 
of service, since the receiver has to establish the identification first before decrypting 
the message. The limitations of speaker recognition in wireless communication were 
identified and tackled in this section to make the system more effective. Some of the 
restrictions can be addressed through packet lost recovery (alternative is to send voice 
features rather than raw data). However, environmental noise and channel mismatch 
remain the main drawbacks for vocal biometric authentication. Therefore, in the 
following sections, the result of investigation that was called out to answer current 
possibility and limitation of voice recognition in wireless communication is 
presented. Finally, an overall evaluation of appropriate techniques to be applied to 
wireless devices is given. 
3.2 Speaker Recognition Characteristics 
Voice is a behavioral biometric and something that has been used since ages. The 
difference is that this technique is done nowadays automatically by machine. It is 
based on using the extracted features of voice to verify or identify the speaker. 
Therefore, it divides this into two main groups: Automatic Speaker Identification 
(ASI) and Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) [23, 24, 75, 77]. In the former, the 
task is to validate a user's identity with no a-priori identity claim using feature 
extraction of the voice, while latter attempts to verify a claimed user identity (Figure 
3.1). ASI determines the similarity between the two speakers, based on the 
calculation of similar features in known voice against the unknown in database. In the 
case of ASV, this is easier because one measures similarity by comparing the claimed 
with a known voice in the database. In addition, speaker recognition can be 
categorized in two different ways include text-dependent and text-independent 
methods. Text-dependent is based on restricting utterances to predetermined words or 
sentences that are same for both training and recognition while Text-independent is 
not based on a specific text being spoken [23]. Text-dependent is the commonly used 
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method with lower error rates. It has short duration enabling system response, 
because user has to wait for authentication before system access [24]. 
 
Figure 3.1: Speaker Verification and Identification Algorithms [80] 
One should note that there is a difference between speaker recognition (subject who is 
speaking) and speech recognition (what is being said). Nevertheless, the bottom line 
is to note that the main aim is to identify who is speaking rather than recognizing 
precisely a random speech from a speaker. There are many factors and parameters, 
which can cause errors in speaker verification regardless of how good an algorithm is. 
Some of these factors are misreading (misspoken prompted phrases), extreme 
emotional states (stress or duress), time variation (intra or intersession), microphone 
placement, poor or inconsistent room acoustics (for instance multipath and noise), 
channel mismatch, sickness (example is flu that can alter the vocal tract), and aging 
(vocal tract drifts away from model with age) [81].  
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3.3 Feature Extraction Methods 
The performance of a speaker recognition process is strongly dependent on 
appropriate set of feature extraction modules. Speaker pattern-recognition models are 
divided into three components: feature extraction and selection, pattern matching, and 
classification. The focus in speaker verification is to design a system that minimizes 
the probability of verification errors. It will therefore, discriminate between the given 
speaker and all the others [81]. In this section, some of the well-known and popular 
feature sets are reviewed briefly (for further information reader is referred to cited 
references). In addition, overview of the feature selection, extraction, and 
discriminate analysis can be obtained in [82, 83].    
3.3.1    Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) 
One of the popular speech based verification methods is to use the information from 
short-time Fourier spectrum represented by Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 
(MFCC). Although MFCC features are quite effective for discriminating speakers, it 
can reduce the performance of a verification system due to mismatch between train 
and test conditions. This is because MFCC is affected by channel distortion and/or 
ambient noise. MFCC is based on frame-by-frame analysis of the speech signal, with 
20ms as typical but also 10 ms as frame advance, (20 ms can represent stationary 
signal and allow for the computation of short-time Fourier spectrum) [88, 89]. The 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute defined a standard in order to 
employ MFCC algorithm in mobile phones [90]. MFCC can be obtained by initially 
performing a standard Fourier analysis, and consequently converting the power 
spectrum to a Mel frequency spectrum. Finally, obtained is MFCC by taking the 
logarithm of that spectrum and computing its inverse Fourier transform. In addition, 
just the first 8 to 16 coefficients are supplied to recognizer [73]. MFCC has generally 
obtained a better accuracy, and in terms of computational complexity, takes less 
processing resources as opposed to other feature extraction techniques [91]. It is for 
this reason that MFCC has taken the lead in speaker identification systems, speech 
recognition, and speaker recognition in general.  
 3.3.2   CMS and RASTA Filtering 
There are two feature-based compensation techniques with the ability of providing 
robustness to channel effects: RASTA-PLP [92] and Cepstral Mean Subtraction 
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(CMS) [93]. Note though that the handset and channel mismatches can still be 
significant sources of error even after CMS or RASTA-PLP is applied [94]. CMS is 
the operation of subtracting the mean MFCC vector from each MFCC feature vector. 
CMS is often used in speaker verification systems for the removal of slowly varying 
convolutive noise due to the communication channel [95]. In this technique, it is 
assumed that the long-term average of the Cepstrum could be estimated from a few 
seconds of speech. This can remove the effects of the convolution distortion by 
subtracting this long-term average from the original Cepstral [73]. The main 
motivation for using CMS in reverberant environments lies in the modeling of room 
as a channel. However, CMS might not be as useful to reduce the effect of long-
duration room impulse responses, which is often the case in room acoustics [94].  
RASTA (Real Active SpecTrAl) is a generalization of CMS based on the fact that in 
many cases, rate of change of nonlinguistic components in speech lies outside the 
typical rate of change of the vocal tract shape. This suppresses the spectral 
components that change more slowly or quickly than the typical rate of change of 
speech. It is demonstrated by Hermansky et al. [96] that RASTA processing improves 
the performance of a recognizer in the presence of convolutional and additive noise. 
The main difference between the CMS and RASTA processing in the log spectral 
domain (Cepstral) is that CMS removes just the dc component of the short-term log 
spectrum, while RASTA makes the current output dependent on its past and enhances 
the spectral transitions. RASTA can be implemented in different filters and performed 
in various instances such as MFCC [73, 96]. 
3.4    Classification and Pattern Matching 
Work on speaker recognition modeling has been going on for many years and 
varieties of techniques have been explored. Template matching is a popular method 
of pattern match in speaker verification. This approach is based on the comparison 
between the input utterance templates with the reference one by aligning the two at 
the same points in time. One of the widely used approaches in template matching is 
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), which is based on dynamic programming that uses 
an optimum time expansion/compression function for nonlinear time alignment. This 
is due to the necessity of stretch/compress from invariable difference between the 
durations of reference and test templates. Another approach is based on probabilistic 
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models of speech signal that describes its time-varying characteristics. This technique 
known as Hidden Markov Modeling (HMM) and can be employed in a number of 
speaker verification algorithms [97, 98]. Similar to the template matching, HMM-
based speaker verification can utilize speaker models derived from a multiword 
sentence, a single word, or a phoneme [71, 100]. In addition, two popular methods in 
text independent speaker recognition described in this section include Vector 
Quantization (VQ) [101] and Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) [102].  
3.4.1 Template Matching 
This method is based on using the reference templates as speaker models by 
composing a sequence of feature vectors derived from fixed sentences uttered by a 
registered user. Next step is to match scores that are obtained by measuring the 
similarity between the aligned utterance and templates. However using the fixed 
templates cannot model the wide variability present in the speech signals [103]. 
3.4.2 Dynamic Time Warping 
DTW is the most popular method, which compensates for the speaking rate 
variability in template-based systems [104]. Doddigton [103] introduced DTW in 
1971 and Booth [105] pointed out that the calculated warp path during the dynamic 
time warping process encodes time-independent information useful for speaker 
recognition. A text-dependent template model is a sequence of templates ൫Xଵ, … , XN ൯ 
that must be matched to an input sequence, ሺXଵ, … , XM ሻ [105]. However, N is not 
equal to M due to the timing inconsistencies in human speech [82]. 
3.4.3 Vector Quantization 
VQ source modeling is another form of template-based method that uses multiple 
templates to represent frames of speech [82]. Soong et al. [107] is first to introduce 
this but improvements in the standard VQ were made by Booth et al. [105]. VQ is a 
coding technique to transmit signals at low bit rates, and can be used in many 
applications such as image/voice compression. In speaker recognition, it is based on 
creating personalized codebook for each speaker, and unknown speaker will be 
identified by aligning the codebook that are closest to the input vectors usually based 
on reading a specific text. It is not essential to perform a time alignment in this 
 34 
scheme. Although lack of time warping greatly simplifies the system, it neglects 
speaker-dependent temporal information, which might be present in the prompted 
phrases [82]. In situations with large set of training data, VQ approach is more 
effective as it offers less computation, because it does not model classes separately 
and combine the separate models. In addition, it does not suffer from the problem of 
segmenting speech into phonetic units, and it is more computationally efficient than 
template matching. However, it is suffering from the complexity of codebook search 
during recognition [108]. 
3.4.4 Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and Gaussian Mixture Model (GMMs) 
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are possibly the most successful and established 
method of automatic speech recognition [97]. Although the basic theory of HMM was 
developed by Baum and Petrie [109], the first attempt to employ it in speech 
processing was made by Baker at CMU [110], and Jelinek et al. at IBM [111]. Over 
the course of time, several improvements have been reported by researchers such as 
mixture autoregressive HMM [112], subword HMM [86], and semi continuous HMM 
[114]. HMM is based on encoding both the temporal structure of feature sequences, 
and the statistical variation of the features. Therefore, it is an appropriate speaker 
model in text-dependent speaker recognition. HMM is a stochastic model that can be 
viewed as a finite state machine, with each state having an associated probability 
density function for feature vector. It is useful for modeling nonstationary signals 
whose time-varying characteristics may be described through a chain of statistical 
states. The main constituents of an HMM are the state observations and transition 
probabilities, which are defined by moving from one state to another. However, start 
states and last states have no income and output transitions respectively. These 
transition probabilities provide a mechanism for connection of the states and 
modeling variations, in speech duration and articulation rates. Finally, the observation 
densities model the statistical distribution of speech spectral features [115]. The 
HMM is called “hidden” since there is an invisible underlying stochastic process 
which affects the observed sequence of events [116]. HMM is suffering from the lack 
of an effective structure for modeling the correlation along the time axis of successive 
speech spectral (Or Cepstral) features. However Vaseghi et al. [115] have shown 
experimentally that the Cepstral-time features within an HMM result in an improved 
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recognition (Hence HMM using Cepstral-time matrices are more robust to noise than 
HMM using Cepstral vectors).  
The HMM technique is very similar to the VQ in action, and HMM states are found 
by a VQ-like procedures. However, in HMM probabilities of transition between states 
are encoded, and the order of presentation of speech data is important. It has to be 
noted though that HMM will cause problems in text-independent speaker recognition 
where no temporal correlation exists between the train and the test data. Therefore, 
single state HMMs known as Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) can be used in text-
independent speaker recognition [117, 102]. Although GMM provide a probabilistic 
model for each speaker, it is not similar to HMM, due to the fact that there is no 
Markov constraint among the sound classes, and hence order of presentation of 
speech data will not affect the recognition decisions. The secret of success with GMM 
is ability to deal with situations that there is no prior knowledge of what the speaker is 
going to say ( In text-dependent applications, additional temporal knowledge can be 
incorporated by employing HMM as likelihood functions, because there is a strong 
prior knowledge of the spoken text) [95]. Applying GMM to speaker verification is 
based on firstly representing each registered speaker by a GMM, and secondly 
computing the ratio between the genuine likelihood and the imposter likelihood to 
enhance the discrimination between the two. The final matter is the issue of genuine 
GMM and background model [120]. Mostly background model is a GMM trained 
from the speech of a large number of speakers who should accurately represent the 
characteristics of all possible impostors. Alternatively, a set of background models is 
formed during verification by selecting the GMM of a small set of client speakers 
whose acoustic characteristics are close to those of the claimant [121]. 
3.5 Summary and Recommendation  
This Chapter discovered a possible solution to address some of the limitations of 
speaker recognition in wireless communication system. Having reviewed different 
algorithms, the algorithm found most suitable and used in this thesis is that of Furui 
[93]. In addition, limitations of this technique in wireless communication are 
addressed by sending voice feature (cepstral coefficients) instead of raw sample. This 
scheme is to reap the advantages of reducing the transmission time and dependency 
of the data on communication channel, together with no loss of packet. Table 3.1 lists 
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some of the works on speaker recognition and their error factors (results can loosely 
compare as they have not been applied under identical conditions for evaluation 
purposes, for instance different train and test paradigms, or dissimilar background 
speaker sets that were used). Obviously, finding the most reliable text-dependent 
speaker recognition technique depends on the specific scenario and the requirements 
of such scenario. Some of the general problems in wireless applications have been 
addressed earlier, and found that they can be resolved to a certain degree with packet 
lost recovery technique or sending encryption of voice features rather than the raw 
data. However, environmental noise and channel mismatch remain the main 
drawbacks for vocal biometric authentication. This is due to the acoustic mismatches 
or distortion of speech data gathered from different microphones, handsets, 
communication channels, and speech coder.  
 Source Feature Method Text Error 
Atal 1974[122] Cepstrum Pattern Matching Dependent i:2%@0.5s v:2%@1s 
Furui 1981 [93] Normalized Cepstrum Pattern Matching Dependent v:0.2%@3s 
Li & Wrench 
1983 [123] LP,Cepstrum Pattern Matching Independent 
i:21%@3s 
i:4%@10s 
Higginsn &  
Wohlford 1986 
[124] 
Cepstrum DTW Likelihood Scoring Independent 
i:10%@2.5s 
i:4.5%@10s 
Higgins 1991 
[120] 
LAR, LP-
Cepstrum 
DTW Likelihood 
Scoring Dependent v:1.7@10s 
Reynold 1995 
[125]; Reynold et 
al. [102] 
Mel- Cepstrum HMM (GMM) Dependent 
i:0.8%@10s 
v:0.12%@10s 
Che & Lin 1995 
[126] Cepstrum HMM Dependent 
i:0.56%@2.5s 
i:0.14%@10s 
v:0.62%@2.5s 
 
Reynold 1996 
[127] 
 
Mel- Cepstrum 
Mel- 
dCepstrum 
 
HMM 
(GMM) 
 
 
Independent 
v:11%/16%@3s 
v: 6%/8%@10s 
v:3%/5%@30s 
Matched/Mis-  
Matched handset 
 Table 3.1: Selected Chronology of previous work include cestrum coefficients (i represents 
identification and v stands for verification) [81, 82] 
3.6 Algorithm Description  
Based on detailed requirements, normalized cepstral coefficients and dynamic time 
warping which is a text-dependent template model has been preferred as described by 
Furui [93] for automatic speaker verification using telephone speech. His results from 
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experimental work indicate that the verification error rate of one percent or less can 
be obtained even if the reference and test utterances are subjected to different 
transmission conditions. Secondly, there is no significant increase in verification error 
with the increase of time interval (for further information reader is referred to cited 
reference). In addition, cepstrum coefficients have the other advantage that one can 
derive from them a set of parameters, which are invariant to any fixed frequency-
response distortion introduced by the recording apparatus or the transmission system 
[93].  
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Chapter 4 
Liveness and Spoofing in Fingerprint Identification: Issues 
and Challenges 
Introduction 
The fingerprint liveness detection refers to the inspection of the finger characteristics 
to ensure whether the input finger is live or artificial. A number of fingerprint 
identification systems are used widely and implemented at various important places 
such as border and immigration services. However, it is not declared by the 
manufacturers of these systems whether liveness detection is actually implemented. 
Possible measures to detect liveness are only proposed in patents and published 
literature. There are three major schemes, which are reported in fingerprint liveness 
literature. These are coupled with the additional hardware, software, or combination 
of fingerprint with other identifications is aimed to verify the liveness in submitted 
fingerprints. In this Chapter, various fingerprint liveness detection methods, which 
are categorized as voluntary and involuntary, are explored. The main objective of this 
Chapter is to critically review the voluntary and involuntary fingerprint liveness 
detection techniques proposed in the literature, and discuss their effectiveness and 
possible limitations.  
4.1 Fingerprint Scanning Techniques 
Fingerprint sensors come in various shapes and sizes however, they can be classified 
in two categories: area scan (or touch) sensor and swipe sensor. With a touch sensor, 
the user places and holds the finger on the sensor surface and impression transferred 
from the pad of the last joint of finger or thumb. Touch sensors are used mostly in 
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fixed systems because of their size and shape [130]. On the other hand, in the swipe 
sensor (a narrow row of sensors), the users slides a finger vertically over the surface. 
These sensors are preferably used in portable consumer electronics because of their 
size and shape [130, 131]. However, user needs to be trained in order to work with 
these sensors and they are not always succeeding to capture fingerprint images. In 
addition, there are some common problems in both sensors, such as direct exposure to 
the environment, damage from mechanical effects, electrostatic discharge (ESD), 
thermal shock, and discrimination between liveness and spoofed finger.  
 
Figure 4.1: Technologies of fingerprint Sensors 
Fingerprint scanners using different technologies for capturing the image of a finger 
are divided into two categories optical and solid state. Figure 4.1 illustrates a general 
taxonomy of fingerprints sensors. In the following section, the different techniques 
used in optical fingerprint sensors are presented and critically reviewed. 
4.1.1 Optical Sensors 
The first generation of electronic fingerprint sensors was based on optical technology 
(Figure 4.2). A light source (usually LEDs) is pointed at one side of a prism and a 
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finger is placed on one face of the prism. The ridges of the fingerprint absorb the light 
while the valleys of the fingerprint do not make contact with the prism, allowing the 
light to be reflected. A camera (CCD or CMOS) picks up the reflected light, which is 
the representation of the ridges and valleys. The optical path of light, S, is defined as 
the total optical length between the finger surface and sensor array. 
 
Figure 4.2: Optical Fingerprint sensor 
Since the fingerprint size is fixed (a typical design has the finger 15 mm in width and 
20 mm in height), S can be determined by the lens focus and camera array size. A 
smaller S means a more compact sensor [132]. 
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Where u is the optical distance from the finger to the lens, v is the optical distance 
from the sensor array to the lens, f is the focal length of the lens, d1 is the finger 
width, and d0 is the camera array width. Initially, this technique was named as 
Frustrated Total Internal reflection (FTIR) [133]. The sensor based on FTIR have 
smaller size CMOS instead of CCD camera and it is difficult to fool them with a 
photograph or image of a fingerprint. Many of the proceeding technologies have 
replaced some mechanisms with smart components but still this has many drawbacks 
specially the size, focusing, and alignment components. 
A. FTIR with a Sheet Prism 
The sheet prism has a number of “prismlets” adjacent to each other [132]. Each 
prismlet has a light entrance surface and an exit surface, this sensor also operates on 
the principle as that of FTIR [134]. However, the prism size can be reduced; the 
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optical path remains unchanged. On the other hand, this mechanism reduces the 
image quality than the traditional FTIR [18].  
B. Optical Fiber Sensor 
This technique employs a fiber-optic plate as a replacement for a prism and lens. The 
Fiber Optic Plate (FOP) consists of the array of optical fibers. A finger should be in 
contact with the upper side of FOP and illuminated from an angle by a light source by 
diffusing light on the top of the FOP. The ridges of the finger are in contact with the 
FOP, while the valleys are not .Therefore, only the ridges scatter light, and the 
scattered light does not reach the CCD/CMOS. Near the valleys, light is reflected 
totally at the FOP air boundaries and transmitted to the CCD/CMOS that is direct 
contact with the FOP [18]. This technique is better than prism sheet because it 
reduces the thickness of sensor and eliminates the additional mechanism required 
with sheet prism based fingerprint sensors. However, to build a high-resolution sensor 
using this technology increases the cost of the sensor because of the optical fibers.    
C. Electro-optics Sensor 
The top surface is a transparent layer upon which the finger is placed. On the inside 
there is a two-dimensional matrix of photoelectric elements (Imaging Layer) 
separated by strip-shaped gaps. The light emitting layer emits the light through the 
strip-shaped gaps, and this passes through the transparent layer to ridges or valleys of 
the fingerprint. Light is reflected back at the valleys to the imaging layer. Since the 
refractive index of a finger and the transparent layer are designed to be very close, the 
ridges will absorb light [33, 132]. The imaging layer is protected from light coming 
from the light emitting layer, hence  it  delivers an output signal only in response to 
light that has been reflected towards the imaging layer. As a result, the pattern of 
ridges and valleys will be generated to form a fingerprint image. 
D. In-Finger Light Dispersion 
In this relatively new sensing technique, a finger is placed directly on the sensor and 
is illuminated by ambient light (available or existing light), while the optical imager 
chip sense the strength of the dispersed light that reaches through the finger. The light 
eliminating form the valley part is dispersed in the air, and becomes weak leaving the 
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corresponding pixels darker [136]. A proprietary, special surface glass over the 
imager chip ensures good imaging and protection. It is difficult to arrange the 
mechanism of theses sensors in compact form, since the focal length of small lenses 
can be very large and image distortion is possible when the reflected light is not 
focused properly. Because of their cost, size and sensing mechanism they are not 
suitable to become a part of many portable systems e.g. PDAs and Laptops. 
4.1.2 Solid State Fingerprint sensors 
Solid-state fingerprint sensors (aka silicon sensors) measure some physical properties 
of a finger and convert it to a digitized ridge valley pattern or image.  
A. Capacitive 
Although, solid-state sensors (also known as silicon or chip sensors) have been 
proposed in patent literature since the 1980s, it was not until the middle 1990s that 
these have been commercially available [137, 138]. Innovation in the field of 
integration and fabrication technologies makes possible to develop small and single 
chip solid-state sensors. These sensors designed to overcome the common problems 
related to optical sensors like image quality, calibration, size and cost [132]. 
 
Figure 4.3: Capacitive Fingerprint Sensor [142] 
Sensor is one chip includes two-dimensional array of micro-capacitor plate (Figure 
4.3) and finger skin act as the other side of each micro-capacitor [139]. Small 
electrical charges are created between the surface of the finger and each of these 
plates when the finger is placed on the surface of the sensor [33]. These sensors have 
smaller imaging area, size, and resolution, however, because of cost of capacitive 
elements, such sensors are more expensive than same size, and quality images in 
optical sensors [141, 142]. The capacitance C is determined by [132]: 
C = k (௦
ௗ
)                                            (4.2) 
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Where C is the capacitance, k is the dielectric constant, s is the surface area of the 
capacitor, and d is the distance between the electrodes of capacitor.  
In addition, it is known that: 
ௗொ
ௗ௧
 = c ௗ௏
ௗ௧
                                           (4.3) 
Where dQ / dt is the change of charge over time and dV/ dt is the voltage change over 
time. Since k and s are fixed, the capacitance C changes with d. In addition, Q can be 
set by charging the capacitor to a known value and therefore, the capacitor voltage V 
will change when C is changed due to the distance that each ridge (closer) or valley 
(further) is located from the capacitor plate. Thus, a fingerprint image can be 
determined by the measurement of the voltage output change over time at each 
capacitor of the sensor array [33, 143]. Many other issues are still with capacitive 
fingerprint sensors. These sensors corrode by frequent use and susceptible to 
electrostatic discharges (ESD) from the fingertip and can damage the device. These 
sensors just image the surface of the skin, which is susceptible to damage and 
contamination from daily activities. For the reason that the dielectric constant of the 
surface layer of finger skin is mainly due to moisture in the ridges and valleys, in dry 
fingers, the dielectric constants will be very close to air and this will result in faded 
images from the sensor. The performance of such sensors is nowadays being 
improved and most of the capacitive sensor makers are declaring that they have 
solved the ESD problem and show the corresponding value of ESD tolerance. 
However, the consistency has been questioned and the durability and mechanical 
strength are still an issue. 
B. Thermal 
Thermal technology based finger print sensors are made from the silicon die tiled by 
pixels of pyro-electric material that is sensitive to detect temperature differences. The 
transferred heat from sensor to the finger is measured by the sensor through scanning 
the surface of the finger [144]. The temperature difference between the ridge and 
valleys are translated to a fingerprint pattern. This is based on the fact that the heat is 
transferred from the sensor surface to the ridges of the fingerprint faster than valleys, 
which are insulated by an air-gap [145].  
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When the finger is placed over the sensor, there is a significant change of 
temperature, generating the corresponding t signal. However, after a short time, the 
image vanishes because the chip and finger have reached at thermal equilibrium, and 
as there is no change in temperature, there is no signal. This effect disappears when 
users sweep their finger over the sensor, due to the touch/no touch of ridge/valley. In 
order to obtain an acceptable data from the thermal sensor, the user must be sure to 
swipe the finger at a constant speed [18, 33]. These sensors tend to consume more 
power than competing technologies and can be less accurate in hot environments due 
to the low difference between the temperature of ridges and the valley. In addition, 
because of their high power consumption, they are inappropriate for portable systems.   
C. Pressure 
The principle of sensing is based on the piezoelectric effect. When a finger is placed 
over the surface (Non-Conducting dielectric material) of the sensor, only the ridges 
encounter the individual sensor cells and no other part of the finger. As a result, the 
pressure from finger generates a small amount of current [142]. The strength or 
weakness of the produced current depends on the pressure applied on the sensor 
surface. These sensors are almost same in size and resolution as capacitive sensors. 
They are less sensitive to condition (wet or dry), and other effects of the finger. 
However, the employed material in this technique is not sufficient sensitive to detect 
the differences between ridges and valleys [33]. Protective coating of non-conducting 
dielectric material over sensor cells blurs the resulting image.   
D. Electric Field (E-Field)  
The fingerprint sensor based on E-Field acquires the image by measuring the 
variations in conductive layer under the skins surface, due to the difference in 
thickness between the ridges and the valleys [18, 132]. The main advantage of this 
sensor is that it does not sufferer from dry skin conditions, calluses, or cuts as it 
creates a fingerprint image from the layer under the skin. 
E. Radio Frequency (RF) 
Radio frequency (RF) based finger print sensors uses RF electromagnetic field to 
create an image of a fingerprint. RF sensors are built on the principles of the 
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capacitive sensor by using the finger itself as both the charge plate and the dielectric 
[142]. A signal can be produced by the finger ring around the periphery of the sensor 
area, travels through the finger. In addition, reduction level of the signal depends on 
the ridges and valleys and this attenuation is calculated by the sensor array to produce 
the fingerprint structure. The main approach of this technology is that it reads below 
the surface of finger, and cannot be affected by dirt, oil, scars, cuts, or other 
impurities.  
Acoustic (Ultrasound) 
The fact that there is noticeable difference between acoustic impedance of the skin 
(the ridges) and air (in the valleys) resulted in invention of an ultrasonic-based 
fingerprint sensor [132,149]. The ultrasonic sensors have two main elements 
comprising the sender and the receiver. The sender generates a short acoustic pulse, 
which can be detected by the receiver as the result of pulse-bounce-back from the 
surface of the finger [33].  
Although, this is one of the most accurate fingerprint scanning techniques, it is not 
widely used due to the large size, high cost, and longer time requirement to acquire an 
image compared to other fingerprint sensors. 
Technology Outer Physic 
Flexible 
Physical
Liveness 
Detection
resolution
(R) limitations 
Optical Solid No No 
R ≤ 600dpi & 
1000 dpi 
possible  [136] 
Optical Focusing and Alignment 
mechanism, Size 
Capacitive Solid No No R < 600 dpi ESD Protection, Poor performancefor damaged and dry skin 
Thermal Solid No No R < 600 dpi 
Environment dependant,  User 
need training ,  
More power consumption, 
 Not suitable for Mobile user 
Pressure 
(Piezoelectric) Solid No No R < 600 dpi 
Less sensitive, Protective layer  
reduces the quality of images 
Radio 
Frequency Solid No Possible R < 600 dpi Low accuracy with dry fingers 
Ultrasonic Solid No Possible R < 600 dpi large size, cost, more time to  acquire  image 
Micro electro-
mechanical 
(MEMS) 
Solid Possible No R <  600 dpi Not particularly for Fingerprint Sensing 
Table 4.1 Comparison of current fingerprint sensors with their physical state, liveness detection, and 
resolution 
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4.1.3 Limitations in Existing Fingerprint Sensors   
In this section, a critical review of the technologies available in fingerprint sensors is 
presented. Although various improvements to the existing technologies are still taking 
place, still many problems exist. Apart from their size, cost, their physical state, and 
resolution, differentiation between real and gummy fingers is still a problem. Table 
4.1, depicts and summarizes the comparison of existing fingerprint sensor 
technologies with their drawbacks. In future, it is essential to develop more sensitive 
and high-resolution fingerprint sensors that can acquire additional information from 
fingers with ridges and valleys including liveness detection. The physical state is also 
necessary to modify because the future electronics applications require the flexible, 
strong, and less environmentally sensitive fingerprint sensors. 
In spite of the advantages of current fingerprint-sensing technologies, detecting 
liveness of a presented fingerprint sample has become a challenging research issue 
[149, 150], due to the possibility of defeating the fingerprint authentication. Although 
some biometric technologies such as facial thermogram and vein pattern may be 
considered stronger and more difficult to simulate artificially, these technologies are 
not widely implemented and will need to be validated as reliable biometric identifiers 
[151]. Next sections consider well-known attack and countermeasures to address the 
liveness limitations on the fingerprint sensor.  
4.2 Sensor Attacks and Protection Schemes: 
Liveness detection (vitality detection) in a biometric system means the capability of 
the system to detect if a presented biometric sample is alive or not. In addition, to 
checking that the sample belongs to the live enrolled and not just any live human 
beings, it is necessary to guard against artificial fingerprints [152]. Liveness detection 
can be executed either at the acquisition or at processing stage in two approaches, 
liveness detection, and non-liveness one (e.g. detecting bubbles in gelatin artificial 
fingerprints) [153]. The main concern in fingerprint techniques is at what level of 
security one can rely on fingerprint readers (e.g. travel authentication like passports or 
access to nuclear facilities). A fingerprint reader is the front end of a fingerprint 
authentication system. This unit captures the fingerprint image by a sensor, which is 
usually one of the optical or solid-state types. There are many techniques to recognize 
the liveness of presented data at sensor level.  
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In this section, various countermeasures to avoid spoof attacks at fingerprint sensor 
level are explored in voluntary and involuntary forms. These techniques are based on 
determining the presence of a user by different responses. This can be from either 
voluntary source such as passwords, smart cards, and multiple biometrics (which 
makes spoofing more difficult), or involuntary liveness detection such as pulse 
oximetry, blood pressure, and heartbeat. In the voluntary case, the required response 
is based on the reaction of the user to hearing, seeing or feeling something. 
Involuntary on the other hand is about the user automatically responding to a 
stimulus, such as muscles responding to electrical stimulation, or skin changing color 
when pressure is applied.  
Although many fingerprint liveness countermeasures to avoid spoof attacks are 
presented in the literature, the majority lack proven results and additional hardware 
requirements, and do not operate efficiently in different environments (such as 
indoors, outdoors, summer and winter). For instance, 3M Blackstone liveness testing 
project (measured electrocardiograph signals (ECG), blood oxygen levels and pulse 
rate) was discontinued because of the disrupting effects caused by user movements 
during the ECG synchronizing stage. It was also quite difficult for the users to remain 
motionless and hold their fingerprints in the required position for six to eight seconds 
[151].  
In addition, there are a number of other limitations with the required hardware such as 
price, size, and inconvenience for the user and in some cases, the possibility to fool 
the system by presenting an artificial fingerprint. The list of possible attacks is 
continuously growing and not all the extra hardware systems, which are needed to test 
and analyze the data, are available as COTS (Commercial, Off-The-Shelf) items.  
In this section, first some of the well-known eminent threats and attacks on the 
fingerprint algorithms are explored. Secondly, some countermeasures and techniques 
to overcome such problems are discussed. Amongst the recommended solutions, an 
attempt is made to select the most effective one. 
4.2.1 Sensor Attacks and Possible Tenability: 
Parallel to improving the fingerprint based system technologies, the various types of 
attack and forging are improving. Due to the new software and hardware technologies 
for editing (e.g. Adobe Photoshop), making an artificial fingerprint has become easier 
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than ever. For instance, by using high-resolution camera, one can get better 
photographs of the fingerprints; or by adding, a preservative to increase the usability 
of gelatin employed for storing fingerprints can last even longer than a week. The 
possibility of defeating a fingerprint biometric system due to its inability to ensure 
liveness through fake biometric samples, make fingerprint authentication systems 
vulnerable against various possible attacks. In this section, these possible attacks 
[150] are explored in different schemes as follows:  
4.2.1.1 The Registered Finger:  
• Stealing fingerprint of a user by casting it into a mould, or causing user to 
press against sensor either directly or indirectly by way of drugs; 
• Separating finger from legitimate user's body ;  
In this case, combining the fingerprint scanner with another authentication method 
such as password or ID card can be used as a countermeasure. Alternatively, a control 
measure to alarm when under duress, or have supervision in place as one control the 
other (two-person implementation where system requires fingerprint from two 
different people) are possible solutions. Obviously, this is not always feasible.  
4.2.1.2 The Unregistered (illegitimate) Finger:  
In this kind of attack, attackers try their own fingers to log in as another user. The 
probability of a successful attack is based either on the high FAR of the system, or in 
the case of categorized system as "loops", "whorls", or "arches", by presenting the 
similar unregistered pattern as registered finger. In this kind of attack, the 
countermeasures can be a) to reduce the FAR of the system; b) in the case of 
categorized systems, to evaluate both the categories of fingerprints and the fingers 
within each category [150]. 
4.2.1.3 A Genetic Clone of the Registered Finger:  
Another type of the attack on the not robust system is genetic clone or using the 
similarity of identical twins fingerprints. Therefore, it raises the demand of carefully 
designed systems with capability to detect even slightly different fingerprints, since 
twin fingerprints are not identical. In the case of genetic cloned, this attack cannot be 
successful by employing a liveness detection mechanism in the system. Although, 
protection against the identical twin is not as easy as protection against a genetic 
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clone, the combination with another authentication method can be a helpful 
countermeasure [150]. 
4.2.1.4 Artificial Fingerprint:  
This attack is made by duplicating a real fingerprint with gelatin, silicone, copier, 
clay, or other materials. In this method, attacker should have the original fingerprint 
either by directly making a mould of user's finger, or by using a residual fingerprint to 
make an artificial one. The useful countermeasures are liveness detection or 
combination with other authentication methods [150]. 
4.2.1.5 The Others:  
In addition to identified types of attack in fingerprint sensor level, there are various 
types of attacks such as flashing a light against scanner, heating up, cooling down, 
humidifying, impacting on, and vibrating the scanner outside its environmental 
tolerances. Moreover, using the residual fingerprint on the sensor surface by dusting 
graphite powder, pressing adhesive film on surface, and many other possible attacks 
in specific sensor type exist [150].  
In addition to above identified attacks, Jain et al. [154] list a number of other types of 
attacks as follows: 
1. Denial of Service (DoS): Damages the system by attacker while a legitimate 
user has no longer access to system; 
2. Circumvention: Allows access to system and data by unauthorized user to 
get either access he may not be authorized to (privacy attack) or manipulate the 
system to be used for illegal activities (subversive attack); 
3. Repudiation: Denies having accesses to system by authorized user to obtain 
double personal benefit;   
4. Contamination or Covert Acquisition: Provides access to system by 
unauthorized user with compromised knowledge of a legitimate user (e.g. lifting the 
latent fingerprint of a user and making an artificial fingerprint by attacker, or 
recording the voice sample of legitimate user and playing it back); 
5. Collusion: Access to the system by way of collusion between administrator 
(super user) and other users to overrule the decision made by system;  
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6. Coercion: Access to the system as genuine users by forcing the user to 
identify themselves to system. 
Scenarios 2 and 4 can be classified as unregistered fingerprint, while 3 and 6 can be 
labeled as registered fingerprint attack as detailed above. In the case of denial of 
service (scenario 1), since every fingerprint sensor has individual acquisition 
technologies and related durability (e.g. surface of optical sensors can be easily 
broken), any offered solutions must depend on the especial investigation of each 
sensor. Furthermore, in scenario 5, the offer of any solution raises the demand of 
implementation details based on application requirements. Next subsection reviews 
various general protection schemes to find optimum solution to improve the security 
and accuracy of fingerprint systems at the sensor level.  
4.2.2 Protection & Countermeasures 
In the case of non-liveness detection fingerprint, the verification system is very 
vulnerable against artificial fingerprint attacks from user leaving behind fingerprints 
every day everywhere without noticing. As a result, with possible attacks either 
identified above or any other method, employment of such systems is inappropriate 
for any application unless a preliminary investigation is carried out in order to assess 
the capacity of the system to ensure liveness. Since every type of fingerprint sensor 
has individual acquisition and related tenability, the protection solutions must take 
into account the special characteristics of these sensors. Liveness detection in a 
fingerprint system ensures that only "genuine" fingerprints are capable of generating 
templates for enrollment, verification, and identification. In addition, in a live 
biometric system, it is difficult for an individual to repudiate the executed transaction 
or access a secure facility or data. However, design decisions are based on the 
specific needs of a biometric application. There are many techniques pointed out in 
literature to recognize the liveness of the presented data and hence, reduce 
vulnerability to spoof attacks at sensor level [149, 152, 153, 19, 156-167]. In this 
thesis, these techniques are explored in two different approaches as voluntary 
(acquisition of life signs by measuring the voluntary properties of users’ body or 
users’ response) and involuntary (acquisition of life signs by measuring the 
involuntary properties of users’ body or users’ response). Furthermore, some of the 
well-known techniques in both will be dealt with briefly.  
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4.2.3 Involuntary Captured Information by Biometric Reader 
The main problem with fingerprint scanner is distinguishing between real fingerprints 
(i.e. silicone rubber) and, other not alive fake fingerprints, such as epidermis of a 
finger [149]. This subsection reviews the published literature on involuntary 
techniques based on automatic (without intention) acquisition of data from the user’s 
body. Generally, the involuntary techniques can be divided into the acquisition of 
data with additional hardware, and use of existing information in fingerprint without 
any hardware requirements. The main concern with using additional hardware is 
adjusting the scanners to operate efficiently in different environments (such as 
indoors, outdoors, summer and winter), leading to problems with using a wafer-thin 
artificial fingerprint glued onto a live finger [149]. In addition, there are a number of 
other limitations with this scheme such as price, size, inconvenience for the user, and 
possibility to fool the system by using an artificial fingerprint [153]. Although not all 
of the extra hardware systems available at COTS (Commercial, off-the-shelf) have 
disclosed characteristics, some well-known methods in both categories evaluated by 
other researchers are described in this subsection. 
1. Temperature:  
This technique is based on extracting the temperature difference between the 
epidermis (about 26-30° C) and silicone artificial fingerprint (max 2°C). Lack of 
ability to detect the wafer-thin silicone rubbers is the main weakness of this technique 
[149]. 
2. Blood Pressure:  
This method is not susceptible to a wafer-thin silicone rubber glued to a finger. 
Excluding single point sensors that must be entered directly into the vein, other 
available sensors at COTS require measurements at two different places on the body 
(e.g. both hands). In addition, it can be bypassed by using underlying finger's blood 
pressure [149]. 
3. Heartbeat:  
This method is accomplished by sensing the finger pulse as liveness detection 
method. This technique has practical problems with diversity in the heart rhythm of a 
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user, which makes it virtually impossible to use in order to consider a person’s heart 
rhythm when scanning the fingerprint (e.g. different rhythms for same user). In 
addition, user’s emotional condition and level of activity will affect the heartbeat 
[149].  
4. Odor:   
In this scheme, detecting the liveness of fingerprint is based on the acquisition of the 
odor by means of an electronic nose, and discriminating between humans skin with 
other material. In spite of the fact that this method is able to discriminate real 
fingerprints from artificial reproductions, creation of a single model of human skin, 
rather than a template, for each user is necessary [167].  
5. Conductivity:  
In this technique, liveness detection is made by checking the conductivity of the 
finger skin, which is from 200 KΩ (dependent on the type of sensor) to several MΩ 
respectively, depending on whether we are during dry freezing winter weather or 
summer. The simple attack in this system can fool the sensor by some saliva on the 
silicone artificial fingerprint to be accepted as live finger [149]. 
6. Detection under Epidermis:  
This is based on detecting fingerprint patterns in the epidermis and between epidermis 
and dermis as a sign of liveness. There are two types of sensors: ultrasonic sensor and 
electric field one. Ultrasonic sensors focus on the fact that the underlying layer is 
softer and more flexible than the epidermis. While electric field alternative are 
focusing attention on the higher electric conductivity of the layer underneath the 
epidermis as compared to the epidermis itself. Two different layers of artificial 
fingerprints with the appropriate characteristics could fool the scanner when the 
characteristics of sensor are known. For instance, in the case of using ultrasonic 
sensors made of flexible and soft print, a second regular artificial print can be 
attached to the first while making sure that the two line patterns are in exact matching 
positions. This can be achieved very easily by a dental technician [149].  
7. Relative Dielectric Constant:  
The dielectric constant of a specific material reflects the extent to which it 
concentrates the electrostatic lines of flux [168]. Measuring the distinct values of 
 53 
relative dielectric constant (RDC) between a live and an artificial fingerprint is the 
foundation for this method. However, RDC is influenced by the humidity of finger in 
different conditions, and fooling such sensor is possible by wetting the silicone rubber 
using alcohol/water mixture before it is pressed on the fingerprint scanner. Since the 
RDCs of alcohol and water are 24 and 80 respectively, and the RDC of a normal 
finger is somewhere between the two [149], it is easy to fool the sensor. 
8. Optical Properties:  
These techniques are based on the different absorption, reflection or scattering 
between the human skins versus other materials under different lighting conditions. 
However, gelatin artificial fingerprint has optical properties very similar to human 
skin [152]. For instance, in color change approach, fake fingerprint can be detected by 
the property of color change exhibited by a real live finger when it touches a hard 
surface. This is due to interaction among the fingernail, bone, and tissue of the 
fingertip caused by applied force of real live finger when it is pressed on the hard 
surface of the scanner. This can modify the hemodynamic state of the finger, resulting 
in various patterns of blood volume or perfusion that is recognizable at the fingernail 
bed and at the surrounding skin region in contact with the scanner. A method to detect 
and quantify such color change is proposed in [169] and used to differentiate a real 
finger from the fakes. Although, this approach is privacy friendly and fast without 
any requirement or training from the user, it is not applicable with all available 
sensors but optical scanners [169].  
9. Pulse Oximetry:  
This technique is based on measuring the arterial oxygen saturation of hemoglobin in 
a pulse [19, 156]. It can be deterred by using translucent artificial fingerprint (e.g. 
gelatin) [156]. 
10. Fine Movements of the Fingertip Surface:  
This method is based on the analysis of fine movements of fingertip surface, which is 
induced by volume changes due to the blood flow. Two optical solutions are proposed 
for measuring characteristic periodic changes of the fingertip volume. The first is 
based on a system composed of a CCD camera and a macro objective to acquire 
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images and analyze that with respect to fine movements of the papillary lines to draw 
on the volume changes. The second is based on a triangulation of a distance laser 
sensor and variation of the distance to fingertip maps, to variation in fingertip volume 
with blood flow. In spite of the advantages, more investigation needs to be done to 
evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility of such methodology. In addition, matching 
techniques needs to be improved (for instance in the case of presenting similar 
patterns to real heart activity curve, measuring curves of camera and the laser is 
solution) [159].  
11. Involuntary Challenge-Response:  
This technique is based on determining the presence of a user by automatically 
(without intention) responding to the requested challenge. For instance, user's 
response to a stimulus such as muscles’ to electrical stimulation or change in the color 
of skin when pressure is applied [153]. An implemented instance of an involuntary 
challenge-response is found in the US patent detector, based on the finger's electrical 
reaction to the small impulse, which outranges response of predefined acceptable 
values assumed as fake [158].  
Another approach has been proposed by [170] to detect fake finger using an Electro tactile 
display system. There are two kinds of limitations with this technique: first lack of 
acceptability because of using the uncomfortable stimulus such as shocking; second is 
the difficulty with distinguishing between the challenged person and the true owner of 
the fingerprint presented to sensor [153]. 
12. Surface Coarseness:  
This new liveness detection approach is based on analyzing an intrinsic property of 
fingertips: surface coarseness (Figure 4.4). Firstly, a fingertip image is denoised using 
wavelet-based approach. In second step, noise residue (original image minus denoised 
image) is calculated and coarser surface texture tends to result in a stronger pixel 
value fluctuation in noise residue. Finally, standard deviation of the noise residue can 
be used as an indicator to the texture coarseness [160]. However, experimental results 
demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique on high-resolution fingertip images 
(~1000 dpi) [160]. Feasibility of such method is dependent on high-resolution 
fingerprint, which is not compatible with all current sensors. 
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Figure 4.4: Using wavelet based denoising. For left image noise residue Standard Deviation = 11.5 
while right image has noise residue Standard Deviation = 36.5 [160]. 
13. Underlying Texture and Density of the Fingerprint Images:  
In this approach, detecting "liveness" associated with fingerprint scanners is based on 
the underlying texture and density of the fingerprint images (Figure 4.5). As first step, 
multiresolution texture analysis techniques are used to minimize the energy 
associated with phase and orientation maps. Subsequently, cross ridge frequency 
analysis of fingerprint images is performed by means of statistical measures and 
weighted mean phase is calculated. As a final point, these different features along 
with ridge reliability or ridge center frequency are given as inputs to a fuzzy c-means 
classifier. Although, the algorithm has 95.36% classification for the limited data, 
more investigation with multiple scanners and different underlying technologies are 
required to validate the ability of such a scheme [161]. 
 
Figure 4.5: Result of the FCM classifier. The left centroid is for live fingerprints and right for not live 
[161]. 
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14. Perspiration:  
This is based on detecting the perspiration phenomenon between the human skin and 
other material under different conditions. In spite of the advantages, it is usually 
possible to deceive fingerprint systems by presenting a well-duplicated synthetic or 
dismembered finger. However, Derakhshani et al. [157] introduced one method to 
provide fingerprint vitality authentication in order to solve this problem. In their 
approach, vitality through fingerprint examination in conjunction with capacitive 
scanners (based on detection of the sweating pattern from two consecutive 
fingerprints), is captured during 5 seconds and a final decision about vitality is made 
by a trained neural network [158]. In addition, there are some other methods such as 
enhanced perspiration detection algorithm, which improves Derakhshani’s work by 
including other fingerprint scanner technologies and use of larger, more diverse data 
sets along with shorter time windows [162]. Another technique is based on the 
statistics of wavelet signal processing to detect the perspiration phenomenon [163]. 
However, this technique has less ability for users with low moisture and highly 
perspiration-saturated fingers, and may not exhibit liveness due to the necessity of 
specific changes in moisture. Therefore, more investigations in terms of accuracy and 
environmental conditions are required to prove efficiency of such system [153].  
15. Valley Noise Analysis:  
This software-based method distinguishes between the live and artificial finger, using 
noise analysis along the valleys in the ridge-valley structure of the fingerprint images. 
The features are extracted in multiresolution scales using the wavelet decomposition 
technique, and liveness detection separation is performed using classification trees 
and neural networks. Dissimilar to live fingers, which have clear ridge-valley 
structures, artificial fingers, have a distinct noise distribution due to the material’s 
properties when placed on a fingerprint scanner [164]. However, results show that 
this technique is very efficient (90.9–100%) for the capacitive, optical, and electro-
optical scanners [164]. Efficiency of such method for all sensors though, needs 
especial investigation of each sensor specification.  
16. Spectrographic Properties:  
This technique is based on the analysis of the spectrographic properties of living 
human tissue (Figure 4.6 Left) for fingerprinting. In this method, multispectral 
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imaging technology (MSI) uses multiple illumination wavelengths rather than the 
monochromatic illumination used in total internal reflectance (TIR) imaging.  
  
Figure 4.6: Left: Spectral-characteristics-of-spoofs and real fingerprint [165] and Right:  Schematic of 
multispectral imaging elements [166] 
In addition, polarizers can be utilized for the purpose of light penetrating surface that 
scatters several times by the time it leaves skin towards imaging array (Figure 4.6 
Right). Inexpensive films and materials are proved inefficient against this method 
[165]. Although, TIR image quality is poor for people with dry skin, it has little or no 
effect on an MSI sensor. This ability to detect subsurface features of the fingerprint, 
based on the difference optical properties of human skin and synthetic material 
observed with the MSI sensor, enables this technology to detect spoof material [165, 
166]. Therefore, more investigations need to be carried out in order to enhance 
usability and security for a fingerprint system that incorporates an MSI-based sensor 
[166].   
17. Skin Deformation:  
This technique is based on the information about how the fingertip's skin deforms 
when pressed against a surface. For instance, there are non-linear distortions between 
fingerprint impressions of the users, who are required to touch the sensor twice or 
move it once it has been in contact with the sensor surface. However, artificial 
fingerprint with the same type of requirements will only give a rigid transformation 
between the two fingerprint impressions and produce quite similar non-linear 
deformations as a live fingerprint [18]. 
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18. Spatial Frequencies of Ridgelines: 
 In this scheme, band-selective Fourier spectrum has been proposed by [171] as 
fingerprint liveness detection. This is based on reflects the distribution and strength in 
spatial frequencies of ridgelines by 2D spectrum of a fingerprint image. In addition, 
the ridge-valley texture of the fingerprint produces a ring pattern around the center in 
the Fourier spectral image and a harmonic ring pattern in the subsequent ring. On the 
other hand, these rings can be produced by both live and fake fingerprints, with 
different amplitudes in different spatial frequency bands and stronger Fourier 
spectrum in the ring by live fingerprints. As an alternative approach, Lee et al. in 
[172] introduced a new method by using the fractional Fourier transform (FrFT). 
They have found out that the energy of live fingerprints is larger than the energy of 
fake fingerprints when it is transformed into the spectral domain. Firstly, fingerprint 
image has been transformed into the spatial frequency domain using 2D Fast Fourier 
transform and detected a specific line in the spectrum image. Secondly, this line has 
been transformed into the fractional Fourier domain using the fractional Fourier 
transform together with its standard deviation to discriminate between fake and live 
fingerprints. However, their experimental results demonstrate the possibility of their 
proposed method to detect fake fingers, further investigation in term of analysis of 
fingerprint image texture and studies on more data and sensors is necessary.   
19. Pores:  
This is based on using a very high-resolution sensor to acquire a fingerprint image, 
and therefore, fingerprint details (e.g. sweat pores) can be used for liveness detection 
since they are more difficult to copy in artificial fingerprints [18]. However, it is 
possible to coarse reproduction of intra-ridge pores with gelatin artificial fingerprints 
[150].  
20. Other Claims:  
In addition to aforementioned liveness detection methods, there are several other 
claimed methods and techniques, which are neither well known due to commercial 
confidentiality or not properly validated yet (e.g. electrocardiography) [149]. The 
possible classification of involuntary liveness detection methods is shown in Table 
4.2. 
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Methods Liveness Detection Technique Limitations 
In
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 
Epidermis Temperature Lack of ability to detect the Wafer-thin silicone rubbers 
Blood Pressure Can be fooled by using underlying finger's blood pressure 
Electrocardiogram (EKG) Disrupting the system by user  movement during the EKG synchronizing 
Pulse Oximetry Can be deterred by using translucent artificial fingerprint
Odor Creation of a single model of human skin, instead of a template for each user is necessary 
Heartbeat Practical problems with diversity in heart rhythm of a user 
Detection under Epidermis Can be fooled by two different layers of artificial fingerprints with the appropriate characteristics 
Relative Dielectric Constant 
Influenced by the humidity of the finger in different 
conditions and can be fooled by wetting the silicone 
rubber 
Optical Properties Gelatin artificial fingerprint has optical properties very similar to human skin 
Skin Conductivity Can be fooled by some saliva on the silicone artificial fingerprint 
Skin Deformation Can be fooled by artificial fingerprint with the same type of requirements for original fingerprint 
Pores Possibility to produce coarse reproduction of intra-ridge pores with gelatin artificial finger 
Perspiration 
Users with low moisture may not be able to use a 
fingerprint scanner, and highly perspiration-saturated 
fingers may not exhibit liveness 
Involuntary Challenge-response
Lack of acceptability and difficulty when distinguishing 
between challenged person and true owner of the 
fingerprint 
Underlying Texture and 
Density 
Lack of relevant independent studies based on a very 
large number of users and effects of long-term 
experience on FRRs and FARs 
Surface coarseness 
Fine Movements of the 
fingertip surface 
Valley noise analysis 
Spectrographic Properties 
Spatial frequencies of 
ridgelines 
Table 4.2 Reported fingerprint involuntary liveness detection methods and limitations 
4.2.4 Measuring the Voluntary Properties of User’s Body or User’s 
Response 
As discussed above, involuntary liveness detections are suffering from a number of 
limitations such as low acceptability, lack of proven established results and additional 
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hardware requirements, and cannot operate efficiently in different environments. 
Therefore, in this subsection voluntary techniques will be investigated in order to 
address some of these limitations of involuntary approach. However, it is clear that 
voluntary techniques have higher acceptability rate due to the detection of life signs 
from user (with intention) manually at the requested challenge. A possible 
classification of voluntary liveness detection methods, available in the literature, is 
presented in the following: 
1. Using Multimodal Biometrics:  
As discussed in Chapter 2, vulnerability against spoof attacks and liveness problems 
in unimodal biometrics can be addressed through multimodal biometric technique. 
Despite, some of these restrictions can be alleviated through multimodal biometric 
approaches by providing multiple evidences of the same identity. Implementing such 
system is currently much more difficult than it seems due to environmental, cost, or 
equipment limitations. Multimodal biometric systems can be designed to operate in 
five different scenarios [10, 32]:  
a. Multi -Sensors:  
In these systems, the information derived from multiple sensors for the same biometric 
trait are incorporated. For instance, the use of multiple sensors (ultrasonic and optical) 
in order to capture different fingerprint features of user. 
b. Multimodal:  
It is based on combining the evidence from more than one biometric trait such as 
fingerprint and voice. Therefore, it is more difficult for an attacker to create both an 
artificial fingerprint and another artificial biometric identifier such as iris, voice, or 
face. However, such system is cost effective due to employ more than one sensor in 
this scenario.  
c. Multiple Units (Multi-Instance): 
This is based on enrolling multiple instances of the same body trait, which can be 
used as identification/verification by either randomization of requested fingers (e.g. 
left and right index fingers), or requesting all fingers enrolled for 
identification/verification. This can reduce the likelihood of spoofed data being 
usable for verification [152].  
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d. Multi-sample:  
This system is based on using a single sensor to acquire multiple samples of the same 
biometric trait (e.g. multiple impressions of the same finger).   
e. Multiple Algorithms:  
This system is based on processing the same biometric data by using multiple 
algorithms such as using different approaches to feature extraction or matching. 
2. Retention of Identifiable Data:  
Retaining image data (i.e. not destroyed data immediately after template generation) 
albeit posing substantial privacy and storage challenges may provide a means of 
resolving spoof claims [152]. 
3. Using Multi-Factor Authentication:  
Although using biometrics with other authentication techniques such as password-
protected smart cards reduces the probability of biometric systems being spoofed, it 
can be lost or stolen and reduces the convenience provided by biometrics [152]. In 
addition, it is not possible to employ such techniques in every application, especially 
in the case of availability of users in large numbers, which makes the template 
database much bigger than any allocated space in smart card.  
4. Fingerprint with Password:  
Using a password as identification is a very well known of the traditional methods. 
Besides, integration of password with fingerprint systems may reduce the associated 
security risk and possibility of forging with this traditional system. Such a system still 
suffers from lost or forgotten passwords. In addition, by using artificial fingerprint 
and stolen password, there is a high possibility to counterfeit such identification. 
However, this system is currently used in a number of applications such as wireless 
devices (e.g. laptop, mobile phone) due to affordability and high acceptability.  
5. Supervision:  
This technique is based on surveillance identification, verification, and enrolment to 
increase the security. Hence, it is more difficult to circumvent a system when being 
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watched. However, this technique suffers from difficulty for a supervisor to detect 
transparent gelatin artificial print glued onto a live finger [19]. 
6. Voluntary Challenge-Response:  
This technique is based on determining the presence of a user by a response to the 
requested challenge (e.g. place of birth). In voluntary case, the required response is 
based on the reaction of the user to hearing, seeing, or feeling something. Dissimilar 
to involuntary, voluntary techniques do not suffer from the lack of acceptability from 
using uncomfortable stimulus such as shocking (e.g. ask the user to enter the pin 
code). However, distinguishing between the challenge-response person and true 
owner of the fingerprint presented to the sensor is still a challenging issue in this 
technique [19, 153].  
Table 4.3, illustrates the possible classification of voluntary liveness detection 
methods.  
Methods Voluntary Measurements 
Limitations 
Multimodal 
biometrics 
Multiple sensors 
Increases the timing, measurement 
and cost 
Multiple biometrics 
Multiple units of the same 
biometric 
Multiple representation and 
matching algorithms for the 
same biometric 
Increases the timing, measurement 
and complex algorithms 
Multiple snapshots of the same 
biometric 
Increases the timing, measurement 
and decrease acceptability 
Retention of data Retaining image data Increases the timing, measurement and cost 
Multifactor 
authentication 
Fingerprint with password Can be fooled by artificial fingerprint and stolen password 
Fingerprint with password-
protected smart cards 
Can be lost or stolen and reduces the 
convenience  
provided by biometrics 
Challenge 
response 
Reaction of the user to hearing, 
seeing, or feeling something 
Difficulty of distinguishing between 
the challenge-response  
person and true owner 
Supervision Surveillance identification, verification, and enrolment 
Difficulty for a supervisor to detect 
transparent gelatin artificial print 
glued onto a live finger 
Table 4.3 Proposed fingerprint voluntary liveness detection methods and limitations 
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4.3 Summary and Discussion 
Various methods in the public domain for artificial fingerprint attacks and 
countermeasures have been reviewed in this Chapter. Although these countermeasures 
have significant advantages for detecting artificial fingerprints, there are a number of 
limitations with them as:  
a) The incompatibility of liveness techniques with some fingerprint sensors, which is 
increasing the measurement time, cost, and lack of proven results;  
b) There is no clear criterion for all sensors and scenarios, and none of available 
methods in the literature has the ability to cover all requirements independently.  
Therefore, any offered solutions for specific scenarios, and sensors, depend on special 
investigation of that scenario, individual acquisition, and related tenability of each 
sensor. Different environments and conditions used depend strongly on each sensor 
specification and each application requirement. Furthermore, more work needs to be 
done to verify these claims and evaluate security levels of each of them. Generally, the 
increase in the security of fingerprint system depends on the high recognition 
performance and liveness detection of user. However, many liveness detection 
techniques in the COTS (Commercial, Off-The-Shelf) and public domain claim to 
have had successful operations. Nevertheless, what is not clear is the proven efficient 
output (i.e. FRRs and FAR) in large number of users, and tenability experiences over 
long period of time. In this regard, using multibiometric have a number of advantages 
includes higher recognition, liveness detection, higher acceptability, and lower 
possibility of defeat due to difficulty for attacker to create both an artificial fingerprint 
and another artificial biometrics. However, it can increase the additional cost of 
sensors and authentication time, which can cause inconvenience for the user. From the 
above review, one can conclude that the security represents in fact, the prioritization of 
risks followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, 
monitor and control the negative effects (or even to accept some or all of the 
consequences of a particular risk), which is similar to other published works in the 
field [18]. Although the purpose of this Chapter was to present the particular liveness 
methods for use in fingerprint identification systems, a number of problems are 
preventing suggestions for perfect technique. The liveness technology market is 
changing rapidly, standards are not widely supported, and performance depends on the 
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operational environment and life cycle cost of the technology. Furthermore, parallel to 
improving the liveness detection technologies, various types of attacks and forges are 
improving as well, and consequently the liveness detection systems should be one-step 
ahead in order to be efficient.  
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Chapter 5 
Multibiometric Cryptosystem in Wireless Communication 
Introduction  
The recent improvement and innovation in networking, communication, and mobility 
especially in wireless networks such as GPRS and WiMAX, have increased the 
demand for enhanced security and identification in these fields. Regardless of the 
nature of the transmitting data with mobile devices, either involving the transfer of 
ownership or rights in M-Commerce or real-time monitoring of patient vital signs in 
M-Health, security of data and devices are the main issues. Many techniques have 
been proposed in the literature to employ biometric traits in wireless application such 
as Telemedicine, M-Health, and E-Commerce [6, 7]. Similarly, the embedding of 
fingerprint sensors in wireless devices such as notebook, PDA, and mobile phone has 
significantly increased during the last few years. Although, the fingerprint 
authentication system presents certain advantages from the protection viewpoint, like 
other unimodal biometric process, it is from the enrollment to the verification level 
susceptible to various types of threats and attacks. Therefore, providing the software, 
hardware, and advanced algorithms to deal with this intolerability against spoofing 
and fraud, remains an issue of concern when employing fingerprint in wireless device. 
These specific aspects are investigated in this Chapter. 
5.1 Security Challenges in Wireless Applications 
As discussed in previous chapters, wireless networks regardless of whether they use 
WiMAX or WLAN as defined in the IEEE 802.11 standard are inherently less secure 
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than wired counterparts due to the lack of physical infrastructure [9]. There are a 
number of relevant publications that have addressed attacks and security issues of 3G, 
WiMAX, and WLAN [8, 9, 43, 44, 45, 47, 208]. These network security attacks have 
been explored by Karygiannis et al. [8] in two different approaches, including passive 
and active attacks as follows: 
1) Passive Attack:  This form of attack signifies that unauthorized party 
attempts to discover valuable information or listen to the channel instead of sending 
any message or disrupt the operation of a protocol. Generally, the passive attacks can 
be classified into the two subgroups as follows:  
i) Eavesdropping: In passive eavesdropping, the attacker monitors 
transmissions for message content.  
ii) Traffic analysis (traffic flow analysis): In this method, attacker attempts to 
gains intelligence by monitoring the transmissions for patterns of communication. 
In a wireless environment, it is very difficult to detect this attack due to not 
producing any new traffic. 
2) Active Attack: This is another form of attack in which attacker inserts the 
information into the network. Although, there is a possibility to detect this kind of 
attack, it may not be feasible to prevent. This kind of attacks can be categorized as 
follows: 
i) Masquerading (Impersonation): this is based on masquerading as trusted user 
by the attacker in order to achieve unauthorized privileges.  
ii)  Replay: this form of network attack is based on retransmitting the valid data 
by the attacker who intercepts transmissions.  
iii) Message modification: this is based on altering a legitimate message by 
deleting, adding to, changing, or reordering it.  
iv) Denial-of-service (DoS attack): this is an attempt to prevent the normal use 
or management of communications facilities.  
In order to make such networks more reliable, these vulnerability issues must be 
addressed first. Otherwise, consequences can be devastating, if such systems are not 
protected against these attacks, especially in sensitive application such as military. 
There are many available publications in scientific domain [8, 9, 45, 47, 208], which 
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address this issue. Generally, wireless networks have to satisfy the following security 
requirement: 
1. Confidentiality: this is to ensure that sensitive information is never disclosed 
to unauthorized third parties.  
2. Authentication: verify the identity of the participants in a communication 
link which is known as authentication and hence, distinguishing legitimate 
users from impostors. 
3. Integrity: integrity guaranties that transformed information could never be 
corrupted or altered in any unexpected way such as radio propagation 
impairment, or malicious attacks on the network. 
4. Availability: since, DoS attacks could be launched at any layer of a wireless 
network and block a legitimate user’s access to the network, availability can 
be a major security issue. This is to ensure the survivability or network 
services despite DoS attacks. 
5. Nonrepudiation: this is to ensure that the originator of a message cannot 
deny having sent the message. 
However, in certain applications there are other security concerns such as 
authorization and audit in E-Commerce application [46]. In addition, the mobility of 
wireless handsets and the possibility of these being lost or stolen is also a security 
concern. Wireless security is an end-to-end requirement, and as explained by Ravi et 
al. [44] can be sub-divided into various security domains including; appliance 
domain, network access domain, network domain and application domain security. 
The main concentration of this chapter is designated to have a control measure in 
place prior to establishing a network connection, so that access is restricted to the 
authorized users only. Biometrics can deliver outstandingly here as compared to the 
traditional solutions for access control, taking into account the rare chances of data 
being lost or stolen. As already discussed in previous chapters, there are inherent 
problems with utilizing multimodal biometric identification systems in wireless 
communications that seem likely to prevent further attempts at improving such an 
approach. The main problems are deeply rooted starting first with the mobility of 
wireless systems and the availability in large numbers, making the system more 
intolerable against spoofing and attack. The second issue is incompatibility of some 
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biometric technologies and algorithms to allow it be employed over wireless medium. 
The latter has been alleviated by providing the incorporation of the fingerprint and 
voice recognition in previous chapters. Therefore, in order to limit the concentration 
to the scope of this thesis, providing the advanced algorithms to deal with former 
intolerability remains an issue of concern.  
5.2 Fingerprint Image Storage 
One of the main significant features in acceptability of any biometric system is 
directly dependent on where the data is stored and how it is protected. In a system 
based on one-to-one matching, the database can be decentralized (e.g. in smart card or 
on the local device) but in wireless applications due to the large numbers of users, it 
should be separated in a database center. Therefore, data and database should be 
protected against the imposter or attacker during transmission and in database. In such 
cases, the acquired sample must be transmitted securely to the location of template to 
perform the decision level. Otherwise, an incorrect storage or transmission strategy in 
a biometrics system can affect the overall biometrics system performance especially 
in wireless communications. As a result, storing biometric features in server is not an 
appropriate technique unless some countermeasures that can make the storage 
inaccessible for imposter such as encryption or anonymous techniques are employed.  
In the next sections, well-known eminent threats and attacks on the fingerprint 
template database and data communication stream are explored. In addition, some 
countermeasures and techniques to overcome such a problem are discussed and 
amongst the recommended solutions, an attempt will be made to select the most 
appropriate one.  
5.3  Protection and Attacks on the Data Communication & Template 
As compared with wired networks, the wireless technologies are more intolerable 
against various types of threats and attacks, due to primarily mobility and availability 
of data in the open area. Therefore, data and database should be protected securely 
during transmission or in database. This section concentrates on the possibility of 
attacks at the fingerprint recognition systems during transmission or in database. 
Anderson [174] and Schneier [175] have documented a number of attacks and 
vulnerability points due to errors in design, implementation, and installation. These 
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eight potential attack points (Figure 5.1) are classified in two categories called 
“Replay” and “Trojan horse” attacks [18]. 
5.3.1 Replay Attacks: 
a.  Attack on the channel between the acquisition device and the feature extractor 
by intercepting the data of a legitimate user which is replayed at a later time to the 
feature extractor; 
b.  Attack on the channel between the feature extractor and the matcher module by 
snooping a biometric feature of user, which is stored to be replayed later on the 
channel; 
c.  Attack on the channel between the system database and matcher module by 
snooping to steal the record of a user to replay later on the channel; 
d. Attack on the channel between the matcher, and the application requesting 
verification by snooping to access the response of a previous verification that is 
stored to be replayed later in the channel. 
Figure 5.1: Possible security attack points (adapted from [179]) 
5.3.2 Trojan Horse Attacks:   
e. Attack at the scanner by fooling the acquisition device (e.g. a fake fingerprint,  
such as a latent fingerprint lifted on a paper); 
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f. Attack on the feature extraction module by using a Trojan horse program to 
disguise as the feature extractor and submit artificially generated fingerprint features 
to the matcher; 
g. Attack on the system database by employing Trojan horse program to disguise as 
the system database and submit an artificially generated database; 
h. Attack on the matcher module by using Trojan horse program to disguise as a 
matcher and submit an artificially generated matching score, which can result a 
denial-of-service when generating a low matching score. 
5.4 Protection & Countermeasures 
As detailed above, the fingerprint authentication system from enrolling to the 
verification level is susceptible to Trojan horse attacks and Replay attacks. Various 
countermeasures proposed to thwart a fake fingerprint attack, therefore, providing the 
algorithms and techniques to deal with the intolerability against Trojan horse attacks 
and replay attacks are investigated in following paragraphs.  
5.4.1 Trojan Horse Attacks:  
The fingerprint authentication system processes from enroll to verification level (i.e. 
scanner, feature extraction, matcher, and system database) are susceptible to Trojan 
horse attack. Embedding a fingerprint recognition system (sensing, feature extraction, 
matching, and database) inside a smartcard is an effective way to prevent installing 
Trojan horses and to avoid intercepting the critical information [18]. However, smart 
card can be lost or stolen and it is not possible employ such techniques over wireless 
applications due to the existence of large numbers of users, which make the template 
database much bigger than any allocated space in smartcard. Therefore, these 
mentioned process levels should be located in a secure and confident position either 
by physical surveillance such as supervision or cryptography algorithms. The 
possibility to fool the scanner by fake fingerprint and the difficulty for a supervisor to 
detect, led to use the cryptography algorithms. Otherwise, it is very difficult to trust 
the scanner or feature extractor by server especially in the wireless application. In 
addition, it is impossible to use the supervision technique with a wide range of users 
such as large computer networks or wireless applications. As a result, storing 
biometric features in server is not an appropriate technique unless using some 
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countermeasures that can make the storage inaccessible for imposter such as 
encryption or anonymous techniques.  
5.4.2 Replay Attacks: 
A reply attack can demolish the trust between the process levels (i.e. scanner, feature 
extractor, matcher, and database) by resubmission of intercepted data of a legitimate 
user. Embedding a fingerprint recognition system inside a smartcard is not an 
effective way to prevent a reply attack as well as Trojan horses in wireless 
applications due to the above-mentioned limitations. Therefore, protecting the 
fingerprint information during the communication process leads to use of the 
cryptography algorithms to increase the confidence in data in any authentication 
stages as a minimum requirement in wireless applications. The next subsections 
describe various cryptographic methods that are proposed by other researchers to find 
optimum solutions preventing such replay attacks at fingerprint system. 
5.4.3 Cryptography Techniques: 
A cryptographic system is as strong as the encryption algorithms, therefore by 
counterfeits encryption algorithms such as digital signature or one-way hash 
functions, whole the system can be forged. Generally, two kinds of key based 
encryption exist; Symmetric that refers to using a single secret key for both 
encrypting and decrypting a message and Public-key which is based on using a pair of 
keys, the first key (the private key) used to encrypt a message and the second one (the 
public key) used to decrypt the message. Key distribution is difficult in symmetric 
cryptography technique especially in a large network like wireless application, in 
which many key pairs should be managed. In addition, encrypted messages can easily 
be decrypted by compromised keys, which for a two-party communication will 
require the key to be changed frequently.  
In comparison with the symmetric, the key management is easier in public-key 
cryptography because only the private key must be kept secret and the key may 
remain unchanged for considerable periods of time (even several years). Therefore, in 
a large network, the number necessary keys may be considerably smaller than in the 
symmetric-key scenario. Although this technique can be used to secure a 
communication link for data integrity, it is not able to solve the non-repudiation 
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problem. In addition, no public-key scheme has been proven to be secure and 
throughput rates for the most popular public-key encryption methods are several 
orders of magnitude slower than the best-known symmetric-key schemes [176]. 
Digital signature is able to solve the problem of non-repudiation based on the 
ensuring the receiver that a message was sent by the claimed sender. There are 
various kinds of digital signature algorithms such as Full Domain Hash and RSA-PSS 
based on RSA, which similar to the traditional handwritten signatures can provide 
non-repudiation [177]. However, the use of public-key cryptography is 
computationally expensive for digital signatures [178] and still old stored image can 
be accepted as readily as a fresh one. In the same way, a hash or digital signature of a 
signal does not check for its liveliness but its integrity [179]. 
5.4.3.1 Challenge-Response:  
Similar to the Challenge-response at the sensing level, this is based on determining 
the presence of a user by specific response from the receiver. The receiver who 
expects a fresh message from sender, first sends a nonce (challenge), requiring the 
subsequent message (response), and accepts the message as fresh only if the message 
contains the correct nonce value. For instance in fingerprint authentication, the server 
accepts the features as genuine only by receiving the secure response from the 
fingerprint scanner. The main limitation of this technique is the difficulty of 
distinguishing between the challenged responding person and the true owner of the 
fingerprint presented to the sensor [153].   
Ratha et al. [179] proposed the method called Image based challenge/response that is 
based on the challenges to the sensor (assumed to have enough intelligence to 
respond to the challenges) instead of challenges to the user. Their approach to assure 
liveliness is providing the sensor with a dissimilar challenge each time and exploits 
the availability of a large number of image pixels to produce image-dependent 
response functions. Their proposed solution, initiated at the user terminal or system, 
then transaction server (assumed is secure) generates a pseudo-random challenge for 
the transaction and sends it to the intelligent sensor. Finally, the sensor acquires a 
signal at this point of time and computes a response to the challenge based on the new 
biometric signal. It is nearly impossible to inject a fake image by integrating the 
responder onto the same chip as the sensor [179]. 
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5.4.3.2 Digitally Watermarking:  
In this scheme, images or features can be protected by embedding information into 
itself. This technique can be explored with two approaches: either visible or invisible. 
In latter, data including picture or features are available visibly (for instance, when a 
logo is added to the corner of a TV broadcast). The invisible watermarking as its 
name suggests will not change the visual appearance of the image in any way and 
only a trained eye can spot the hidden incorporated data (example of this type is 
copyright protection). In addition, digital watermarking can be classified in different 
categories depending on robustness including fragile and semi fragile. Fragile 
watermarking is a scheme that any modification is detectable while as opposite in 
robust watermarking, modification to the watermarked content has not affect the 
watermark. The latter is normally used for copyright protection or fingerprinting 
applications. In addition, semi-fragile watermark is robust to legitimate changes such 
as image compression while fragile to severe tampering or malicious distortions such 
as content modification [173].  
Generally, watermark insertion can be implemented in two common approaches 
encompasses spatial and transform domain. The transform domain watermarking 
methods are executed in the coefficients of transformed image, which is obtained by 
transform techniques such as DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform), DWT (Discrete 
Wavelet Transform), DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform), and many others. While in 
the spatial domain watermarking are directly implemented to the original image 
pixels. In addition, robust watermarks can also be performed by using a combination 
of domains as well. Usually, transform domain method is more robust to resist image 
attacks than spatial domain methods [155, 140]. However, in some cases, DCTs and 
DFTs outperform the basic solutions; the information hidden with DWTs represents 
the better surviving wavelet-based compression algorithms than information hidden 
with DCTs or DFTs [129, 135].  
For instance, Yeung et al. [128] proposed the watermarking fingerprint image by 
apply some forms of chaotic mixing to transform a visually pleasant into 
indistinguishable forms. However, visual patterns can be recovered after inverse 
transformation in their method. Finally, they have shown that their invisible fragile 
watermarking technique does not affect the recognition and retrieval accuracy. They 
believe that “watermarking of images will provided value-added protection, as well as 
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copyright notification capability, to the fingerprint data collection processes and 
subsequent usage”. 
As another case in point, Ratha et al. [179] present a method to hide small messages 
in a wavelet compressed fingerprint image, called WSQ-based data hiding. Their 
method hides such messages with minimal impact on the decompressed appearance 
of the image. Their approach is characterized by random placement of the message 
bits in the compressed and quantized WSQ indices. The fingerprint image can be 
decompressed without any visible difference by any decoder while, only the right 
decoder can locate and extract the hidden message from the compressed image. The 
main advantage of the algorithm is the possibility of using different random number 
generators or seeding strategies to make each different implementation unique. In 
addition, breaking one version will not necessarily compromise another one due to 
the necessity of compatible outputs of one the encoder with another version of the 
decoder [179]. However, the main issue in fingerprint image-based techniques is the 
lack of proven established results in term of security and any advantage over standard 
cryptographic techniques [18].  
5.4.3.3 Cancelable (Revocable) Biometrics:  
As discussed by Schneier [180] in the case of stolen biometric information during the 
process, such as a template database dissimilar to the digital certificate, the biometric 
system is unable to issue another one. For instance, if the user’s thumb fingerprint 
information has been stolen during fingerprint authentication, the user does not have 
another thumb fingerprint as a different password and this remains stolen for life. In 
addition, the biometric traits are necessarily common across different functions and as 
one should never use the same password on different systems, the consequence of 
using the same encryption key in for two different applications is quite severe (e.g. 
fingerprint to start car, unlock medical records, and access to the laptop). However, as 
compared with PIN or signature, biometrics traits are powerful in term of uniqueness, 
universality, and impossibility of lost or stolen. Biometric lacks useful characteristics 
when used as key, such as secrecy, randomness, inability to update or destroy. These 
limitations can be addressed by designing the biometric systems with ability to 
reissue, update, or destroy the template if it is compromised (e.g. stolen digital data) 
which is called “Cancelable Biometrics”. The main advantage of such system is not 
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losing the disclosed biometric information (e.g. fingerprint image or fingerprint 
template) forever and enhancing the security and privacy of the biometric system as a 
result. In addition, because of enrolling the intentionally distorted or some privileged 
information (e.g. an encryption key) in finger (or other biometric) instead of using the 
true finger, different applications are able to use a dissimilar template for which it 
becomes infeasible to change the database by using a fingerprint template [180]. 
Ratha et al. [181], have introduced cancelable biometric in order to alleviate the 
aforementioned problems with biometric systems. Their scheme consists of an 
intentional, repeatable distortion of a biometric signal based on a specific chosen 
transform. As a result, the biometric signal is distorted in the same fashion at each 
presentation for enrollment and for every authentication. Furthermore, using a 
different transform in every instance of enrollment is rendering the cross matching 
impossible. In the case of a compromised variant of the transformed biometric data, 
the transform function can simply be changed to create a new variant (transformed 
representation). When a noninvertible distortion transform is selected, even in the 
case of known transform function and transformed biometric data, the undistorted 
(original) biometric cannot be recovered [181]. Ratha et al. [182] loosely divide the 
alternate solutions emerged after defining the problem of cancelable biometrics: 
1. Biometric Salting: In this technique similar to the password “salting” in 
cryptosystems, the database is created by hashing the password (P) and 
pseudorandom string (S) together (H (P + S)). As a result, the random sequence 
increases the entropy and finally the security of the password (biometric information) 
[182]. The main advantages of salting (e.g. Biohashing) scheme are low false 
accepted rates and possibility of generating multiple templates for the same user by 
using different keys (Since the key is user-specific). However, in the case of a 
compromised user-specific key, the template is no longer secure due to the usually 
invertible transformation. In addition, it is necessary to design the salting mechanism 
in such a way that the recognition performance does not degrade due to the matching 
in the transformed domain (especially in the presence of large intra-user variations) 
[183]. 
2. Biometric Key Generation: This scheme refers to generating a key directly from 
the biometric signal without requiring any user-specific keys or tokens like 
“biometric salting” methods. In this approach, instead of storing the actual biometric 
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itself, a calculated key K (B) from the biometric (B) is stored and during verification 
it is checked if K (B) = K (B'). However, the key generation is scalable when 
compared with the salting technique; the main problem remains achieving error 
tolerance in the key due to the inability to extract the same feature at different time 
[182].   
3. Fuzzy Schemes: this is based on constructing cancelable templates by combining 
the biometric information with public auxiliary information P (also called helper data, 
shielding functions, or fuzzy extractors) to reduce the intra user variation. This 
scheme initiate by defining a metric d (B, B'), (e.g., Hamming, Euclidian, set 
distance, etc.) on noisy biometric data B and B'. In their notation, Gen and Rep 
represents generating and reproducing functions in this scheme. As next step, the 
generating function takes the biometric data along with user specific key/information 
K to produce a public string P and a secret string S, Gen(B, K) ՜ < S, P >. Finally the 
reproducing function takes the public string along with another biometric 
measurement to reproduce the secret string Rep (B', P) ՜  S. “In other words, fuzzy 
schemes extract some randomness S from B and then successfully reproduce S as 
long as d (B, B')൑ ε” [182]. 
4. Noninvertible Transforms: In this approach, the biometric is transformed using 
a one-way function stored instead of the original biometric. In addition, the 
transformation takes place in the same signal or feature space as the original 
biometric. One of the most popular non-invertible transform is a one-way hash 
function and when using it together with a verification function, can be used to hiding 
the biometric information due to the infeasibility to find x such that H(x)=h 
computationally for any given value h (information hiding). This feature can be used 
as collision avoidance due to the fact that for any given block x, it is computationally 
infeasible to find y് x such that H(y) = H(x). However, during different 
authentication attempts when passwords are the same, obtaining the same-hashed 
function it is not possible due to the impossibility of acquiring the same fingerprint 
image during various acquisitions [182].  
The non-invertible transform provides increased security than the salting approach in 
the case of compromised keys due to the nature of this function, which makes very 
hard to recover the original biometric template. Such system provides also diversity 
and revocability by using application-specific and user-specific transformation 
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functions, respectively. However, a trade-off between discriminability and 
noninvertibility of the transformation function remains the main drawback of this 
approach. This is caused by the necessity of preserving the discriminability (similarity 
structure) of the features transformation function and necessity of noninvertibility 
simultaneously in order to decrease the possibility to obtain the original feature set by 
the adversary [183]. 
Furthermore, Jain et al. [183] classified biometric cryptosystems as key binding and 
key generation systems depending on how the helper data is obtained. If this is 
obtained by a binding a key (independent of the biometric features) with the 
biometric template, it is referred as a key binding and if it is derived only from the 
biometric template and the cryptographic key is directly generated from the helper 
data, it is referred as key generation. The main advantage in the key binding system is 
that this is tolerant to intra-user variations in biometric data, due to the error 
correcting capability of the associated codeword. However, this can possibly reduce 
the matching accuracy due to the necessity of using error correction schemes by 
matching that prevents the use of sophisticated matchers developed specifically for 
matching the original biometric template. The other drawback is the necessity of 
carefully designing the helper data and not providing the diversity and revocability by 
biometric cryptosystems. As a recent trend, there are some attempts in the literature to 
introduce these two properties (diversity and revocability) into the biometric 
cryptosystems mainly by using them in conjunction with other approaches such as 
salting [184]. In contrast, the key generating cryptosystem remains an attractive 
template protection method especially in the cryptographic applications due to the 
direct generation of the key from biometrics. However, this key does not have a high 
stability and entropy due to the low stability of the biometric feature [183]. 
Ratha et al. [182] addressed the security and privacy issues with fingerprint databases 
by cancelable biometrics over other approaches. They present an analysis of the 
approximate strengths and merits for several alternatives, such as Cartesian, polar, 
and functional transformation. They showed experimentally that a surface folding 
transform achieves better results than the other two transforms. Finally, they conclude 
that a cancelable transform can be applied in the feature domain without much loss in 
performance. 
As discussed by Thomas et al. [185], the main problem in using cancelable 
fingerprints is the requirement of an explicit registration step to align a fingerprint 
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image to a pre-determined point of reference on some coordinate system. This means 
that in order to recover an alignment between two fingerprints in the feature space, it 
is easier to recover an alignment in the non-invertible transformed space and this is 
diminishing the verification performance of the fingerprint recognition system. One 
method to address this issue is the triangles technique described in [186] and 
extended in [187], which is using minutiae directly as features based on the computed 
higher-level Meta features (triangles). For any set of three minutiae, a triangle can be 
formed and the three sides of the triangles, the three angles of minutiae orientation, 
and the height of the largest triangle side are used as invariants [185]. In addition, 
Jain et al. [183] have discussed various aspects of attack against stored biometric 
templates and available techniques in the literature to counter these threats. They have 
classified template protection schemes into two categories namely the feature 
transformation and the biometric cryptosystem. In their analysis, they believe that 
there is no “best” approach yet for template protection and the choice of any 
protection scheme is directly dependent on the application scenario and requirements. 
They have presented the specific implementations of these approaches on a common 
fingerprint database. Finally, they conclude that available template protection 
schemes are not yet sufficiently mature for large-scale deployment and they do not 
meet the requirements of diversity, revocability, security, and high recognition 
performance. Therefore, they believed that the limitations of using a single template 
protection could be addressed either by hybrid schemes which take advantage of the 
different protection methods or by multibiometric and multifactor authentication 
systems [183]. 
For instance as a hybrid scheme, Bringer et al. [188] applied secure sketches to 
cancelable biometrics in order to use the security advantages of both schemes. They 
explained a specific algorithm that showed good performances on a fingerprint 
database by mixing several sketching techniques and a cancelable transformation. In 
addition, they proposed to add a physical layer of protection by embedding an 
enrolled template and the matching algorithm in a smart card [188].  
In another multibiometric instance, Sutcu et al. [189] considered a fusion of a 
minutiae-based fingerprint authentication scheme with SVD values of face biometrics 
in the feature level, which was used to construct secure templates based on the 
“secure sketch” and a known geometric transformation on minutiae. However, the 
fusion at the feature level is difficult especially in the multi-modality biometrics due 
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to the different feature representations and different similarity measures [190]. They 
have investigated different possible methods to combine the extracted features from 
different modalities, and construct secure templates to make it computationally 
infeasible to forge an “original” combination of fingerprint and face image that passes 
the authentication. Therefore, features of the transformation (minutiae to points on a 
circle) fingerprint minutiae [191] have been selected to be combined easily with SVD 
coefficients due to the same representations of features. They have shown the 
possibilities for much more complicated operations that can be performed over the 
combined biometric features before doing classification or authentication, although 
their fusion technique is based on the “and” of independent tests of fingerprint and 
face biometrics. However, the problems encountered are the precise measure of min-
entropy of the original features, due to the high dimensional space and limited data 
and determine the exact information leakage due to the sketch. 
5.5 Validation of Watermarked Fingerprint with Text Dependent 
Speaker Recognition 
Although the fingerprint authentication system represents certain advantages from the 
protection viewpoint, like other unimodal biometric process, it is from the enrollment 
to the verification level susceptible to various types of threats and attacks. Therefore, 
various available attacks and countermeasures in the public domain for different level 
of fingerprint system (sensor, template, and communication level) have been 
reviewed in this Chapter. Despite the fact that these countermeasures are able to 
represent significant advantages against number of attacks, none of available methods 
in the literature has the ability to cover all fingerprint security requirements (e.g. 
diversity, revocability, liveness detection, and high recognition performance) 
independently.  
Therefore, providing the software, hardware, and advanced algorithms to deal with 
this intolerability against spoofing and fraud, remains an issue of concern when 
employing fingerprint in wireless device. In this regard, using the hybrid schemes to 
take advantage of the different protection methods or multibiometric and multifactor 
authentication systems can alleviate some of the limitations of current fingerprint 
based system. As detailed in the previous chapter, multibiometric have a number of 
advantages includes higher recognition, liveness detection, higher acceptability, and 
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lower possibility of defeat. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, possible solution to address the 
limitations of the speaker recognition in wireless communication has been 
recommended. It is based on sending voice features instead of raw sample through the 
proposed text dependent algorithm, therefore reducing the transmission time and 
dependency of the data on the quality of microphone or communication channel. 
Therefore, watermarked fingerprint with the same text, which is used as text 
dependent speaker recognition will be combined and embedded as cancelable 
multibiometric recognition (Figure 5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Block Diagram of Recommended System 
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In the enrolment scheme first, the fingerprint is watermarked with a memorable text 
and will be sent together with the voice feature based on the same text to the server 
over wireless channel. While in the verification stage, the claimed user will be asked 
to input fingerprint with a memorable text and utterance the text that is watermarked 
with the fingerprint during the enrolment stage. Finally, matching and accepting the 
claimed user will be based on the matched input fingerprint and text dependent voice 
feature of the claimed user with the one in the database. The Discrete Wavelet 
Transform technique has been used to embed and extract the text into the fingerprint 
image. This is due to the robustness of the transform domain as compare with spatial 
domain methods and DWT represents the better surviving wavelet-based compression 
algorithms than other. This wavelet technique will be explained in depth in the next 
Chapter. 
This system has capability to take advantage of both cancelable biometric and 
multibiometric with less manipulation in wireless device, wireless communication 
and biometric system. In addition, this text dependent voice can be used as a 
challenge respond to determining the presence of a user by response to the requested 
challenge (e.g. place of birth). There are a number of other advantages for suggested 
system encompasses: 
1. Improving the accuracy of the overall system: The accuracy of the system can 
be improved by combining the information derived from multiple traits to reduce the 
FAR and FRR of the system; 
2. Cover the limitation of non-universality and noisy data: Provide sufficient 
data that is not derived from a fingerprint alone and cover the inadequate single trait 
as well (e.g. recognize the user by voice feature if fingerprint feature is not enough);    
3. Improving the security of system: In consequence of integration of multiple 
traits, it is significantly difficult for an impostor to spoofing the identity of the 
legitimate user (i.e. it is more difficult to create both an artificial fingerprint and 
voiceprint). In addition, different applications are able to use the dissimilar templates 
and features. 
4. Ability to reissue, update, or destroy the template: It has ability to reissue, 
update, or destroy the template if this is compromised (e.g. stolen digital data). In 
addition, such system is not losing disclosed biometric information (e.g. watermarked 
fingerprint or voice feature) forever which is enhancing the security and privacy. 
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5. Cover the limitation of unacceptable challenge response: Addressing the 
limitations of challenge response in this scheme by acceptability of voice in wireless 
device and simply distinguish between the challenge respond person and true owner if 
the fingerprint data contains the correct nonce (e.g. knowledge-based text dependent) 
value. 
Some of the general techniques to build cancelable fingerprint and voiceprint have 
been discussed in this and previous Chapter; implementation details of the developed 
technique over wireless communication system will be investigated in the next 
Chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Watermarked Fingerprint  
(Tested Over Wireless Network) 
 
  
Introduction 
In the previous Chapters (2, 3, 5), appropriate biometric traits (voice recognition and 
fingerprint identification) offered together with multibiometric system to provide a 
reliable authentication method with optimum performance and accuracy in wireless 
communication system. In addition, watermarking has been introduced and DWT 
(Discrete Wavelet Transform) was shown to be satisfying the need for the protection 
of fingerprint image. The purpose of this Chapter is to develop a simple and accurate 
method to obtain high level of confidence fingerprint identification and watermarking 
technique through a simulated investigation. Therefore, based on the proposed 
methodologies in the previous Chapter, embedding the watermark message into the 
fingerprint image has been design and developed. This scheme encompasses three-
step procedure, fingerprint image enhancement,  embedding the watermark message 
into the enhanced fingerprint image and verify the integrity of the claimed user by 
extracting this watermark from the watermarked fingerprint image. In addition, this 
Chapter presents the motivation for developing this method, its phases, and its 
possible advantages through the simulate investigation. 
6.1 Fingerprint Characteristics 
Each person has individual fingerprints, which consists of different patterns, which 
can be classified in different ways. The most recent standard used by experts after 
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years of study is based on three different groups, called loop (left and right), arch 
(plain and tented) and whorl or whirl (Figure 6.1). In addition, these main pattern 
types can be divided into different subgroups such as right or left loops, plain or 
narrow arches, and combinations of them. 
 
Figure 6.1: Tented arch, Arch, Left loop, Right loop, and Whorl 
 
Figure 6.2: Fingerprint 
6.2 Fingerprint Algorithm 
The fingerprint contains detailed pixel information from the ridges and valleys of the 
image (Figure 6.2). Generally, fingerprint authentication techniques comprise the 
following five steps:  
1. Fingerprint Acquisition  
A fingerprint reader is the front end of a fingerprint authentication system. This unit 
captures the fingerprint image by a sensor, which is usually one of the two types: 
optical and solid state. These types of sensor have been detailed in Chapter 4.  
2. Image Enhancement  
Once the fingerprint image is captured, its quality is usually improved by 
enhancement techniques. This is particularly necessary if the image is damaged or not 
acquired very well. 
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3. Feature Extraction 
In this stage, the characteristics or features of the ridge patterns are identified. 
Different features can be extracted from the ridges but the most prominent are called 
minutiae. These are alternatively known as endpoints (the point at which a ridge 
terminates) and bifurcations (the point at which a single ridge splits into two ridges).  
4. Matching Level 
This is the stage at which feature values are compared with similar feature values in a 
database, and a matching score is generated. 
5. Decision Level 
At this stage, a decision is made to either accept or reject the claimed identity based 
on the matching score obtained from the matching level. 
Generally, fingerprint-matching techniques can be classified in three main groups 
namely; minutiae-based, correlation-based and ridge feature-based matching [18]: 
(a) Correlation-Based Matching:  
This method is based on superimposing an image from database with the fingerprint 
image captured during the enrollment and measuring the correlation of intensities 
between corresponding pixels for different alignments. 
(b) Ridge Feature-Based Matching:  
This technique is based on features (other than minutiae) extracted from the ridge 
pattern. Despite the fact that distinctiveness of these features is lower than minutiae, 
perhaps more reliable features may be extracted because of difficulty with extraction 
of minutiae in very low-quality fingerprint images. 
(c) Minutiae-Based Matching: 
In this matching technique, minutiae (ridge terminations and ridge bifurcations) are 
chosen as features. The position of minutiae are extracted from the fingerprint image 
and stored as sets of points in a plane. The two sets of points, one from the template 
and the other from the input image, are examined based on their alignment and the 
number of pairings is used for matching. Typically, in one fingerprint, endpoints and 
bifurcations combine to form up to 30 minutiae points on average.  
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In addition, there is another possibility by reaping the advantage of two matching 
systems. For instance, Ross et al. [49] proposed a hybrid-matching scheme based on 
employing both minutiae and ridge flow information in order to represent and match 
the fingerprints. In the correlation-based approach, decision is based on the measuring 
of the correlation of intensities between corresponding pixels for different alignments. 
The performance of these two methods relies on the effect of different parameters. 
These parameters are accurate detection of minutiae points and matching techniques 
in minutiae-based techniques. In the correlation-based approach, these parameters are 
non-linear distortions and image’s noise. Nevertheless, generally minutiae-based 
presents better performance when compare with the correlation-based techniques 
[49].   
In minutiae based matching, the attempt has been made to align two sets of minutiae 
points and make a decision based on the total number of matched minutiae [26, 49]. 
On the other hand, pre-processing of fingerprint images is a critical step before 
matching and feature extraction in order to improve the quality of the image, reduce 
computational time, and remove noise in the images. Hence, many efforts have been 
reported in the public domain to address this issue. For instance, Fourier transforms 
[76], Gabor filters [192], wavelets [193], histogram equalization [48, 64], and fuzzy 
algorithms [195] together with binarization, and thinning are a number of valuable 
steps for fingerprint image enhancement. 
6.2.1 Justification of Using Fingerprint Enhancement before 
Watermarking  
In order to address the lack of security issues in wireless communication, a novel 
multibiometric system has been proposed in previous Chapter. This was based on the 
combination of watermarked fingerprint with the same text, which is used as text 
dependent speaker recognition. The focus of this Chapter is on the minutiae-based 
matching and starts from the second step of fingerprint authentication (Enhancement) 
before embedding the watermark data. This is for the reasons that fingerprint image 
consist of worthless image area without valuable ridges and furrows which must be 
excluded before matching a pair of fingers. The valuable remaining area is sometimes 
known as ROI (Region of Interest). There are many publications in scientific 
literature on watermark schemes that are based on the enhancement of the fingerprint 
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image [65, 79, 196 - 199]. For instance, Hsieh et al. [196] proposed a method based 
on the fingerprint image enhancement, discrete wavelet transform, and secret sharing 
scheme. They experimentally have shown that the retrieved enhanced fingerprint 
images are more recognizable than without enhancement.  
In addition, there are several other advantages to embedding the watermarked data 
into the fingerprint image after enhancement algorithm. Firstly, watermark detection 
can be more robust against segmentation and other attacks such as filtering, due to 
degraded quality (even if the attacker concentrating his attack on the ROI). Secondly, 
there is the possibility of removing a part of watermark data during the enhancement 
process, which can be avoided by embedding this data into ROI, instead of whole 
image. Thirdly, it can provide more transparency to the embedded watermark since 
the region of interest is a highly textured area and the human eye is less sensitive to 
changes in that area. Finally, it can be used as countermeasures against changing the 
useless part of image by the attacker. This is because the useless part of fingerprint 
image is not processing in any fingerprint recognition algorithm, and hence it is not 
possible to detect any change in that portion of the image [65].  
Therefore, some of the most common techniques used for the image enhancement 
step will be explained briefly together with proposing a novel method in the 
following section. This is to enable a discussion on the performance of the chosen 
method in comparison to other techniques in detecting artificial fingerprints or other 
attacks.   
6.3    Fingerprint Images Enhancement Algorithms 
The performance of feature extraction algorithms depend on the input fingerprint 
images and usually, fingerprint image enhancement is applied to obtain an enhanced 
output image through a set of intermediate steps. Various techniques, which are used 
to enhance the gray level of the fingerprint images, have been published in the 
scientific literature [106, 113, 119, and 202 –207]. The majority are based on the 
information about the local ridge structure in term of estimation of the local ridge 
orientation from input fingerprint images. However, such algorithms, which perform 
very well for good quality images suffer a drastic decrease of performance when low 
quality images are used, due to noise (creases, smudges, and holes). This section 
presents a novel enhancement algorithm based on the following methodology:  
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Methodology 
Fingerprint images include unnecessary information such as scars, moist or areas 
without valuable ridges and furrows, and in order to eliminate the redundant 
information and filter the useful information, a specific process using the following 
four steps has been designed: 
1. Normalization: 
Generally, by normalizing an image, the colors of the image are spread evenly and all 
available values fills instead of just a part of the available gray scale. This technique 
used to reduce the variations in gray level values along ridge and furrows [25]. 
Histogram equalization, as normalization method, is a general process used to 
enhance the contrast of images by transforming its intensity values. As a secondary 
result, it can amplify the noise, producing worse results than the original image for 
certain fingerprints. Therefore, instead of using the histogram equalization, which 
affects the whole image, CLAHE (Contrast Limited Adaptive Histogram 
Equalization) is applied to enhance the contrast of small tiles and to combine the 
neighboring tiles in an image by using bilinear interpolation, which eliminates the 
artificially induced boundaries. In addition, the 'Clip Limit' factor is applied to avoid 
over-saturation of the image, specifically in homogeneous areas that present high 
peaks in the histogram of certain image tiles due to many pixels falling inside the 
same gray level range [99]. Additionally, a combination of filters in both domains, 
spatial and Fourier is used to obtain an appropriate enhanced image.  
2. Binarization: 
Its process to transforms the gray scale image into a binary image. Binary number 
(zero and one are represent by black and white) and then thinning process that 
reduces the ridges into one-pixel width. Finally, local minutiae are located on the 
binary thinned image. Various techniques are exist to binarizing the gray scale image 
such as: iterative application of a Laplacian operator and a dynamic thresholding 
algorithm [118] or fuzzy approach that uses an adaptive thresholding to preserve the 
same number of black and white pixels for each neighborhood [195] and etc.  
In this section during this phase, the gray scale image is transformed into a binary 
image by computing the mean value of each input block matrix (16 ൈ 16) and 
replacing all pixels with equal or greater than local mean with the value 1 and other 
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pixels with the value 0 [48].  
3. Quality markup: 
In this phase, the unwanted data is removed, in order to separate the fingerprint image 
from the background or any unnecessary details before analysis. The algorithm is 
based on distinct block processing in which, the image is partitioned into blocks of 8 
by 8 pixels, each represented by a matrix. The intensity of each pixel is used for the 
elements of these matrices. The standard deviation of each matrix (block) is 
calculated. All of the elements of each matrix are then replaced by its calculated 
standard deviation. Finally, in order to obtain the boundaries for the region of interest, 
the background image is removed by comparing the values of each matrix (elements) 
to a threshold value. 
4. Thinning: 
A good thinning method will reduce the width of the ridges down to a single-pixel 
while keeping connectivity and minimizing the number of false minutia as byproduct 
of this processing [26]. Generally, fingerprint images should often be filtered again to 
remove these false minutia structures. The proposed algorithm in this thesis 
eliminates most of these false minutia structures by sliding neighborhood processing 
in a first step followed by thinning without any additional filtering. Finally, the 
fingerprint image is separated from the background and local minutiae are located on 
the binary thinned image.   
6.3.1 Histogram Equalization 
In general, enhancement is the most used technique in medical image processing and 
biometric identification based on image. This will become the bottleneck when the 
image has very poor contrast. To improve the contrast of the image, a mapping can be 
used to transform the pixel intensities of the image. Histogram equalization is a well-
known non-linear contrast enhancement technique to normalize cumulative histogram 
as the gray mapping function to obtain a new enhanced image with a uniform 
frequency distribution of image gray levels. Due to the flat distribution of the gray 
scale, basic form of the histogram can produce a worse result than the original image. 
In addition, by enhancing the contrast of an image through a transformation of its 
intensity values, the histogram equalization can amplify the visibility of image noise 
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and eliminates the minor contrast differences of pixels falling in a small special 
region. Adaptive histogram equalization (AHE), which is an improved form of basic 
HE (Histogram Equalization), was invented independently by Ketcham et al. [211], 
Hummel [210] and Pizer [212] to enhance the contrast of medical images [216]. 
Basically, AHE uses pixelated form of the original image to apply the histogram 
equalization mapping to each individual pixel. In this method, the intensity of a pixel 
in a region is adapted by the surrounding pixels. Furthermore, bilinear interpolation 
scheme is applied to avoid visibility of region boundaries. Although, different size of 
the matrix set results in a different output, an 8 × 8 matrix commonly generates 
optimum result [213]. Whilst AHE largely improves the contrast of image in 
heterogeneous areas, the major drawback is amplification of background noise in 
homogeneous areas. To overcome this problem, a limited contrast enhancement is 
applied particularly in homogeneous areas. In the contextual histogram, these areas 
are distinguished as high peaks where many pixels fall inside the same gray level. 
Therefore, application of CLAHE permits only a specific number of pixels in each of 
the bins associated with local histograms. This result in a limited slope associated 
with the gray-level assignment scheme. To keep the total count of histogram 
identical, clipped pixels are then equally redistributed over the whole histogram. In 
this case, a multiple of the average histogram contents specifies the contrast factor 
(clip limit). To achieve limited contrast enhancement, low contrast factor is used as it 
lowers the slope of the local histogram. Whilst a very high contrast factor represents 
AHE technique, a very low factor (one) results in the original image (further 
information about CLAHE can be obtained from [213,216]).  
Although, selection of appropriate clip limit generates an excellent result on most 
images, output image intensity cannot be used for quantitative measurements, where 
physical meaning of image intensity is important. As a first step of the image 
enhancement process, histogram equalization is applied to enhance the image contrast 
by transforming the intensity values of the image (the values in the color map of an 
indexed image), which are given by the following equation for k= 1,2,3, … L: 
S୩ ൌ Tሺr୩ሻ ൌ ෍ P୰൫r୨൯
୩
୨ୀଵ
ൌ ෍
n୨
n
୩
୨ୀଵ
                                        ሺ6.1ሻ 
Where S୩ is the intensity value in the processed image, corresponding to r୩ in the 
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input image, and P୰൫r୨൯, j ൌ 1,2,3, … L, represents the histogram associated with the 
intensity level of input fingerprint image. In other words, the values in a normalized 
histogram approximate the probability of occurrence of each intensity level in the 
image. In the following Figures (Figure 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6), the differences between 
the histogram of the normal fingerprint before and after histogram, equalization 
(implemented in the MATLAB Image processing toolbox by function “histeq”) is 
depicted [214]. It should be pointed out that by enhancing the contrast of an image 
through a transformation of its pixel intensity values; the histogram equalization can 
amplify the noise and produce worse results than the original image for some 
fingerprints. This is due to the fact that many pixels fall inside the same gray level 
range. Therefore, instead of applying the histogram equalization, which works on the 
whole image, CLAHE is used to enhance the contrast of the small tiles of an image 
and to combine the neighboring tiles using a bilinear interpolation. This will eliminate 
the artificially induced boundaries. In addition, 'Clip Limit' factor (implemented in the 
Matlab Image Processing Toolbox by the function “adapthisteq (f,”clipLimit”) is 
applied to avoid the over-saturation of the image, specifically in homogeneous areas, 
which display a high peak in the histogram at the particular image tile.   
By using CLAHE with Clip Limit, the slope of the Cumulative Distribution Function 
determined for the contrast histogram equalization is limited and the histogram is 
redistributed across all recorded intensities, enhancing the contrast and reducing the 
noise effects. Finally, the pixels are mapped by linearly combining the results from 
the mapping of four nearest neighboring regions. One has to note that contrast 
enhancement methods are merely designed to enhance particular characteristics in 
order to improve the image contrast. They do not supplement the structural 
information of the image. CLAHE is based on adaptive histogram equalization 
(AHE), where the histogram is calculated for the contextual region of a pixel. The 
pixels intensity is thus transformed to a value within the display range proportional to 
the pixel intensity’s rank in the local intensity histogram. CLAHE is a refinement of 
AHE where the enhancement calculation is modified by imposing a user-specified 
maximum, i.e., clip level, to the height of the local histogram, and thus on the 
maximum contrast enhancement factor. The enhancement is thereby reduced in 
uniform areas of the image, which prevents over enhancement of noise and reduces 
the edge-shadowing effect of unlimited AHE. The size of pixels contextual region 
and the clip level of the histogram are the parameters of CLAHE.  
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Figure 6.3: Original (sample1) fingerprint image (a), After CLAHE with Clip Limit (b), Histogram of 
original fingerprint (c), After Histogram equalization (d), After CLAHE (e), After CLAHE with Clip 
Limit (f). 
(a)                                                                 (b)                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
(c)                                                                 (d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(e)                                                                  (f)                                 
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Figure 6.4: Original (sample2) fingerprint image (a), After CLAHE with Clip Limit (b), Histogram of 
original fingerprint (c), After Histogram equalization (d), After CLAHE (e), After CLAHE with Clip 
Limit (f). 
(a)                                                                 (b)                            
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(e)                                                                  (f)                                 
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Figure 6.5: Original (sample3) fingerprint image (a), After CLAHE with Clip Limit (b), Histogram of 
original fingerprint (c), After Histogram equalization (d), After CLAHE (e), After CLAHE with Clip 
Limit (f). 
(a)                                                                (b)                            
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(e)                                                                  (f)                                 
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Figure 6.6: Original (sample4) fingerprint image (a), After CLAHE with Clip Limit (b), Histogram of 
original fingerprint (c), After Histogram equalization (d), After CLAHE (e), After CLAHE with Clip 
Limit (f). 
(a)                                                                 (b)                            
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(e)                                                                  (f)                                 
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The images in Figure 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 are the histogram-equalized results of the 
fingerprint images and improvements in average intensity and contrast are obvious. In 
addition, the spread of the histogram over the entire intensity increases the contrast 
and the average intensity level in the histogram of the equalized image. This level is 
higher (lighter) than the original level. The original fingerprint image and the 
corresponding processed images (after CLAHE with Clip Limit) are presented in 
Figure 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The image in Figures 6.7 is the plot of transformation 
functions of CLAHE method with clip limit of 0.5. It is quite evident that the narrow 
range of intensity is transformed into full intensity scale in the output fingerprint 
image. In order to carry out the simulation of proposed enhancement algorithm, 
fingerprint samples from the database “DB 4 NIST” (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology) [220] have been employed. NIST Fingerprint database is comprised 
of 512 × 512 pixels in 8-bit gray scale images of randomly selected digitized inked 
fingerprints. However in practice, the NIST databases [220, 221] are only largely 
diffused datasets, they are not well suited to testing “on-line” fingerprint systems. 
This is due the fact that these images are considerably varying from those acquired by 
optical or solid state sensors, which are normally available in electronic devices 
[224]. Nevertheless, it was the attainable database during the simulation process. 
Therefore, experimental investigation of the other fingerprint databases such as 
FVC2004 or FVC 2006 [222,223] is necessary as future work of this research to 
evaluate the performance and to enable the unbiasedness of proposed algorithm. The 
experimental test has been carried out in Matlab environment under windows XP 
professional on PC Pentium 4.   
 
Figure 6.7: Plot of original image histogram, after CLAHE with Clip Limit 
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6.3.2 Spatial and Fourier Domain Filtering 
Sherlock et al. [215] enhanced the fingerprint image in the Fourier domain, based on 
convoluting each image with pre-computed filters of the same size as the processed 
image. However, their algorithms do not use the full contextual information provided 
by the fingerprint image because of the assumptions that the ridge frequency is 
constant throughout the image, and decreases the number of pre-computed filters. 
Another approach has been proposed by enhancing the fingerprint image completely 
in the Fourier domain. This algorithm is based on dividing the fingerprint into 
overlapping blocks, and in each block, the image is obtained by [200]:  
Iୣ୬୦ሺx, yሻ ൌ FFTିଵ൛Fሺu, vሻ|Fሺu, vሻ|୩ൟ 
 
Fሺu, vሻ ൌ FFT൫Iሺx, yሻ൯                         ሺ6.2ሻ 
This approach does not require the computation of intrinsic images for this operation, 
which has the effect of increasing the dominant spectral components while 
attenuating the weak components [200]. According to equation 6.2, a two-
dimensional Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) is applied as a second step, and 
computing the IFFT of each dimension of the input matrix is equivalent to calculating 
the two-dimensional inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT), defined by the 
following equation [99]:  
             fሺx, yሻ ൌ
1
MN
෍ ෍ Fሺm, nሻe୨
ଶ஠୫୶
M e୨
ଶ஠୬୷
N
Nିଵ
୫ୀ଴
Mିଵ
୬ୀ଴
                 ሺ6.3ሻ 
0 ൑ x ൑ M െ 1,    0 ൑ y ൑ N െ 1 
This technique was proposed by Watson et al. [87] and Willis et al. [39] to perform a 
sort of contextual filtering without requiring explicitly computing local ridge 
orientation and frequency. In their algorithm block size of 32 ൈ 32 was found to be 
best and using a fast radix-2 FFT when the block size is a power of two, the FFT 
speed is optimum. Although , as it is considered by Willis et al. [39] requirements of 
patching in holes and smoothing, as well as separating incorrectly joined ridges is met 
in their algorithm, applying this technique raise two issues. The first is discontinuities 
at the edges of adjacent blocks and the second is at the edges and background of the 
image. In their algorithm, the former has been compensated by overlapping blocks 
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and latter by summing the gray level pixels in each block and assigning the block to 
the background if this sum exceeds a threshold. However, a large amount of overlap 
between the neighboring blocks (e.g., overlap of 24 pixels) is necessary which can 
significantly increases the enhancement time [18].  
Aguilar et al. [200], after analyzing various solutions used a combination of filters in 
both domains, spatial and Fourier to obtain an appropriate enhanced image. Their 
algorithm is based on algebraic sum of two enhanced images in which the resulting 
pixel will be white, if both images are white. As it is considered in their algorithm, 
Gabor filters have important signal properties such as optimal joint space frequency 
resolution. The even symmetric form of the Gabor function in their algorithm is given 
by: 
  Gሺx, yሻ ൌ exp ቊെ
1
2
ቈ
xଶ
δ୶ଶ
൅
yଶ
δ୷ଶ
቉ቋ cosሺ2πfxሻ                      ሺ6.4ሻ 
Where f is the ridge frequency and the choice of δ୶ଶ  and  δ୷ଶ determines the shape of 
the filter envelope and the trade-off between enhancement and spurious artifacts [31, 
200]. 
     
    Figure 6.8: Left: After Fourier Transform Right: After Combination of Filters  
6.3.3 Fingerprint Image Binarization 
The fingerprint binarization is an algorithm that produces a 1-bit type image from 8-
bit grayscale image. However, the adaptive binarization method is based on a 
threshold t, with gray-level pixels lower than t assigned to 0 and the others to 1. It is 
known that dissimilar fingerprint images have special contrast and intensity, and 
therefore, a unique threshold t is not the appropriate value for a general fingerprint 
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image analysis. The local threshold technique changes t locally, by adapting its value 
to the average local intensity. However, in very poor quality fingerprint images, the 
local threshold method cannot guarantee acceptable results and a special threshold 
value, which has sufficient effect, is required [18, 26].  
     
     
Figure 6.9: After Binarization 
A wide range of evaluation study of locally adaptive binarization has been conducted 
by Trier et al. [41]. They have shown experimentally that Niblack’s [147] method 
with post processing step appears to be the best. However, some improvement to this 
binarization method has been made by Sauvola et al. [148] and Wolf et al. [42] later. 
The fingerprint binarization based on the adaptive thresholding is a common image-
processing tool [26] and has been previously utilized in number of the fingerprint 
enhancement methods [48, 78, 84, 85]. In this Chapter, Greenberg et al. [48] method 
is applied based on determining the mean value of each input matrix and replacing all 
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pixels with equal or greater than local mean with the value 1 and other pixels with the 
value 0 (Figure 6.9). However, presented method in this thesis is able to reap the 
advantages of adaptive thresholding and Aguilar et al. [200] algorithm by summing 
the binarized images and assigning the resulting pixel to the background, if both 
belong to the background. From the experiment, this method is preferred due to the 
noticeable difference (more true minutiae) between this technique and summing the 
image after FFT and Gabor filter directly.  
6.3.4 Foreground and Background Detection 
In general, a fingerprint image contains ridges described by bright pixels and valleys 
by dark pixels plus some blank space near the edges. Normally the blank spaces are 
not valuable due to the noise of the image in this area. Therefore, the image area 
without valuable ridges and furrows must be excluded from the fingerprint image. 
The valuable remaining area is sometimes known as ROI (Region of Interest).  
    
    
Figure 6.10: (a) Fingerprint image, (b) Thresholded fingerprint image (c) Region of interest (ROI) and 
(d) ROI of fingerprint [60] 
(a)                                                                  (b)                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c)                                                                 (d) 
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Ratha et al. [60] in order to find the "interior" (aka ROI) of the fingerprint, have 
designed the algorithm based on  partitioned fingerprint  into 25 × 25 block and 
compute the percentage of white area (z) within each block and if z > t (threshold), 
set all pixels in the block to white. Otherwise, set all pixels in the block to black. In 
their algorithm, each block examined against a threshold t value obtained by the Otsu 
optimum threshold method [60]. In conclusion, each pixel is either an element of b 
(bright) or d (dark), as shown in Figure 6.10 (b). In their resulting image, the white 
region corresponds to the ROI (6.10 (c)) and by superimposing Figure 6.10 (c) on 
Figure 6.10 (a); they produce the regions of the fingerprint images, which is shown in 
Figure 6.10 (d) [60]. 
In order to find the ROI of a fingerprint, an algorithm based on distinct image block 
processing is presented in this Chapter. Suppose that the image is presented by an 
M×N matrix (corresponding to M×N pixels), whose elements define the gray scale 
intensities of the pixels. This matrix is partitioned into sub-matrices of size p × q. 
Here we assume that the numbers M and N are divisible by p and q respectively. If 
this is not the case, the image matrix is padded with zeros as necessary. As a result of 
partitioning, n ൌ ሺM ൈ Nሻ ሺp ൈ qሻ⁄  sub-matrices B୩୪ are produced: 
ܤ௞௟ ൌ ൫ܾ௜௝
௞௟൯
௣ൈ௤
                                          ሺ6.5ሻ 
   ݇ ൌ 1,2, … ݌, ݈ ൌ 1,2, … ݍ 
݅ ൌ 1,2, … ܯ ݌⁄ , ݆ ൌ 1,2, … ܰ ݍ⁄  
Where the values b୧୨
୩୪ are the intensities of the pixels in the block. Next, the standard 
deviation of all elements is calculated for each sub-matrix and all of its elements are 
replaced by the standard deviation. This operation is shown mathematically as 
follows: 
ߪ௞௟ ൌ ሺߪ௞௟ሻ௣ൈ௤                                             ሺ6.6ሻ 
ߪ௞௟ ൌ ඨ
1
݌ ൈ ݍ
෍൫ܾ௜௝
௞௟ െ ܾ௞௟തതതത൯
ଶ
௜,௝
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ܾ௞௟തതതത ൌ ଵ
௣ൈ௤
∑ ܾ௜௝
௞௟
௜,௝                                         ሺ6.7ሻ 
The transformed image consists of n blocks of different intensities. Figure 6.11 shows 
the result of this block processing for different block sizes. The reason behind using 
standard deviation will be explained as follows. Consider a block of the original 
image represented by the matrix  B୩୪ . It is reasonable to assume that if the block is 
located in the region of interest its standard deviation will be higher than the case 
where it is located in the background. This is due to the fact that the variations in 
pixel intensities are higher in the ROI compared to the background. As a result, the 
blocks located inside the ROI are brighter as can be seen in Figure 6.11.  
     
 
     
Figure 6.11: Transformed Fingerprint Image after Standard Deviation  
a) 4×4 , (b) 8×8, (c) 16×16 and (d) 32×32 
(a)                                                                  (b)                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c)                                                                 (d) 
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Figure 6.12: Boundaries after Standard Deviation 
 (a) 4×4 , (b) 8×8, (c) 16×16 (d) 32×32  
     
Figure 6.13: Left: Region of interest (ROI) and Right: ROI of fingerprint (sample4)  
(a)                                                                (b)                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)                                                                 (d) 
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Figure 6.14: Left: Region of interest (ROI) and Right: ROI of fingerprint (sample3) 
     
Figure 6.15: Left: Region of interest (ROI) and Right: ROI of fingerprint (sample2) 
        
Figure 6.16: Left: Region of interest (ROI) and Right: ROI of fingerprint (sample1) 
In order to remove the image background and obtain the ROI, each block σ୩୪ is 
examined against a threshold t value obtained by the Otsu optimum threshold method 
[217]. Elements of each matrix with higher value than the threshold are considered 
bright; otherwise, they are considered dark. In this way, the ROI is separated from the 
rest. As shown in Figure 6.12, matrices of different size result in different boundaries. 
As a result of numerical experiments, 8 × 8 matrices are selected and by 
superimposing this ROI on the binarized fingerprint, ROI of fingerprint images will 
be produced (Figure 6.13, 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16). 
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6.3.5 Thinning 
Thinning is the last step of the fingerprint image enhancement before feature 
extraction, and it is used in order to clarify the endpoints and the bifurcations in each 
specific pixel, subject to the numbers of pixels belonging to these features in the 
original fingerprints. A good thinning method will reduce the width of the ridges 
down to a single-pixel while keeping connectivity and minimizing the number of 
false minutia as byproduct of this processing [26]. Generally, in order to eliminate the 
false minutia structures (e.g. bridges, holes, spurs, spikes and lonely points) that could 
appear when using thinning operation (Figure 6.17), the fingerprint images have to be 
filtered latter. For instance, in order to eliminate the spike that often appears on the 
thinned binary images, Ratha et al [146] implement an adaptive morphological 
“open” operator.   
In this thesis an algorithm has been developed, which eliminates most of these false 
minutia structures in only one-step without any intermediate filtering. This is 
performed by using initially a sliding neighborhood processing and then thinning the 
result. Although, as it is considered by Ratha et al [146], the preprocessing stage does 
not eliminate all possible defects in the input gray scale fingerprint image (e.g. ridge 
breaks due to insufficient amount of ink and ridge cross connections due to over 
inking are not totally eliminated) and sometimes introduces some artifacts, which 
later lead to spurious features. Therefore, it might be necessary to employ post-
processing stage in order to remove these artifacts (e.g. proposed heuristic rules by 
Ratha et al [146] to eliminate any remaining ridge breaks, spikes, and boundary 
effect).  
           
Figure 6.17: Affection of thinning without Sliding Neighborhood 
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Figure 6.18: Fingerprint after sliding neighborhood a) 2×2, (b) 3×3, (c) 4×4and (d) 5×5 
     
           
Figure 6.19: Fingerprint after thinning (a) 2×2, (b) 3×3, (c) 4×4 and (d) 5×5 
(a)                                                            (b)                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c)                                                           (d) 
(a)                                                            (b)                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c)                                                           (d) 
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A pixel's neighborhood is some set of pixels, defined by their locations relative to the 
center pixel and the analysis is performed on a pixel at a time. The value of any given 
pixel in the output image is determined by the application of an algorithm to the 
values of the corresponding input pixel's neighborhood. The neighborhood is a 
rectangular block that is slides in the same direction as you move from one element to 
the next in an image matrix.  
      
         
Figure 6.20: Fingerprint after thinning     
Determining the Center Pixel is based on the odd or even number of rows and 
columns of neighborhood. If it both dimensions has an odd number, the center pixel is 
essentially in the center and if any of dimensions has an even number, the center pixel 
is just to the left or above center. For instance, the center pixel in a 2 × 2 
neighborhood is the upper left one. Generally, the center pixel in any m × n 
neighborhood is mathematically shown by [99]:   
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                                 Floor (([m n] +1)/2)                                  ሺ6.8ሻ 
As illustrated in Figure 6.18 and 6.19, the selection of different sets of blocks results 
in different outputs, and if the size of the block is bigger that 2×2, discontinuous 
ridges will be produced in the fingerprint image. Therefore, 2×2 set of matrices are 
applied in this step to avoid any discontinuous ridges (Figure 6.20). However, this 
algorithm has different effect on dissimilar fingerprint database depend on the width 
of the ridges and nature of the existing false minutia structures in the image. As it is 
explained earlier, the employed database in this thesis is considerably varying from 
those acquired by optical or solid state sensors, which are normally available in 
electronic devices.  
6.3.6 Summary 
Different methods in the public domain for fingerprint image enhancement have been 
reviewed, and a new methodology allowing superior performances is proposed. In 
order to avoid specific shortfalls of this process, the procedure follows first the 
application of CLAHE with Clip Limit in order to enhance the contrast of small tiles, 
to eliminate the artificially induced boundaries and to avoid over-saturation of the 
image specifically in homogeneous areas. In addition, a combination of filters in both 
domains, spatial and Fourier is used to obtain an appropriate enhanced image. 
Some possible new developments have been carried out especially by applying the 
standard deviation analysis of the array to each distinct M × N blocks of image in 
order to remove the background and obtain the region of interest. The last phase of 
this new enhancement methodology is the application of the sliding neighborhood 
processing to obtain a thinned fingerprint image without any intermediate filtering 
and substantial reduction of the computational complexity. The analysis of its 
possible advantages is carried out through a simulated investigation. 
6.4 Proposed Watermarking Algorithm:  
In the previous Chapter, various watermarking techniques and possible domains in 
order to embed the watermark has been reviewed. As detailed, embedding the 
watermark in the transform domain is more robust as compared with spatial domain. 
Therefore, DWT, which is of latter type, is utilized to embed the watermark into the 
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fingerprint image. This section focuses on the study of watermarking the fingerprint 
image as used in the proposed multibiometric cryptosystem in previous Chapter. 
Methodology 
Based on the proposed algorithm in Chapter 5, this section describes the methodology 
for performing the fingerprint watermarking with text. This algorithm is divided into 
two parts, watermark embedding and watermark extraction. In the watermark 
embedding stage, firstly, presented memorable word by the user is converted to the 
image. In a second step, a single-level two-dimensional wavelet (DWT2) is applied to 
the enhanced fingerprint image and transformed image of the text from prior step. 
This is to decompose both images into low-pass subband and high-pass subbands. 
Finally, after embedding watermark coefficients to the most significant coefficients at 
the low and high frequency bands of the discrete wavelet transform of an fingerprint 
image, watermarked fingerprint image has been reconstructed by using single-level 
inverse discrete two-dimensional wavelet transform (IDWT2). In the watermark 
extraction stage, the memorable word has been used to verify the integrity of the 
watermarked fingerprint image by the process of detection. Figures 6.21 and 6.22 
illustrate the flowcharts of embedding and extraction respectively. 
 
Figure 6.21: Watermark Embedding Process 
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Figure 6.22: Watermark Extraction Process 
The above approach is explained in more detail as follows: 
A. Decomposition 
As detailed in previous Chapter, watermark can be embedded in either the spatial 
domain or frequency. The watermark embedded in the frequency domain is more 
robust than in the spatial domain. As is explained by Mallat [218], a wavelet 
transform can be interpreted as decomposition into a set of frequency bands having 
the same bandwidth on a logarithmic scale. It comes with superior advantages and 
hence, discrete wavelet transform (DWT) is preferred in this work at decomposition 
stage. As is shown in Figure 6.23, firstly, input signal is computed by a successive 
low-pass decomposition (Lo_D) and high-pass (Hi_D). Two-dimensional DWT leads 
to a decomposition of approximation coefficients at level j in four components. This 
encompasses the approximation at level j + 1, which is produced from pure low-pass 
together with the decompositions produced from high-pass in three orientations 
(horizontal, vertical, and diagonal). The following chart describes the basic 
decomposition steps for fingerprint and watermark images: 
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Figure 6.23: Decomposition steps of two-dimensional DWT [99] 
Where downsample columns and rows keep the even indexed columns, and even 
indexed rows respectively. In addition, Lo_D and Hi_D convolve at rows with filter 
X, the rows of the entry, which is set to “Harr” filter in this experiment, and at 
columns, with filter x, the columns of the entry.  
Computing the approximation coefficient (cA) of the watermarked fingerprint image 
is mathematically shown below [201, 219]:  
ܫௐ
ᇱ = ܫௐ (1+ α ௐܹ )                               (6.9) 
Where IW′  represents the cA of the watermarked fingerprint image I, IW  is the 
approximation coefficient (cA) of the fingerprint image and WW  is the (cA) of the 
watermark W. As expleained above these two coefficient (WW  and IW ) can be 
produced by using the DWT low-pass decomposition. In addition, there are three 
detailed information coefficients (cH, cV, and cD) of the watermarked fingerprint 
image IWᇱ   that are embedded in the higher frequency components of the image. 
Computing these coefficients is based on the following equation: 
ܫௐ
ᇱ = ܫௐ + β ௐܹ                                 (6.10) 
Where, IW  is the coefficient (cH, cV, or cD) of the fingerprint image I and WW is the 
corresponding coefficient of the watermark image W. As explained previously, these 
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three coefficients can be produced from the DWT high-pass decompositions in three 
orientations (horizontal, vertical, and diagonal).  
        
        
     
Figure 6.24: Invisibility of the watermark Image against Various value of α and β 
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As detailed by Taskovski et al. [219] and Lam et al. [201], human eyes are very 
sensitive to changes from low-pass decomposition but not sensitive to small changes 
in the edges and the textures which are embedded in the higher frequency 
components of the image. This is due to sensitivity of human eyes to small changes in 
smooth part of the image that is represented by low-resolution representation in which 
most of the information in image is located. Therefore, invisibility of the watermark 
is kept by selecting a smaller value of α, and a larger value of β. This invisibility is 
depicted in Figure 6.24.    
B. Embedding a Watermark Image into the Fingerprint Image 
Once these coefficients are obtained for both fingerprint and watermark images, the 
watermark image ones can be embedded into those of fingerprint. Firstly, fingerprint 
wavelet coefficients (IW ) and those from watermarked (WW ) are generated by a 
single-level two-dimensional wavelet transformation. Secondly, in order to obtain the 
approximation coefficient (cA) and three coefficients (cH, cV, and cD) for the 
watermarked fingerprint image, the equation 6.9 and 6.10 are being applied. 
 
Figure 6.25: Reconstruction step of Two-Dimensional IDWT [99] 
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Furthermore, in order to reconstruct the watermarked fingerprint image, inverse 
Discrete Wavelet Transformation (IDWT) is applied to these coefficients, as is being 
discussed below.   
C. Image  Reconstruction 
In this step, after embedding the watermark image coefficients, IDWT is applied to 
the watermarked fingerprint coefficients in order to achieve the final secure 
watermarked fingerprint image. Those decomposed components can then be 
assembled back into the original fingerprint image. This process is called 
reconstruction, or synthesis, and mathematical manipulation that affects synthesis is 
called the inverse discrete wavelet transform. Therefore, to reconstruct the 
watermarked fingerprint from the wavelet coefficients, IDWT2 has been performed. 
Figure 6.25 illustrates above, where upsample columns and rows insert zeros at odd-
indexed columns and rows respectively. In addition, Lo_R and Hi_R at rows 
convolve with filter X, the rows of the entry, which is set to “Harr” filter in this 
experiment, while at columns; convolve with filter x the columns of the entry.  
D. Retrieving an Embedded Watermark  
In the previous steps, the discrete wavelet transform has been used to decompose 
images and then watermark image coefficients are embedded into the fingerprint 
image coefficients and assembled back into the original image by inverse discrete 
wavelet transform. Generally, the task of decoding the watermarked image is to verify 
the presence of the watermark image. However, because of using fingerprint image as 
host image, the fingerprint image should be unique; otherwise, it will cause the false 
acceptance for the imposter. This is due to the fact that fingerprint technology is 
unable to obtain the identical image and feature, each and every time scanning and 
analysis is done. Therefore, in order to address the problem of indistinctness in a 
fingerprint image when presented at different times, watermark image has been used 
to extract the fingerprint image. Finally, this extracted fingerprint image can be 
matched against the one that is stored in the database to verify the integrity of the 
claimed user. In addition, presence of the memorable word can be verified during this 
process. Figures 6.26 illustrates the original fingerprint and watermarked fingerprint 
images, extracted watermark and extracted fingerprint images.  
 115 
   
     
Figure 6.26: (a) Original Fingerprint (b) Watermarked Fingerprint image. (c) Watermark image and 
(d) Extracted Fingerprint image 
6.4.1 Summary: 
This section has been introduced and developed fingerprint watermarking technique 
based on the proposed multibiometric system in the previous Chapter. This scheme 
encompassed five-step procedure; novel three-step procedure for the fingerprint 
image enhancement together with two step embedding and extracting the watermark 
into the enhanced fingerprint image.  
As indicated in this Chapter, feature extraction in fingerprint minutiae-based 
matching is performed by two-dimensional storage of sets of points extracted from 
two fingerprints. The performance of feature extraction algorithms highly depend on 
the quality of input fingerprint images and usually, to improve the quality of output 
(a)                                                               (b)                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)                                                              (d) 
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image, an intermediate step of fingerprint image enhancement is required. In addition, 
there are several advantages to embedding the watermarked data into the enhanced 
fingerprint image, which is detailed in subsection 6.2.1. Therefore, section 6.3 
introduces a novel method for enhancement of fingerprint image by means of 
eliminating the artificial induced boundaries, precise background omission; avoid 
oversaturation of the image in homogeneous areas, with no intermediate filtering and 
computational complexity. In order to eliminate the induced boundaries, CLAHE 
(contrast limited adaptive histogram equalization) technique is employed. ‘Clip 
Limit’ is then applied in order to avoid oversaturation of the image in homogeneous 
areas. Subsequently, the image is disintegrated into an array of distinct blocks and the 
discrimination of the blocks is obtained by computing the standard deviation of the 
matrix elements to remove the image background. Once the boundary for the region 
of interest is obtained, a new modified thinning method using slide neighborhood 
processing is applied to clarify the endpoints and the bifurcations in each specific 
pixel. In contrast to other thinning algorithm, proposed approach does not require any 
intermediate filtering and substantial reduction of the computational complexity. The 
analysis of proposed fingerprint image enhancement and its possible advantages is 
carried out through a simulated investigation in the section.   
Finally, in section 6.4 watermarking technique has been introduced and DWT 
(Discrete Wavelet Transform) shown to be satisfying the need for the protection of 
fingerprint image. The purpose of this is to develop a simple and accurate method to 
obtain high level of confidence fingerprint identification and watermarking technique 
through a simulated investigation. Therefore, based on the proposed methodologies in 
previous Chapter embedding the watermark message into the fingerprint image has 
been design and developed. This scheme encompasses two-phases including 
converting the memorable word into image and embedding this watermark into the 
enhanced fingerprint image as first step and then verify the integrity of the claimed 
user by extracting this watermark from the watermarked fingerprint image. As it is 
shown in Figure 6.26, this image has been embedded into and extracted successfully 
from enhanced fingerprint image without any effect on appearance of the 
watermarked fingerprint and extracted fingerprint image. Furthermore, there is 
possibility of using different letter of the memorable word to make each different 
implementation unique. Therefore, breaking one version of the watermarked image 
will not necessarily compromise another one.  
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6.5 Applying Proposed Algorithm to Wireless Communication  
In this thesis, unimodal and multimodal biometric were reviewed in theory and 
experiments in an attempt to find the optimum type of biometric traits with better 
throughput performance and accuracy in wireless communication systems. In Chapter 
2, 3 and 5, literature review was provided with the aim of finding the biometric 
solution to protect wireless communication and finally linking appropriate biometric 
algorithms and techniques together. An algorithm to approach this goal is 
watermarking the fingerprint with the same text as a text-dependent voice recognition 
that in turn can be combined and embedded to form a cancelable multibiometric 
recognition. Such a method comes with the capability of taking advantage of both 
cancelable biometric and multibiometric. General techniques to build cancelable 
fingerprint and speaker verification have been discussed in Chapter 3 and 5. In 
addition, an appropriate fingerprint image enhancement and watermarking technique 
has been proposed and simulated in section 6.3 and 6.4 together with the voice 
recognition algorithm in Chapter 3. As discussed in previous Chapters, these 
biometric authentication techniques are able to cover the limitations of information 
security objectives in wireless communications. In spite of these advantages, 
providing the real-time authentication together with decreasing the bandwidth 
consumption in many wireless applications remains a challenging research issue. In 
this section, an attempt has been made to assess and evaluate the performance of 
proposed system. This encompasses the investigations and discussions on such 
fundamental issues, the implementation of this system and its effect on the relative 
performance over various wireless communication systems (WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G).  
Methodology 
The five-step challenge/response process (Figure 6.27) has been developed based on 
the described proposed methodologies in Chapter 3 and 5. As detailed in Chapter 5, in 
order to prove the validity of the presented fingerprint by the claimed user, the server 
should recognize the fingerprint and send a challenge in the form of a word or phrase 
to the user. Finally, the server accepts the user as genuine only by receiving the 
secure response, which is pronouncing the challenge (voiceprint). This form of 
implementing multibiometric in wireless communication can address the identified 
limitations of fingerprint identification by distinguishing the claimed   person and true 
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owner of the fingerprint though the user’s voiceprint. There are two initial steps 
involved prior to engaging the user with challenge and awaiting user’s response.  
Establishing Security Capability 
This phase is based on initiating the connection between user and server to have 
access to the service, device, or data. The user of a wireless device (e.g. PDA or 
Laptop) sends the request to server and asks for access to the data or facility. 
Processing Request 
The server begins this phase by sending User ID request (Fingerprint), in order to 
start authentication of the user. 
Phase 1: Presenting the User Fingerprint and Memorable Word 
Upon receipt of User ID requested by server, the user starts identification process by 
presenting his/her own fingerprint and memorable word as the User ID requested by 
server. The identification depends solely on fingerprints to authenticate the identity 
claimed by an individual who requires the access. 
Phase 2: Authenticating the User and Retrieving the Challenge 
Once the user’s watermarked fingerprint is received, fingerprint identification will be 
implemented by the server. If the user is accepted by identification process, a related 
challenge in the form of word, or phrase will be retrieved from the watermarked 
fingerprint in database in order to verify the integrity of presented fingerprint.  
Phase 3: Responding to the Challenge by Voiceprint 
In this phase, the user responds to the requested challenge by pronouncing the phrase 
or word and sending it to sever as voiceprint. This response to the requested challenge 
can be used to verify either the claimed user is genuine or imposter, by verifying the 
liveness of presented fingerprint and avoiding any possible replay or Trojan horse 
attack. As it is detailed in Chapter 3, it is based on sending voice features (cepstral 
coefficients) instead of raw sample through the proposed system, therefore reducing 
the transmission time and dependency of the data on the quality of microphone or 
communication channel. In addition, this scheme has the benefit of the transcoding as 
well as no packet being lost. One point should be noted here is the high quality of 
acquired speech due to the controlled condition.  
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 Phase 4: Authenticating the Response 
Upon receipt of user response, the server will typically authenticate the received 
response from the user through the voice recognition algorithm. This is to validate the 
legitimacy of the user in order to have access to the service or data.  
Phase 5: Accepting or Rejecting the User 
This phase completes the setting up of a protected connection between the user of 
wireless device and remote server by either providing permission to have access or 
denying the user. 
Figure 6.27: Schematic Challenge/Response for Implementing Multibiometric in Wireless 
Communication 
 120 
6.6 Simulation of Projected System in Wireless Communication 
In the previous section, an appropriate architecture was offered to provide a 
multibiometric solution over wireless communication. This section simulates a 
projected model over three wireless technologies, WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G. After such 
a model is being simulated, the results will be presented to check the effect of these 
networks upon the performance of the proposed system in terms of speed, reliability, 
and the quality of service. Therefore, the five-step challenge/response process will be 
accomplished over WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G, and the most important parameters 
including corresponding delay, throughput, and jitter will be analyzed. Finally, these 
parameters can be further studied by investigating their effects on the proposed 
multibiometric applications in wireless communication. This is to clarify how 
wireless communication systems can benefit through this system.   
Simulation Software and Environment: 
In order to measure QoS (delay, throughput, and jitter), the Wireshark software [209] 
has been used which is a network packet analyzer. Wireshark will try to capture 
network packets and display packet data as detailed as possible. In addition, the 
experimental test has been carried out under Windows XP Professional on two 
Pentium (R) 4 notebooks, CPU 2.80 GHz as client and server. The delay (D) was 
monitored for every single packet and different sizes of watermarked fingerprints 
were tested using the PING utility tool based on the following equation: 
D ൌ ሾሺ܀܋ି܂ܛሻ ା ሺ܀ܛି܂܋ሻሿ
ଶ
                                        (6.13) 
Where Ts is the time at which the packet was sent from the server. The time at which 
the packet was received by the client on the other hand is Rc. Similarly, Tc is the time 
at which the packet was sent from the client and the time at which the packet was 
received by the server is Rs. In addition, in order to experience the worst case of 
voice features in terms of size, maximum packet size of this feature has been utilized 
(126 KB). The tests for every packet size were performed four times, in different 
periods of a day. Every single packet size was tested 20 times in a single period of a 
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day, and its average was calculated. The second parameter, jitter was monitored 
automatically on both client and server sides based on the following equations: 
Net Jitter = 1/2  ෍ Tୱ౤శభି Tୱ౤
Nିଵ
ே
௡ୀ଴
 + Tୡ౤శభି Tୡ౤
Nିଵ
               (6.14) 
Where N and Ts୬ are total number of packets and the time at which the packet (n) is 
received at the server respectively. As detailed in Chapter 5, watermark fingerprint 
and voice features will be sent instead of sending the raw voice file in order to avoid 
packets being lost. In spite of the fact that TCP can address the packet loss issue by 
retransmitting the missing packets, it can decrease the throughput of the connection. 
Therefore, these throughputs were measured automatically using Wireshark. The 
throughput at the client (uplink throughput) was measured when the server was 
sending and similarly, the throughput at the server (downlink throughput) was 
measured when the client was sending. The test was carried out around four to five 
times in order to calculate the average throughput for every individual file size. 
Simulation begins by sending the eight various sizes of fingerprint as phase one of 
proposed system in which the smallest, medium, and the largest sizes of data have 
been selected. The packets then are delivered through the three selected wireless 
technologies (WiMAX, Wi-Fi, and 3G) in order to measure QoS (delay, throughput, 
and jitter). The same process is carried out for the largest voice packet size. The 
Matlab codes employed in voice feature (cepstral coefficients) extraction have been 
provided for public use [61]. After the simulation, the results can be extracted from 
the measured parameters (delay, throughput, and jitter). The parameters here can be 
varied over the different wireless technologies. Finally, with the parameters being 
varied and under different technologies, the results can be evaluated. 
6.6.1  Delay, Throughput, and Jitter for Fingerprint in Different 
Wireless Technologies: 
The experiment was carried out by connecting the system to a hub and configuring its 
respective IPs. The substation was connected to a computer and was treated as a 
client. The base station was connected to another system and treated as a server. The 
readings for delay were noted initially at 5% bandwidth. To enable monitoring of 
delay over small packet sizes, the bandwidth was reduced to 1%. Ping application did 
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not react to 1% bandwidth since the packets were damaged and hence the bandwidth 
was set to 3%. In addition, the Wi-Fi network at Brunel University and T-Mobile 3G-
network card has been used for this simulation. The computer connected with the 
network card was treated as the server and another as client. Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 
depict the average delay, throughput and jitter for every corresponding fingerprint 
packet respectively in WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G networks. The delay for every single 
network varies which shows the speed, external interference, and performances of 
every single network. As is shown in these three tables, the maximum delay, 
throughput, and jitter are 18.19, 507and 1.84 respectively in WiMAX, 82.44, 445 and 
3.79 in Wi-Fi and 284.29, 129 and  12.64 in 3G networks.  
FILE SIZE 
(KB) 
WiMAX 
54 59 72 150 256 364 482 570 
Delay(ms) 14.4 14.52 18.12 16.11 17.19 12.65 18.19 17.54 
Throughput 
(kbps) 502 502 501 507 504 501 502 504 
Jitter(ms) 1.76 0.89 1.84 1.92 1.21 0.94 1.14 1.17 
Table 6.1: Delay, Throughput, and Jitter for WiMAX 
 
FILE SIZE 
(KB) 
Wi-Fi 
54 59 72 150 256 364 482 570 
Delay(ms) 80.24 81.39 80.91 81.27 80.63 82.44 81.42 81.18 
Throughput 
(kbps) 346 354 402 296 336 445 339 375 
Jitter(ms) 2.17 3.79 3.25 2.36 2.76 1.92 1.21 2.25 
Table 6.2: Delay, Throughput, and Jitter for Wi-Fi 
 
FILE SIZE 
(KB) 
3G 
54 59 72 150 256 364 482 570 
Delay(ms) 161.32 162.26 164.42 166.17 216.2 227.37 238.47 284.29
Throughput 
(kbps) 114 119 121 113 129 134 116 118 
Jitter(ms) 10.54 9.65 10.73 12.64 10.31 11.54 12.52 11.86 
Table 6.3: Delay, Throughput, and Jitter for 3G 
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6.6.2 Delay, Throughput, and Jitter for Voice Features in Different 
Wireless Technologies: 
The table 6.4 shows the delay comparison for different sizes of voice features for all 
the three technologies WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G. The delay for all the three 
technologies clearly explains the performance of each technology. The delay was 
monitored for every single packet size and tabulated as shown below. In addition, 
table 6.5 illustrates the average delay, throughput, and jitter for the largest voice 
feature in WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G networks.  
Wireless 
Technology 
FILE SIZE (KB) 
27 48 54 67 89 93 108 126 
WiMAX 
(ms) 10.54 11.89 12.97 11.21 12.11 13.32 14.74 12.64 
Wi-Fi 
(ms) 71.24 71.39 72.99 71.2 71.26 72.4 89.1 71.32 
3G 
(ms) 101.1 108.3 118.9 119.6 124.43 129.3 135.41 141.17 
Table 6.4: Delay Comparison for Voice Features in WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G 
 
 
Maximum voice feature size 
(126KB) 
WiMAX Wi-Fi 3G 
Delay(ms) 12.64 71.32 141.17 
Throughput (kbps) 596 342 146 
Jitter(ms) 2.2 2.8 11.18 
Table 6.5: Delay, Throughput, and Jitter of largest Voice Feature for Different Technologies 
6.6.3 Analysis 
As discussed in the literature review, WiMAX technology proved to be the quickest 
with high performance to transfer biometric data over the network due to the shortest 
delay as compared to the other networks (Wi-Fi and 3G). In addition, though different 
sizes of packets have been sent, the network delay always remains just about constant 
in WiMAX and Wi-Fi. However, the measured throughput varies for each technology 
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and this is due to the experiments being carried out in different times, i.e. peak and 
off-peak. The jitters of all the three technologies did vary drastically from one 
another.   
Obviously, specific requirements for any biometric system depend on the scenario 
and its requirements. To the best of our knowledge, there is no set standard for 
applying biometrics over internet or wireless communication, unless for voice and 
video. Latter addressed by ITU (International Telecommunication Union), Cisco[38] 
measures standard requirement for QoS parameter (150 ms is defined as acceptable 
delay, higher than 400ms is unacceptable and between these values user should be 
aware of quality issues, acceptable jitter is 30ms, and the guaranteed bandwidth for 
the video should be at least 1.2 times the actual throughput). Therefore, if guaranteed 
bandwidth is accepted for the voice and video, it is accepted in this algorithm 
(fingerprint and voice features) due to the less throughput requirement. There is 
however no restrictions on the proposed challenge/response algorithm in terms of 
delay, jitter, and throughput except in cases that requires verifying identities in real- 
time or near real-time delivery (no appreciable time delay). The Figures 6.28 and 6.29 
show the delay comparison of different technologies with watermarked fingerprints 
and voice features differing sizably for WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G. The delays for all the 
three technologies clearly explain the performance of each technology. The delay 
does not increase proportionally as the file size increases in Wi-Fi and WiMAX, due 
to the background traffic in the network. However, maximum delay in the worst case, 
faced in 3G network, was 284.29 ms for fingerprint and 141.17 ms for voice feature, 
which is acceptable even in the real time communication. It should be noted that the 
main factors that were involved in delay encompass limited bandwidth of tested 3G 
network (150 kbps), signal variations, and background traffic. Therefore, in the case 
of real-time requirements and limited bandwidth in some environment (e.g. aircraft), 
either increasing the bandwidth or designating the special communication without any 
background traffic can be possible solutions. As an alternative solution to save the 
bandwidth in wireless channel, some effective compression techniques with small 
acceptable loss like Wavelet Scalar Quantization (WSQ) can be utilized for 
fingerprints. Although the jitters of all the three technologies vary drastically from 
each other, they are still all considered within the accepted range for every single 
network.   
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Figure 6.28: Delay Comparison for Different Size of Watermarked Fingerprint over Different 
Technologies 
Figure 6.29: Delay Comparison for Different Size of Voice Features over Different Technologies 
6.7 Summary: 
In this thesis, a novel multibiometric system has been developed and proposed to 
achieve a fully automatic positive personal identification with high level of 
confidence over wireless applications. In previous Chapters, theoretical attempt has 
been made to assesses and evaluate the performance of proposed method over various 
wireless communication systems (WiMAX, Wi-Fi, and 3G). The review of the 
technological background on the multibiometric technologies has been performed 
with greater depth on why biometrics has been selected and what are the limitations 
of these biometric techniques in wireless applications. In this Chapter, an 
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experimental study has been implemented to empirically evaluate the feasibility of 
such systems in wireless communications. Many network packet analyzers have been 
studied and finally Wireshark was found to be the best suited as it remains operable 
over many operating systems and definitely, it provides many advantages when 
compared with other available simulators. In this regard, experimental investigation 
of this system in wireless communications has been executed in two steps (phase one 
and three). This is due to the dependency of these two phases on QoS of 
communication channel. Therefore as a first step, various sizes of watermarked 
fingerprints have been selected and delivered through the three selected wireless 
technologies (WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 3G), in order to measure QoS (delay, throughput, 
and jitter). As second step, the same process was done for the largest voice packet 
sizes. Based on the experimental results, it is shown that such system is fully capable 
of being applied over these wireless communication channels (WiMAX, Wi-Fi and 
3G). However, as it has been shown experimentally, the delays for WiMAX and Wi-
Fi were shorter compared to 3G. In addition, as discussed in previous Chapters, the 
system provides an adequate security to prevent service theft, thus protecting the 
service provider’s investments in wireless infrastructure through projected system. 
The performance comparison of WiMAX with Wi-Fi and 3G has provided a clear 
approach of implementing multibiometric in WiMAX for adequate security. 
Therefore, proposed multibiometric cryptosystem can be applied in real time for all 
types of mentioned wireless networks. Although, the developed integrated system has 
been simulated through wireless channel and simple test has been performed to 
validate its capability, the full evaluation based on the requirement of each specific 
application is necessary. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendation for Future Work 
The main concentration of this thesis has been designated to having a control measure 
in place prior to establishing a wireless network connection, so that access is 
restricted to the authorized users only. In previous chapters (2 and 5), the limitations 
of using single biometric protection techniques and possible solutions to address them 
through the employment of multibiometric cryptosystem are presented together with a 
motivation for developing such methods. This system is built upon a complete 
challenge/response methodology in order to obtain a high level of security on the 
basis of user identification by fingerprint and further confirmation by verification of 
the user through text-dependent speaker recognition. First in the enrolment stage, 
fingerprint is watermarked with a memorable text and is sent together with the voice 
feature, constructed from the same text, to the server over wireless channel. Then in 
the verification stage, the claimed user will be asked to input the fingerprint plus 
memorable text, to be watermarked, and utter the same text for comparison with that 
of enrolment stage, for final acceptance or rejection. In addition, in chapters 3 and 6 
appropriate fingerprint and speaker recognition algorithms have been described. In 
order to implement fingerprint watermarking, i.e. incorporating the memorable word 
as a watermark message into the fingerprint image, an algorithm of five steps has 
been developed. The first three novel steps having to do with the fingerprint image 
enhancement (CLAHE with 'Clip Limit', standard deviation analysis and sliding 
neighborhood) are followed with further two steps for embedding, and extracting the 
watermark into the enhanced fingerprint image utilizing Discrete Wavelet Transform 
(DWT). In the speaker recognition stage, the limitations of this technique in wireless 
communication are addressed by sending voice feature (cepstral coefficients) instead 
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of raw sample. This scheme is to reap the advantages of reducing the transmission 
time and dependency of the data on communication channel, together with no loss of 
packet.  
In Chapters 6, the performance of this multibiometric cryptosystem to implement 
secure and real time wireless communication has been assessed. The medium of study 
for this purpose included Wi-Fi, 3G, and WiMAX. Finally, as indicated by simulation 
study for each phase and experimental study of the whole system, this multibiometric 
cryptosystem can be applied in real time for all types of mentioned wireless networks. 
7.1 Achievements 
The main aim of this research was the development and investigation of the 
multibiometric cryptosystem as access control for secure wireless communication. In 
order to achieve this, related literature concerning feasible multibiometric application 
in wireless system that yield maximum security was reviewed in depth. The problem 
was however that wireless networks regardless of whether they are based on WiMAX 
or Wi-Fi, are inherently less secure than wired counterparts due to lack of physical 
infrastructure. With the main concern being how to provide access only to authorized 
users, this time literature concerning the limitations and merits of fingerprint and 
voice recognition has been reviewed as a way of securing wireless networks. It was 
concluded that there are two bottlenecks to employ these biometric traits in wireless 
application. First, there is the dependence of data on the quality of communication 
channel, transcoding, transmission errors, and possibility of impostors’ hack in voice 
recognition. Second, although the fingerprint authentication system presents certain 
advantages from the protection viewpoint, it is from the enrolment to the verification 
level susceptible to various types of threats and attacks including fake finger attacks, 
Trojan horse attacks and replay attacks. Therefore providing the advanced algorithms 
to deal with this intolerability against spoofing and cover the limitations of these 
techniques in wireless application remains an issue of concern. In order to address 
these issues and improve the accuracy of the whole system, the following steps have 
been accomplished:  
• A compatible multibiometric system based on combining the fingerprint 
authentication with that of voice recognition as access control for secure 
wireless communication system has been introduced. Fingerprint and voice 
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recognition were selected due to their feasibility, high balance of all the 
desirable properties, high performance, and accuracy. 
• The possible limitation of fingerprint and voice recognition in wireless 
communication has been investigated and multibiometric cryptosystem was 
proposed and developed to address these limitations based on the 
watermarking of the enhanced fingerprint with the same text, which is used as 
text-dependent speaker recognition. 
• A novel method for enhancement of fingerprint image has been proposed by 
means of eliminating the artificial induced boundaries, precise background 
omission; avoid oversaturation of the image in homogeneous areas, with no 
intermediate filtering and computational complexity. In order to eliminate the 
induced boundaries, the CLAHE technique was employed. ‘Clip Limit’ was 
then applied in order to avoid oversaturation of the image in homogeneous 
areas. Subsequently, the image was disintegrated into an array of distinct 
blocks and the discrimination of the blocks has been obtained by computing 
the standard deviation of the matrix elements to remove the image 
background. Once the boundary for the region of interest was obtained, a new 
modified thinning method using sliding neighborhood processing is applied to 
clarify the endpoints and the bifurcations in each specific pixel. In contrast to 
other thinning algorithms, the proposed approach does not require any 
intermediate filtering and lead to a substantial reduction of the computational 
complexity. The analysis of the proposed fingerprint image enhancement and 
its possible advantages has been carried out through a simulated investigation.   
• In order to implement fingerprint watermarking, i.e. incorporating the 
memorable word as a watermark message into fingerprint image, an algorithm 
was developed. In the watermark embedding stage, firstly, presented 
memorable world by the user was converted to the image. In a second step, 
two-dimensional wavelet (DWT2) was applied to the original fingerprint 
image and transformed image from the text. This was carried out in order to 
decompose both images into low-pass subband and high-pass subbands. 
Finally, after embedding watermark coefficients to the most significant 
coefficients at the low and high frequency bands, of the discrete wavelet 
transform of an enhanced fingerprint image, the watermarked fingerprint 
image has been reconstructed by using inverse discrete two-dimensional 
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wavelet transform (IDWT2). In the watermark extraction stage, the 
memorable word has been used to verify the integrity of the watermarked 
fingerprint image by the process of detection. 
• The performance of multibiometric security and proposed system has been 
assessed in real time wireless communication systems and Wi-Fi, 3G, and 
WiMAX platforms were investigated as end-to-end communication channels.  
The main goal of this thesis was to design a multibiometric system, which is capable 
of achieving a fully automatic positive personal identification with a high level of 
confidence over wireless channels. The author has developed a prototype 
multibiometric cryptosystem system as access control for secure wireless 
communication. Although, the main focus was designated to address the limitations of 
these two biometric traits in wireless communication, the whole system was developed 
and the performance proved to be acceptable. The reliability of this approach needs to 
be tested against a large database for any modifications to be made respectively. If 
proven commercially reliable, this system can be employed in wireless devices to 
provide access to authorized users. Such a system when fully commercialized could 
replace PIN or ID card as a way of authentication in any feasible application (e.g. 
commercial and health care environments). Nowadays various types of attacks at and 
interceptions into wireless communication in sensitive areas, such as airports and 
nuclear sites, have raised the necessity for such systems to protect the digital voice 
communications as well as access control. In addition, by using the authorized wireless 
devices such as mobile phones, many telephone calls, and delays could be eliminated. 
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
In this thesis, the author discussed the limitations of current fingerprint and voice 
recognition approaches in wireless communication and some possible solutions 
through the proposed challenge/response technique. Although, the presented results 
through the simulation and experimental study was able to assess an acceptable 
performance of this system over wireless channel, number of problems still need to be 
resolved to make this more effective. The possible improvements have been identified 
as follows:  
• As detailed in Chapter 3, some of the speaker recognition limitations in 
wireless communication have been addressed by sending voice features 
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(cepstrum coefficients) instead of raw sample. However, many approaches 
have been proposed in the literature for voice feature extraction and their 
results can only be loosely compared because of their evaluations not being 
performed under identical conditions. As a result, more evaluations, and 
comparison, are necessary to achieve more accurate voice features as future 
work.   
• As alternative to the proposed watermarking algorithm, there is the possibility 
of using the voice feature as key to encrypt the fingerprint image. However, the 
vector should be unique, if not; it will cause the false acceptance for the 
imposter. On the other hand, re-extracting the vector is difficult in speaker 
recognition; therefore, these issues can be explored as the next challenge for 
this research. 
• In general, the main goal in fingerprint feature extraction is extracting as many 
as possible, true minutiae and avoiding any possible false minutiae. This will 
become the bottleneck when the image has very poor quality. The author’s 
enhancement algorithm based on a new methodology has allowed superior 
performances, and possible advantages were discussed in Chapter 6. 
Nevertheless, comparison with other enhancement algorithms can be 
implemented in order to enable a discussion of whether or not; these proposed 
techniques have better performances in terms of detecting minutiae points and 
elapsed time. 
• The main concentration of this thesis was designated to address the security 
and feasibility of multibiometric technique over wireless communication. In 
this report, solutions to overcome such problems are offered and amongst the 
suggested solutions was tried to choose the best one. Performance 
improvement of the proposed system can be achieved by incorporating the 
accurate (proper) matching techniques for fingerprint and voice recognition. 
Although, to limit the concentration to the scope of this thesis, this scheme was 
not investigated, finding out the appropriate matching technique is ideal for 
further work. 
• Despite the fact that some of the fusion techniques proved efficient in 
improving the classification performance, there is no consensus on the best 
fusion technique. For this reason, further investigation (in terms of 
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performance disparity and correlation between sources) based on the suggested 
multibiometric cryptosystem and related expert of two selected biometric traits 
(voice and fingerprint) is essential. Nonetheless, accuracy of the whole system 
definitely can be improved using the appropriate fusion techniques to achieve 
results that are more reliable.   
• Although the main aim of this research was to develop and investigate the 
multibiometric (fingerprint and voice recognition) cryptosystem, such a 
proposed system has the capability to take advantage of integrating the 
password as well due to the already usage of the text as requested challenge. 
Therefore, this capability can be investigated as the next step of this research. 
• It is imperative to study the engineering and legal aspects of the proposed 
system in real world applications (e.g. E-Commerce), before any deployment 
of such system. 
• Although, the developed integrated system has been simulated through 
wireless channel and simple test has been performed to validate its capability, 
full evaluation based on the requirement of each specific application is 
necessary. 
• Finally, more validation tests on the robustness of proposed watermarking 
technique are necessary against various kinds of attacks.  
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